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( ..- PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
Summer list 17, sheet 1 
No. 79-1583 Cert to CADC(Bazelon,Tamm,Robinson) 
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA 
v. 
MARSHALL (Sec'y of Labor) Federal/Civil Timely 
Please see Preliminary Memorandum in No. 79-1429, American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Marshall. 
I would hold this case for Republic Steel Corp. v. ·OSHA, 
No. 78-918, aAd American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 
No. 78-919. 
The SG has filed a response in which the AFL-CIO and the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union concur. 




MARSHALL (Sec'y of Labor) 
No. 79-1583 








SUMMARY: The cotton industry attacks OSHA standards for 
permissible levels of cotton dust in workplaces on several 
grounds, one of which, what OSHA must show to establish that 
its standards are "feasible", is an issue pending before this 
Court in cases to be argued during the 1980 Term. 
FACTS: Section 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 authorizes the Secretary of Labor, after notice 
and opportunity to comment·, to establish mandatory national 
standards governing health arid safety in the workplace. 29 USC 
§ 655 (b). ~ provides in p.ert,inent part: f"' 6(f)~ 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with 
toxic materials ~r harmful physical agents under this 
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the 
best available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity even 
r if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt 
with by such standard for the period of his working life. 
[emphasis supplied] 
Cotton dust is not a carcinogen, but exposure to the dust --
for sustained periods causes respiratory problems and has been 
specifically linked to ~:t;i= ~, a 
debilitating disease which ~s to permanent lung damage. 
Exposure to cotton dust was one of the expressly-recognized l ~­
health hazards that provoked passage of the Act. 
In 1978, Jollowing publication of a proposed standard, a 
series of public hearings, and submissions of written data and 
comments from interested parties, the Secretary issued final 
standards restricting the amount of cotton dust allowable in 
the air of workplaces in the cotton industry. The standards 





C.F.R. § 1910.1043(f) (2) (v)] requiring that, where certain ~ ~ 
an employee certified by a _ - ~~~~ levels of exposure are exceeded, 
\\ ~. -.... J:;,.y. physician as 16nable to wear a respirator may transfer wi ~hout
1 
--- A. • 1.~1'1A ~I loss of pay to any other position in the company that is ~,,  
available and that has an exposure level below the designated 
level. 
Pursuant to 29 USC§ 655(f) (allowing pre-en~orcement 
~ 
w;b · ~tf{ 
judicial review), 
.fl ,, 
the standards were attacked as infeasible by ---------
representatives of the cotton textile industry and of 
-nontextile industries including the petrs Cotton Warehouse 
Ass'n and American Cotton Shippers Ass'n. Two minor aspects of 
the standards were also challenged b~ployee unions as too 
lax. 
HOLDING BELOW: CADC upheld the standards except for their 
~--~-~ 
application to the cottonseed oil industry. The court first 
four 
, .... 
held that the proper standard of review for notice-and-comment ~~v~ 
rulemaking under the Act is the test of "sub~ence , )urnii/ ~ 
~
on the record considered as a whole," 29 usc § 655 (f), rather  
than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard applicable to '1 ~ 
informal rulemaking. O
.,.__f /.-A.~ ~ - .. - . - _, .. 
Citing two prior concurring opinions ---~ 
Judge Bazelon, however, theCA stressed that it would not 
resolve controversies over technical data. 
On the merits, (1) the CA rejected industry challenges to 
the feasibility of the exposure level as applied to the latter 
stages of textile production and to the~-year deadline for 
compliance. The CA noted evidence that many employers were 
already in compliance with the standards and held that while 




improved with more extensive studies, § 6(b) (5) requires the 
agency to develop standards based upon "the best available 
evidence" (emphasis supplied by CA) and that standard had been 
satisfied. 
(2)T~A also rejected the industry petrs' claims that the 
agency's $550 million figure grossly understated the actual 
capital costs required in order for the industry· to comply with 
the standard and that the true cost was unreasonable because it 
would drive many companies out of business. The CA looked to 
the agency's analysis of two cost estimates (one by the 
agency's own economic feasibility contractor) and to the 
agency's stated reasons for finding both of them excessive, 
and found the analysis reasonable. The CA then noted that the - l 
agency "had evidence in its record that~h: ind-ustr~ oul~ ?e 
able to pass compliance costs on to consumers," citing as 
"evidence" the fact that one cost consultant had a s sumed that 
costs of compliance would be passed on, and added that even if 
a few firms are forced to shut down, that would not make the 
standard economically infeasible; the agency had expressly 
concluded that "the industry as a whole will not be threatened 
~
by the capital requirements of the regulation." The CA found 
significant the fact that the employee unions, by supporting -
the agency on the economic feasibility issue, had rejected the 
claim that the standards threatened the industry's survival. 
(3) The CA also rejected industry's claim that the standard 
was invalid because no cost-benefit analysis had been 
conducted. The CA noted that other statutory schemes such as 




does not, and took the view that Congress itself had 
undertaken a cost-benefit analysis totally ih favor of 
preventing "material impairment of health or functional 
capacity" of employees. The CA reasoned that under Vermont 
Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
US 519, 524 (1978), a court may not require an agency to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis unless the agency or Congress 
officially requires this procedure. 
(4) The CA also rejected a challenge to the permissible-
exposure-level for the non-textile industries covered by the 
standard. 1 The CA recognized that the types of dust may 
differ between textile and nontextile industries and that 
"health effects in the nontextile industries appear to be less 
prevalent and less severe than in the textile mills", but 
( noted that the agency had concluded that nontextile workers 
still "run the risk" of material health impairment. The CA 
concluded: 
OSHA thus explained the evidence it used, the reasons for 
its conclusions, and its responses to the industries' 
evidence and objections. When agencies are entrusted with 
regulating risks on the frontiers of scientific and medical 
knowledge, we cannot ask for more. 
(5) The CA upheld the medical transfer and wage guarantee 
provisions, reasoning that absent such provisions, employees 
"may refrain from disclosing actual health impairments from the 
dust exposure" and holding that OSHA is authorized to guard 
against such problems. 
1. The CA made an exception for the cottonseed oil industry, 
as to which the court found that the record did not adequately 
establish economic feasibility of the standard. The industry 
had estimated that the standard would shut down 52% of its 




The CA denied rehearing en bane, but Judge MacKinnon would 
have held resolution of the cost-benefit question for this 
Court's opinion in the benzene case, Industrial Union Dep't, 
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No. 78-911 (decided 7/2/80). 
CONTENTIONS: Separate cert petns attacking theCA's 
decision have been filed by (1) the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and 13 textile manufacturers, 
(2) the National Cotton Council of America (NCCA), and (3) the 
Cotton Warehouse Association (CWA) and the American Cotton 
Shippers Association (ACSA). These petns were all filed before 
this Court's decision of the benzene case, and all petrs 
assert a conflict with the decision of the lower court in the 
benzene case. 
/ 
(1) ATMI (represented by Robert Bork) asserts a conflict in 
the CAs as to what showing OSHA must make in order to establish 
that its standards are "feasible" within the meaning of the 
statute. The CA's decision means that the agency need only 
have concluded that the entire industry will not be put out of 
business. CAS has read it to require OSHA to demonstrate that 
the standard will not cause widespread busines~ failure and 
consequent unemployment. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Dep't 
of Labor, 489 F2d 120,130 (CAS 1974). CA6 and CA7 have read 
it to require a showing that the benefits of a standard · are 
proportionate to its costs. RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 
594 F2d 566,573 (CA6 1979); Turner Co. v. Secretar y of Labor, 
561 F2d 82,85 (CA7 1977). The approach of CA6 and CA7 is 
correct; otherwise there would be an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority. National Cable Television v. United 
. . 
- 7 -
States, 415 US 336,342 (1974) • 
(2) In this case, CADC has finally surrendered to the 
"Bazelon heterodoxy", repeatedly condemned by Judge Leventhal 
and by Professor K.C. Davis for its excessive deference to 
administrative agencies. The court abdicated its judicial 
review function by requiring only that the agency have 
articulated reasons for its conclusions. The CA opinion 
contains ludicrous examples of deference, such as the 
treatment of a consultant's assumption as "evidence". 
(3) The wage-guarantee provisions exceed OSHA's statutory 
authority. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 48 USLW 4189 (US 
2/26/80) (upholding regulation allowing an employee to refuse to 
work when he has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury, 
but noting congressional rejection of a "strike with pay" 
provision and stressing that the regulation does not require 
pay for work not done). 
NCCA, identifying itself as a "supplemental petitioner 
solely on matters of cost and impact", argues that substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole does not support the OSHA 
finding that the standard is economically feasible. 
CWA and ACSA, the trade associations respectively for the 
cotton warehouse industry and for cotton classing offices, 
argue that the CA improperly failed to require an OSHA finding 
of "material" health impairment in those industries. The 
court's standard of "risk" of illness is insufficient. There 
is a lack of medical evidence indicating the existence of 
material health hazards in warehouses and an absence of any 





dust encountered in these places is qualitatively different 
from that in textile plants: it is less respirable. It was 
improper to allow evidence from the "unrelated" textile 
industry to override the absence of evidence pertaining 
directly to~ industries. 
Th~ t e Court to · h~ l~ Nos. 79-1429 (ATMI) and 0__) 
79-1583 (NCCA} for Republic Steel Corp. v. OSHA, No. 78-918, 
and American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, No. 78-919 
(cert. granted, 7/2/80}. In these cases, the Court will 
consider the meaning of the word "feasible" in § 6 (b) (5} of 
OSHA and the standard of judicial review applicable to OSHA 
"feasibility" determinations. 
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO 
( v. American Petroleum Institute, No. 78-911 (7/2/80}. He 
points out that the Secretary has volunteered to reconsider the 
standards for cotton warehouses and classing offices. 45 Fed. 
Reg. 50328-29 (7/29/80}. 
The employee-union resps have concurred by letter in these 
~~.........:.---~~ 
recommendations of the SG. 
With respect to the wage-guarantee provision, the SG 
stresses that the Act authorizes the Secretary to require 
"practices, means, methods, operations, or processes [that 
are] reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment" [29 USC § 652(8}] and that wage 
guarantees are included "practices", "means", or "methods". 
DISCUSSION: The SG's recommended disposition appears 




in§ 6(b) (5) is before this Court in the pending coke-oven 
emissions cases, and this Court's resolution of the standard 
of review issue in those cases will presumably cast light on 
the merits of ATMI's "Bazelon heterodoxy" argument in the OSHA 
context. 
The ~ge guarantee issue presents an important question, 
going far beyond the W'hirlpool case, and theCA's resolution 
of the issue is dubious. 
I would hold Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583 for Nos. 78-918 and 
78-919, with a view toward ultimately granting cert on the 
wage-guarantee issue. I would GVR No. 79-1789 in light of 
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No. 78-911. 
The SG has filed a response in which the AFL-CIO and the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union concur. 
8/6/80 Coleman Opn in Appendix 
~r,?7-c-~~ 
~ s-c-
G~~ ~ l· 
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Summer list 17, sheet 1 ert to CADC 
No. 79-1429 ~ 
(Bazelon, Tamm, Robinson) 
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, et al. 
v. 
MARSHALL [U.S. Secretary of Labor] 
No. 79-1583 ~ 
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA 
v. 
MARSHALL 
No. 79-1789 b--1/cl- f< ~~ ~ 
COTTON WAREHOUSE ASS'N, et al. 
v. 
MARSHALL Federal/Civil Timely 
(e xt'n in 79-1789) 
_ () . ~~~~~ \~se ~~ ~ ~~ 
~d he ~ ~r \~\~~ a{ ~~ 
<.; r~b,. A gl't!Mk ~5 ~ro~;de J aX- leasf- b>t tl.o 
> 
- 2 -
The Preliminary Memorandum for these curve-lined cases suggest e d 
•: 
that 79-1429 and 79-1583 be held for the OSHA coke oven cases [No. 
78-918, Republic Steel Corp. v. OSHA; and No. 78-919, American Iron & 
Steel Institute v. OSHA]. That option is no longer available because ---------the writs in coke ovens have just been dismissed under Rule 53. 
The SG's response with respec~ t~a~ filed after 
cert was granted in coke ovens, atgued only for a ~d. Accordingly, -the Court may wish to call for a supplemental response. 
Alternatively, the Court should consider a grant on two questions 
(restated here): (1) whether' the CA correctly interpreted the 
statutory requirement that OSHA standards be "feasible"; (2) whether 
the CA applied a correct standard of review. These questions encompass 
issues 1, 2, and 3 in petition 79-1429 1 and both questions in 
79-1583. They are important, they were left open in last term's 
and they are identical to issues that would have been benzene case, --.......,..... 
~-------~--------------------------------~ presented in the coke oven cases. 
Also, and without any further response from the SG, the wage 
guarantee issue (Issue 4 in No. 79-1429) appears to be independently 
certworthy. 
The coke ovens development appears not to affect No. 79-1789, in 
which OSHA concedes that a GVR is warranted in light of benzene. 
9/18/80 Coleman Opn in Appendix 
of No. 79-1429 
1. The "questions presented" in 79-1429 are incredibly biased and it 
would be confusing to grant on the issues as stated there. The Court 
may want to li~~~~nt to the questions presented in 79-1583, 
which are more neutrally-stated. 
,, ' 
September 29, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced . ............... , 19 . . . 
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N OT VOTI NG 
(\ ... ~ '? Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <:J': ;;;:~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ........ ............. ... . 
Brennan, J ..................... ~ ... ~ . .. ~~~ . J .. ~'f. ."?~ . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... ..... . 
Stewart, J ..................... ~. . . . . .... ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .. . .......... . . .. . .. . 
White, J....... . .... .. .. . ·:/· . ~B.~ L, .. 2..-. ~A~ ... ............ ... .......... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 
Blackmun, J ....................... V · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·; 1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Powell, J . .............. ..... . V. .... ... ~~~ .. J. ·J· ~.c~ . ':t .... .......................... . . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . V. . . . . . . . G~ :S . .. I . 1: . ~ . . . . . . . . . . .......... . ...... . ........ . 
Stevens, J . . .... . ... . .. . . ... . .. V . . . . . . .. ~~ ~· .. . / .f .. k . rt: 4~ . .. . ......................... .. 
• • • • • • • 0 0 • • • ••• 0 ••••• • • ••• 0. 0 •• •••••••• 0 •••••• •••••••••••• • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
September 29, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
NATL. COTTON COUNCIL, ETC. 
vs. 
MARSHALL, SEC. LABOR 





Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
Marshall, J . ......................... . 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J ........................... . 
Rehnquist, J ........... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMEN'Jc 










• • • • 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 0 0 •• •• 0 ••••• 0 0 • ••• 0 ••• 0 •••• 0. 0 •• 0 •• •• 0 ••••• 0 ••••• 0 • •••••••••• 
MEMO TO FILE 
lfp/ss 1/15/81 
79-1419 American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Marshall 1.' 
When I got into the briefs on this case, it 
occurred to me that possibly the Ethyl Corporation was 
interested in the case. There were two reasons for this 
thought. This is the "cotton dust" case, and one of the 
main issues is whether under OSHA the relationship between 
benefit and cost of complying with regulations must be 
considered a~firmatively in the adoption of a regulations. 
Then, in loo~ the amici briefs, one is fil;{ed by an 
association that listed its 137 members. It members are 
corporations, one of which is Ethyl. 
I called Larry Blanchard, Vice Chairman of the 
Board and the officer of the corporation who has followed 
the regulatory problems of the company more closely than 
anyone else. Larry is a former partner of mine at Hunton & 
Williams, and we talked frankly. He did not even know the 
"cotton dust" case was in our Court, nor did he know that an 
association of which Ethyl was a member had a filed a brief. 
I advised Larry that at least some of the briefs refer to 
the "lead cases" as also presenting the cost/benefit 
question. I stayed out of the lead cases because Ethyl - as 
one of the end product users of lead - might have an 






the present cotton dust case, and he sees no reason why I 
should disqualify. 
Incidentally, he said that the lead case in which 
Ethyl was or may have been interested, has been denied by 
this Court. As I have not followed these cases, I do not 
know what the status is. In any event, Larry also said that 
Ethyl - in his view - has lost all of its battles and is 
complying with OSHA's regulations. He also noted that the 
cost/benefit question arguably may arise in almost every 
OSHA regulation controversy. Thus, unless a judge must 
disqualify himself whenever an issue may affect industry in 
general, he could not own any securities. Neither the 
statute nor the Code of Ethics requires such a result. 
Before calling Larry, I spoke to Justice Stewart, 
and discussed this question with him, pointing out that an 
amicus brief probably included corporations in which he or 
~ 
his family trusts~own shares. Potter reminded me that the 
Court has consistently followed the policy that Justices do 
not disqualify on account of amici briefs. Any other rule, 
would enable interested persons to manipulate the 
disqualification of Justices. Nor did Justice Stewart think 
the possible similarity of the wage/benefit question arising 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 19, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1429, ATMI v. Marshall [the "Cotton Dust" case] 
Question Presented 
The principal question is whether OSHA, before 
setting a limit on workers' exposure to a toxic substance, must 
establish that the benefits of that limit exceed the costs that 
will be incurred to achieve it. The second question is whether 
OSHA has statutory authority to require by rulemak ing that 
employers in the cotton industry institute certain wage-




This is one of several recent cases involving the 
costs and benefits of environmental and job-safety laws. Th~s 
case, like the Benzene case from last Term, involves OSHA's 
authority under its Act to set standards for worker exposure to 
toxic substances. It is instructive briefly to describe the 
issues before the Court in Benzene. 
The chemical benzene is a carcinogen. OSHA took the 
point of view that any exposure to a carcinogen is harmful, and 
such exposure therefore should be made limited. OSHA claimed 
its authority to do so under section 6(b) (5) of the Act, which 
provides: 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards 
dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, 
shall set the standard which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, 
on the basis of the best available 
evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional 
capacity even if such employee has regular 
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such 
standard for the period of his working 
life. 
The reference to the term "standard" apparently incorporates by 
reference§ 3(8) of the Act, which defines "standard" as 
conditions .•• or •.. practices, means, 
methods, operations, or processes, 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment. 
The Secretary took the position that there is no safe 
exposure level to a carcinogen such as benzene. He thought, 
therefore, the § 6 (b) ( 5) required him to set an exposure limit 
3. 
at the lowest level that would not impair the viability of the 
industry. That level, he thought, was 1 part per million 
(ppm) . 1· 
In reviewing this standard, the Court was badly 
fragmented. Justice Stevens wrote for three justices reversing 
and remanding. You joined parts of his opinion and also wrote 
separately. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result. Four 
justices joined a dissenting opinion. 
The plurality held that § 3 (8) and § 6 (b) (5) should 
be read in tandem. Section 3 (8) requires standards that are 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment." According to the plurality, however, 
"'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.'" Slip op. at 31. 
There are many activities that we engage in every day that 
entail some risk, but that nevertheless are considered "safe." 
Id. According to the plurality, therefore, the threshold 
requirement of § 3 (8) is to show that, at prevailing exposure 
levels, the "place of employment is unsafe," id. at 3 2, by 
presenting a "significant" risk of health impairment, id. at 
41. On the record in this case, the plurality concluded that 
the Secretary had not done so. His assumption was that any 
exposure to a carcinogen was harmful and subject to regulation. 
The plurality, by imposing a threshold test of the significance 
of risk, required the Secretary to document his assumption. 
Because the Secretary had failed to adduce evidence meeting the 
threshold test, the plurality did not need to reach the more 
4. 
difficult question of whether the Secretary had to undertake 
"cost-benefit analysis." 
You joined parts of the plurality opinion and wrote a 
short opinion of your own. In it, you noted that OSHA's 
"fallback" position was that substantial evidence supported the 
1 ppm standard even under the plurality's test. You undertook 
to respond to OSHA's alternative position. "[A]ssum[ing] that 
OSHA properly met this burden," you concluded that "the statute 
also requires the agency to determine that the economic effects 
.-,.._...- -.._.~ '-"--............. ~ 
of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the expec 
benefits. An occupational health standard is neither -----,-. 
'reasonably necessary' nor 'feasible,' as required by statute ., 
if it calls for expenditures wholly disproportionate to the 
expected health and safety benefits." Id. at 4-5 (Powell, J., 
concurring). You noted that "[t]he cost of complying with a 
standard may be 'bearable' and still not reasonably related to 
the benefits expected. A manufacturing company, for example, 
may have financial resources that enable it to pay the OSHA-
ordered costs. But expenditures for unproductive purposes may 
limit seriously its financial ability to remain competitive and 
provide jobs." Id. at 5 n. 4; see also id. at 6 & n.6, 7. 
Moreoever, if economic considerations are ignored, OSHA's 
reading of the statute would result in misallocation of 
resources because the industry would spend too much money to 
eliminate one risk, and not have enough left to try to 
eliminate some other one. In sum, the implication of your 
opinion is that Congress could not possibly have wanted OSHA to 
.... 
50 
consider costs to ensure that entire industries would not be 
ruined, but to ignore costs when the level of regulation is 
slightly less stringent. See id. at 4-7. "There can be litt~e 
doubt that Congress intended OSHA to balance reasonably the 
societal interest in health and safety with the often 
conflicting goal or maintaining a strong national economy." 
Id. at 6 n.6. 
Discussion 
In this case, as you know, OSHA set an exposure 
standard of 200 micrograms of cotton dust per cubic meter. For 
... 
"slashing and weaving" aspects of the textile industry, OSHA 
set the standard at 750 mcgs/cu m. OSHA did so because it 
believed that a stricter standard, although desirable, would 
not be technologically "fea-sible" because it would ruin the 
industry. The question is whether OSHA should have set even a 
higher standard in light of the substantial costs of reaching 
the 200/750 standard. Your opinion in Benzene in dictum 
anticipated this crucial issue in the Cotton Dust case. 
A. Petrs' Arguments 
1. Cost Benefit Analysis. OSHA's construction of 
the statute treats costs as totally irrelevant until they reach 
the point at which the standard, if implemented, would destroy 
an entire industry. This cannot be the law. OSHA should have 
to make a responsible prediction, supported by substantial 
evidence, of the economic impact of its standard, and to 
6. 
explain why it believes that a standard having such a burden is 
worthwhile. 
OSHA seems to believe that Congress left it free to 
impose enormously costly requirements in the context of a 
single health hazard, as long as compliance with that single 
standard does not ruin the industry. In Benzene, the plurality 
sought not to "give the Secretary the unprecedented power over 
American industry that would result" if he could try to require 
a risk-free workplace. But the plurality's threshold 
requirement that OSHA only eliminate "significant health 
risk[s)" only does half the job. There may be significant 
health risks that cannot prudently be avoided. Put another 
way, there may be ways of achieving almost as much health 
l 
OSHA violated ti/'ft4u./ benefit at a drastically reduced cost. 
the statute in two ways. it failed to make a~ 
----------------------~~ 
responsible cost estimate. The costs of OSHA's regulation are 
in dispute. One [the RTI estimate] concluded that the standard 
would cost $1.1 billion. OSHA rejected this estimate, and 
opted for a $550 million estimate [Hocutt-Thomas]. But this 
estimate was not based on the exposure standard eventually 
adopted, but rather on a less stringent one. Thus, OSHA 
~ - ......__._ -
inexplicably based its cost estimate on a study that did not 
even purport to measure the cost of the standards OSHA 
eventually adopted. To be sure, OSHA speculated that the 
Hocutt-Thomas estimate contained biases (failure to subtract 
for new technology and retrofitting costs) that perhaps made 
the estimate too large. But only by the most remarkable 
7. 
coincidence would the amount of the overstatement be equal to 
the additional costs required to attain the more stringent 
standards that OSHA actually adopted. Thus, OSHA failed ev~n 
to produce a cost estimate that could survive the threshold 
duty, established by the plurality in Benzene, to show that the 
total cost would not bankrupt the entire industry. As noted, 
its cost date was flawed. Moreoever, its assumption that 
increased costs could be "passed through" to consumers ignored 
the fact that constraints imposed by foreign competition made 
any passing-through difficult. 
~even if ~SHA did meet its threshold burden, 
the agency failed to explain why the costs of its standards 
were justified in light of their benefits. The mere fact that 
----------~--
compliance costs are not great enough to destroy an entire 
industry does not mean that a standard comports with the 
requirements of the Act. On the contrary, "Congress did not 
intend OSHA to reduce each signficant hazard without regard to 
economic consequences . short of serious dislocation." 
Benzene, slip op. at 5-6 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). OSHA's 
standards may require only such conditions, practices, and 
operations as are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment." 
§ 3(8) of the Act. In sum, the standard setting provisions of 
§§ 3 (8) and 6 (b) (5) are qualified and relative in nature. 
The legislative history confirms this view. Senator 
Javits, the author of the Administration's original bill, took 
the position that OSHA standards should be "reasonable" and 
.. 
8. 
"practical" as well as technologically achievable. The Senate 
Committee, although rejecting Javits' plan to establish 1' an 
independent review board, agreed that the standards under § 6 
should be "feasible requirements." The addition of that term 
I 
into § 6(b) (5) satisfied Senator Javits. Furthermore, the 
Senate Committee also substituted the word "material" for "any" 
impairment of health. This, too, was designed to produce a 
"balanced" bill, so that OSHA could not try to establish a 
risk-free utopia regardless of costs. 
This concern also was demonstrated in the compromises 
in the drafting of the judicial review sections of the bill. 
Congress adopted a hybrid procedure that permitted informal 
rulemaking but required that a reviewing court look for 
"substantial evidence on the record as a whole" rather than the 
more deferential review for "arbitrary and capricious" 
behavior. In sum, it is clear that Congress believed it was 
enacting a "fair and reasonable bill that balanced the needs of .....__ ~ ~._.... ~
workers and industry." 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 248. --Petrs thus believe that OSHA must show that its 
standards address significant health risks or material health 
impairments, and that the standard is expected to achieve a 
significant reduction of that risk. According to petrs, 
whether a reduction in risk is significant depends on the costs 
necessary to achieve it. Petrs try to make clear, however, 
that they do not expect OSHA to engage in a rigidly formal 
cost-benefit calculation that places a dollar value on employee 




alternative courses of action to see whether society's limited 
industrial-hygiene resources are not being squandered ' or 
misallocated. It is, of course, up to OSHA to make this 
assessment in the first instance, Benzene, supra, at 7-8 n. 8 
(Powell, J., concurring), subject to judicial review. Even 
though a court might well be reluctant to disturb the agency's 
judgment, forcing it to identify and weigh the factors will 
have a salutary effect on the agency's decisionmaking process. 
Petrs note that most courts facing OSHA cases have 
required some analysis along these lines. See cases cited in 
briefs. Petrs also point out that other statutes with similar 
language have been construed similarly. ~ ~ . . -
OSHA's effort in this case fails because it did not 
assess the benefits of its standards in light of the costs 
required to achieve them. OSHA did not seriously analyze the 
impact that the industry's proposed program (which involved 
medical surveillance coupled with respirator use and employee 
transfers) would have. Moreoever, OSHA did not differentiate 
between the varying grades and symptoms of byssinosjs in 
.... 
evaluating the benefits of its standards. Most of the grades 
of byssinosis are reversible _____ __... if monitored. OSHA, however, 
treated grade 1/2 byssinosis which is simply infrequent 
chest tightness -- as a grave harm. It is not. Cotton dust is 
not a carcinogen like benzene. 
2. Wage-Maintenance Programs. A separate issue 
involves OSHA imposition of a wage-maintenance program. Under 
OSHA's rules, respirators must be provided and used during the 
\~ 
10. 
transition period before the new rule is fully in effect. With 
this requirement petrs have no quarrel. Pursuant to section 
(f) (2) (v) of the rule, however, employees unable to u~e 
respirators (because of facial configuration, for example) must 
be given an opportunity to transfer to another, safer, job. 
Such transfers may be made even though the employee shows no 
symptom of byssinosis. Moreoever, employers must ensure that 
such employees suffer no loss of earnings. 
Petrs contends that OSHA doesn't have the authority 
to do this. The Act contains no express grant of authority for 
this requirement. The CA concluded that the provision was 
impliedly authorized by section 3 (8) of the Act as a measure 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment and places of employment." Petrs contend 
this is not correct. The CA' s view would invest OSHA with 
virtually limitless authority to impose almost any imaginable 
requirement arguably related to health, such as health 
insurance, food stamps, or health spa retreats. In the course 
of debate on the Act, Congress rejected a provision that would 
have permitted an employee to "strike with pay" at his own 
initiative to avoid a hazardous workplace. As the Court noted 
in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 u.s. 1, 17-80 (1980), 
Congress did not want to let employees obtain their regular 
salary for doing no work. Thus, Congress must have intended 
that OSHA not accomplish by rule what Congress itself was 
unwilling to do by statute. Finally, petrs point out that 
Congress in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 
11. 
authorized the agency to promulgate wage protection 
regulations. Congress thus knew how to write such matters in~o 
the law. That Congress chose one year later not to do so in 
this context suggests that OSHA cannot do it by regulation. 
B. Resps' Arguments 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis. The Cotton Dust standard 
plainly meets the threshold inquiry, established by the Benzene 
plurality, that the prior standard represent a significant risk 
of material health impairment. The previous standard was 
approximately roughly 500 to 1000 mcg/cu m. Under this old 
standard, as the agency found, one worker in four will contract 
some grade of byssinos i~. One in 15 risks a case of grade 2 
....... ~ 
byssinosis. One in 1000 risks a grade 3 case of the disease. 
(flA-L~ I 
Under the industry's propo~al, a 26% ris~ of ~ 
.:.-
byssinosis would remain. The Secretary found this to be 
unacceptable. There is n9 bright line separating the mjJd and 
chronic forms of the disease. Thus, it simply is incorrect -------... -- ------
that persons can be identified and taken off the job before 
their disease becomes irreversible. Second, even those with 
mild forms of the disease suffer material impairment. Third, 
medical surveillance (which the industry plan requires) is 
ineffective as a primary control method. Testing is not always 
accurate and workers sometimes are afraid to report symptoms. 
Fourth, there are insufficient openings for transfers for the 
number of workers that would need them under the industry plan. 
Finally, respirators simply do not always work, and many 





Under the plan as adopted, 13% of workers would incur~ -
the disease. The Secretary declined to impose a more strict 
standard because he found that doing so would severely injufi:e 
the financial health of the industry. 
If the Secretary met the threshold test established 
by the Benzene plurality , ---·rne quest ion in this case becomes 
whether the Secretary had to go farther and show somehow that 
the costs of implementing the standard are less than its 
benefits. As the CA held, Congress did not intend to impose 
such a requirement. The statute provides only that the 
standard be the one that "most adequately ensures, to the 
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, 
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health." § 
6(b) (5) of the Act (emphasis added). Thus, Congress itself has 
done the balancing. It wanted the Secretary to achieve the -------
highest level of protect ion consistent with industry health. 
The definition of "feasible" is "capable of being done." The 
word does not refer to the desirability or benefit of doing 
something, but only the capacity to do so. OSHA's task, then, 
is simple. It first determines the level or protection at 
which no worker will face a significant risk of material harm. 
Then, OSHA looks to see whether that level of protect ion is 
technologically and economically achieveable. If it is not, 
OSHA sets its standard at the level that provides the maximum 
protection consistent with industry long-term health. 
Cost-benefit analysis is simply not part of the .....___ - -------- ---inquiry. Congress envisioned no such gloss on the plain 
~ '""I 
13. 
language of the statute. Congress was determined that the 
benefits of eradicating toxic substances categorically 
outweighed the costs of doing so, provided that the indust:ay 
could survive. Senator Dominick noted that the bill required 
the "best available standards," and Congress knew that these 
requirements would impose substantial costs. Congress 
envisioned that these costs would not be avoided by variances 
or cost-benefit analysis, but rather through government loans. 
15 u.s.c. § 636(b) (5). It cannot be overemphasized that 
Congress demanded the level of protection that "most 
adequately" protects workers. § 6(b) (5) of the Act. No member 
of Congress so much as suggested that this language in the 
statute, or any other language, requires the Secretary 
undertake cost-benefit considerations. This omission "cannot 
be deemed inadvertent." Benzene, supra, at 32 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
Nothing cited by petrs 
modification of the term "any 
is to the contrary. The 
impairment" to "rna ter ial 
impairment" has nothing to do with cost benefit analysis. 
Rather, as the plurality in Benzene recognized, this change was 
directed at the threshold matter of establishing a significant 
risk of injury. Congress clearly did not want OSHA to regulate 
trifling or remote injuries such as mosquito bites. 
Petrs also exaggerate to the extent that they argue 
that OSHA intends to push industry to the brink of ruin. It is 
true that OSHA wants to set the highest possible standards. 
But these always must be consistent with the long run health of 
14. 
the industry. This is the purpose of · the "feasibility" 
requirement. In light of that requirement, the Secretary has 
construed the Act always to maintain the industry's long-rl!m 
profitability and competitiveness. In this case, for example, 
the agency modified the proposed "weaving" standard from 500 to 
750 mcgs/cu m because it was clear that the lower limit was not 
reasonable. There are at least four ways in which the 
Secretary pays attention to the danger of resource 
misallocation. First, he sets his own priorities based on the 
urgency of potential danger to workers. Second, as the Benzene 
plurarity held, he regulates only "significant risks of 
material harm." Third, he looks to see whether proposed 
alternative methods would accomplish the same result at lesser 
cost. Fourth, he gives consideration to costs in deciding how 
long the compliance period should be. The longer the period, 
the greater the possibility of inexpensive technological 
innovations and the greater the likelihood of improving 
equipment by attrition rather than by retrofit. 
In any event, it is not clear what is meant by "cost-
benefit analysis." Any such analysis necessarily must attempt 
to quantify human life. How can this be done? It essentially 
is arbitrary. Even if cost-benefit analysis means comparing 
costs against the dollar amount of preserved working capacity 
and medical bills, still the Secretary would have to make a 
prodigious undertaking. 
2. Wage-Maintenance Programs. The Secretary did not 
exceed his authority in including the medical transfer and 
15. 
income protection provisions in the cotton dust standard. 
These also are "practices, methods, operations, or processes" 
that are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide sa~.e 
or healthful employment." § 3 (8) of the Act. It will take · 
several years for the industry to comply fully with the new 
standard. These interim procedures are necessary to protect 
workers. Some employees are unable to wear respirators. They 
are entitled to preserve their wages in the meantime because 
the burden of compliance is on the industry, not the worker. 
Employees will be reluctant to report symptoms unless they are 
protected by a job-transfer or wage-maintenance option. 
Nothing in the Whirlpool case is to the contrary. 
That case involved a "strike with pay" provision. The job-
transfer provisions in this case only are applicable where a 
doctor has certified that an employee cannot wear a respirator 
and where there is an alternative job that the employee can 
perform. 
Summary 
Your opinion in Benzene seems to control the key 
issue in this case. Common sense teaches that safety costs 
money. It always is pass ible to make things more safe, but 
incremental safety gains cost money. The law of diminishing 
returns suggests that incremental safety gains are achieved 
relatively inexpensively at first, and eventually only at great 
marginal cost. OSHA construes its statute to require it to set 




cost is essentially 
16. 
In other words, under the OSHA approach, 
irrelevant until the expense becomes 
1' so 
great that the entire industry's survival is impaired. In 
Benzene, you rejected this view: Congress cannot be deemed to 
have intended OSHA to ignore the fact that, at some point, the 
marginal cost of increased safety exceeds the incremental 
increase in safety. 
The other issue in the case, pertaining to the 
income-maintenance component of the rule, is not controlled by 
your opinion in Benzene. It is close. I tend to think the 
agency has the better of that part of the argument. The 
income-maintenance provision is reasonably consistent with the 




SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 20, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1429, The Cotton Dust Cases 
In this memo, I'll try to answer some of the 
questions you raised, and also clarify some of the points that 
may have been unclear in my first memo. 
' . 
A. The Relationship Between "Feasibility" and "Cost-Benefit" 
It is vi tal to appreciate the distinction betwee~ 
examination of technological/economic feasibility and cost-
benefit analysis. OSHA concedes that it must examine the 
former; petrs would like OSHA also to perform the latter. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under § 6(b) (5) of the Act. 
Section 6(b) (5) of the Act instructs OSHA to set the standard 
at the level that "most adequately ensures, to the extent 




In OSHA's view, the feasibility provision requires 
.. -·-------.. ------------ --
onl~ that the standard be (1) technologically capable of 
-··--- -
achievement, and (2) not so high that it would "put[] 
employers out of business." ,, Industrial Union Department v. 
467, 478 (CADC 1974) (McGowan, J.). Thus, 
under OSHA view of the statute to the extent 
will be promulgated if it would ruin an 
industry. That is why the controversy over the cost estimates 
is relevant. OSHA accepted the "Hocutt-Thomas" $550 million 
estimate. In OSHA's view, the industry as a whole (although - -----------
perhaps not some weak individual companies) could pay that 
price, particularly in light of the industry's ability to "pass 
through" cost increases to consumers. [There may be problems 
with the Hocutt-Thomas estimate. See Bench Memo at 6-7.] 
In sum, under OSHA's view of the statute, the 
"feasibility" requirement of § 6(b) (5) refers only to the 







"Feasib!.lity" does not require cost-benefit 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under § 3 (8) of the Act. 
Petrs, however, suggest that cost-benefit analysis may be 
derived from § 3 (8) of the statute, which requires that a 
standard be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to promote 
safe or healthful employment." OSHA does not now contend, as 
it did in Benzene, that § 3(8) should not be construed in 
tandem with § 6 (b) (5). OSHA does contend, however, that the 
language in § 3 (8) is directed only at the threshold problem 
identified by the Benzene plurality: namely, whether the 
regulation was aimed at reducing a "significant risk of 
material harm." Plurality op. at 35. In this case, according 
to OSHA, that threshold problem is long past, because the 
agency found that its standard would demonstrably diminish the 
incidence of byssinosis. In sum, the "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate" language is relevant only to the threshold test of 
the Benzene plurality: the need to show a demonstrable risk of 
material harm. 
3. Relevance of Costs In OSHA's View. OSHA 
strenuously insists that it does not intend to drive "industry 
to the brink of ruin." There are several ways that OSHA 
considers cost without employing formal cost benefit analysis. 
Bench Memo 13-14. There are five principal ways in which cost 
is relevant to the calculus. First, OSHA always desires to 
maintain the industry's long-run profitability and 
competitiveness. In this case, for example, OSHA modified its 
4. 
original weaving standard of 500 mcgs/cu m because it was clear 
that the lower standard was not reasonable. Second, OSHA setst 
its own timetable of regulatory policies based on the urgency 
of potential danger to workers. Third, in accordance with the 
holding of the Benzene plurality, OSHA only seeks to regulate 
"significant risks of material harm." Fourth, OSHA looks to 
see whether proposed alternative methods could achieve the same 
results at less cost. Fifth, OSHA considers compliance costs 
to be relevant in deciding how long the compliance period 
should be. The longer the period, the greater the possibility 
of inexpensive technological innovations and the greater the 
likelihood of improving equipment by replacement rather than by 
retrofit. 
4. Summary of OSHA's Position on Costs. You 
inquired whether the Secretary claims authority to set 
standards "in disregard of their economic impact, with the sole 
limit being that the cost of a single standard must not be so 
great as to threaten the destruction of an entire industry." I 
think the answer to your question is a "qualified yes." As I 
have shown, OSHA does insist that neither the "feasibility" 
requirement of § 6(b) (5) nor the "reasonably necessary" -
requirement of § 3(8) requires cost-benefit analysis. See ---------------------
discussion supra and Bench Memo. It claims this authority 
because Congress wanted regulations that "most adequately" 
ensure worker health. OSHA does, however, insist that it is a 
sensible regulator. The agency considers costs in various ways 




claims that it does not understand the nature of formal cost 
benefit analysis, because that process would require setting a t 
dollar value on human life and health. See Bench Memo at 14. 
B. Findings of Fact 
Like you, I cannot find the Secretary's findings and 
conclusions in the materials that we were given. I have, 
however, studied theCA opinion in some detail. It referred to 
the record quite frequently and did not reject any conclusion 
reached by the agency. 
1. Evidence Supporting OSHA's Standards. The CA 
noted that the agency proposed to adopt, and after hearing 
evidence did adopt, a "dust control strategy." This approach 
requires equipment modifications to keep the dust level low. 
The industry, by contrast, proposed an alternative involving 
medical surveillance, the use of respirators, and job 
transfers. 
The CA found that, at least in its chronic stages, 
byssinosis is a material health hazard. Pet. App. 50-51 n.83. 
The causal nature of the disease is not clear, id. at 51, but 
it is clear that something in cotton dust induces the disease 
in some persons. OSHA relied on several witnesses who 
testified that the control of dust is the only effective way to 
control the disease. Id. Medical surveillance generally was 
ineffective because the disease sometimes does not manifest 
itself until it already has reached the irreversible stage. 
Indeed, industry • s witnesses testified that medical 
surveillance without dust control was ineffective. !d. at 51 & 
6. : 
n.87. Approximately 25% of the workers would contract 
byssinosis under the industry's proposed exposure level. Id. 
at 49 n. 79. According to one key study that OSHA apparently 
credited, only about 12% of the workers would get the disease 
under OSHA's exposure levels. Brief for Secretary at 8. 
The industry apparently introduced evidence 
suggesting less pessimistic conclusions, but the agency thought 
the industry studies had been "discredited," Pet. App. 48 & 
n.76. The CA refused to disturb OSHA's evidentiary weighing. 
Id. at 49 n.77. 
2. Evidence Supporting OSHA's Cost Estimates. I'll 
not repeat the relevance of this information, which is 
described above in this memo. Nor will I reiterate at length 
the dispute over the accuracy of this information. I discussed 
the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas estimates in my prior memo at pp. 6-
7. The only tenable basis for rejecting OSHA's reliance on the 
latter estimate is that the estimate was based on the 
expectation of complying with a less stringent standard. OSHA 
found, however, that any resulting downward bias here was 
offset by certain upward biases elsewhere in the Hocutt-Thomas 
figures. The CA refused to disturb OSHA's conclusion. Pet. 
App. at 62-66. 
C. Conclusions and Recommendation 
Your memo was very perceptive. I did merely "resolve 
the cost/benefit question . 
what [you] wrote in Benzene." 
. 
' 
. in a brief summary, accepting 
I did so because--much to my 
1: 
7 • 
dismay--! found myself believing that the government had the 
better of the argument on that key issue. 
I found your "broad brush" remarks in Benzene to be 
persuasive as a policy matter. Though it is uncomfortable to 
think that it costs too much to save a human life, a rational 
policy should recognize that society has a great interest in 
maintaining a strong national economy, and that it sometimes is 
necessary to take risks--even health risks--to further that 
interest. See Benzene, slip op. at 6 n.6 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Yet, on reviewing the authorities cited, I tend to 
think that the government may be right that Congress, however 
foolishly, did not put this policy into the OSHA Act. Consider 
the legislative history that petrs advanced. See Bench Memo at 
7-8. Petrs point to nothing really persuasive that shows that 
Congress intended cost-benefit analysis. Their citations to 
legislative history are very vague. They refer to the desire 
to have a "reasonable" or a "balanced" bill. They also rely on 
the fact that Congress made the standard of review "substantial 
evidence" rather than "arbitrary and capricious." If Congress 
had wanted OSHA to balance costs against benefits, I would have 
thought that legislators would have made this clear. They did 
not. Can this omission "be deemed inadvertent?" Benzene, slip 
op. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The government's construction of the statute--while 
perhaps unwise as a policy matter--seems to conform more 
closely with the legislative history. See Bench Memo at 12-13. 
' ' 
8. 
Congress may well have envisioned that costs be relevant to 
setting a standard only to the extent that they would not 
"put[] employers out of business." Industrial Union 
Department, supra. 
Even if you now agree with my tentative inclination, 
however, I should think that you are bound by your Benzene 
opinion. If you want to pursue that course, I tend to think 
that the best language to rely on is the "reasonably necessary" 
reference in § 3 (8) • I thought the government's rebuttal on 
this point, see discussion supra, was probably persuasive, but 
somewhat less persuasive than its strong rebuttal on the § 
6 (b) (5) argument. 
P.W.C. 1/20/81 
P.S. I'll xerox one or two of the better CA opinions on this 
issue • 
. ' ·;. 
lfp/ss 1/20/81 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Paul Cane DATE: Jan. 20, 1981 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Cotton Dust 
I dictated the attached memorandum at home Monday 
evening. It is an unstructed identification of points and 
questions that we may have to address if asked to write the -
opinion. Also, your thinking about these will assist me in 
deciding how to vote at Friday's Conference. Before we 
discuss this case on Thursday, I hope you will have an 
opportunity to consider these points and questions. 
I am asking Sally to give you the memorandum, 






TO: Paul Cane DATE: Jan. 20, 1981 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
79-1429, 79-1583 Cotton Dust Cases 
Your bench memo, written under considerable 
pressure, is quite helpful in setting forth the arguments 
presented by petitioners and respondents. You resolve the 
cost/benefit question - the critical one - in a brief 
summary accepting what I wrote in Benzene. I was able in 
that case to paint with a "broad brush". In the present 
case, however, I am not sure that we could write a 
persuasive opinion without being more specific. 
A puzzling feature of this case, at least for me, 
is that the briefs on both sides present reasonable 
arguments - assuming that the facts and findings stated in 
each case are correct. I still have not been able to locate 
in the briefs or printed appendix, a copy of the Secretary's 
findings and opinion. The briefs do not seem to make any 
specific references to such findings. I have not read 
CADC's opinion carefully, but it seems to make general 
findings that - if accepted - might make it difficult for 





In sum, what are the established facts in this 
case? To what extent does the record justify the factual 
assertions in petitioners' brief. Or, vice versa, to what 
extent does the record justify the rather sweeping factual 
2. 
assertions in the government's brief. I am not suggesting 
at this time that we review the record. Rather, I am 
wondering whether the Secretary (or OSHA) made findings that 
were accepted by the Court of Appeals and - if so - what 
were they. 
And apart from findings, does the Secretary, in 
any opinion, or its brief, concede that it asserts authority 
to set standards "in disregard of their economic impact, 
with the sole limit being that the cost of a single standard 
must not be so great as to threaten the destruction of an 
entire industry?" See question No. 1 presented in 
petitioners' brief. 
In petitioners' brief, summary of argument, p. 19, 
it is stated: 
"OSHA's approach treats the cost of its 
standards as being totally irrelevant until 
they reach some undefined point at which the 
standard, if implemented, would cause the 
destruction of an entire industry." 
If indeed this is OSHA's "approach", we have a 
rather easy target. But where is OSHA's "approach" or 
position on this question, stated, and exactly what does it 
·. 
claim as being its authority with respect to the cost of 
standards? 
3. 
My recollection from the Benzene case is that OSHA 
took the position that only §6(b) (5) applies, and therefore 
that it is authorized to "set the standard which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, ••• that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health • • " 
OSHA denies that §3(8) (a), defining the term "standard" 
limits §6(b) (5) in any way. My recollection, however, is 
that in the Benzene case the plurality opinion - in which I 
joined to this extent - held that the two sections must be 
read together so that the test is not merely one of 
feasibility (construed by OSHA to mean "technological 
feasibility" (seep. 13 SG's brief), but in addition that 
the standard must be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide" a safe environment. 
Does OSHA accept in this case - or did it accept 
when the cotton dust standard was adopted- that S3(8) and 
6(b) (5) must be read together? Putting it differently in 
this case that its standard is "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate" as well as being technologically feasible? 
In my brief concurring opinion, I did not 
undertake to go beyond general language. Assuming the 
applicability of the necessity to show a standard to be 
., 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate", and that this means 
there must be a demonstration of a reasonable relationship 
between cost and benefits, what sort of evidence must be 
considered and what kind of findings would be require? 
I notice, for example, in the brief of the 
American Industrial Health Council (amicus), it is said: 
"We do not suggest that OSHA must engage in a 
strictly quantative cost/benefit assessment. 
But as several courts have held, OSHA may not 
issue a standard until it has evaluated the 
benefits that will be gained and the 
resulting costs and has found a reasonable 
relationship between the two." 
Has this been done in this case, or does OSHA 
claim this is unnecessary? 
Briefs supporting reversal of the decision below 
refer to other decisions of courts of appeals that do 
require cost/benefit analysis. I would like to have xerox 
copies of any CA opinions that in fact do this, with your 
view as to which is the best case. 
4. 
In sum, Paul, while I have no doubt whatever that 
OSHA is assuming a virtually unrestricted power to establish 
standards almost solely in light of perceived health and 
safety benefit (e.g., the absolutely risk free workplace), 
the SG's brief seems to argue that OSHA did in fact consider 
carefully "economic feasibility" (p. 14, et seq.), and 






$543,000,000 for the industry that OSHA considered to be 
economically feasible. To be sure, the SG speaks in terms 
of "feasibility" rather than "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate". Specifically, what do you perceive to be the 
difference. If OSHA and the SG were arguing that 
technological feasibility is all that need be considered, 
why would there be any discussion of the Hocutt-Thomas and 
other cost estimates? Petitioners say that the answer is 
that these estimates relate only to the survivability of the 
industry in its entirety, without considering any of the 
factors that I mentioned in my concurring opinion. 
* * * 
No doubt, Paul, you will consider this memorandum 
to be rather negative and pessimistic from the viewpoint of 
one who holds my view that Congress must have intended a 
weighing of costs against benefits. I am not implying any 
change in the views I expressed in Benzene. Rather, I find 
few specific answers to the questions in this case, and am 
hopeful that - with your greater familiarity with the case -




ANOTHER SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 21, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1429, ATMI v. Marshall [the "Cotton Dust" cases] 
The more I think about this case, the more attractive 
seems your suggestion that we seriously consider Justice 
Rehnquist's nondelegation argument. Let me try to sketch out a 
theory of decision based on this argument. Please forgive its 
rough form. I had no time to make it ornate, and I provide 
little or no authority for some propositions . 
.. 
·~· •,..; !;!.-, , 
' . 
I. Purpose of Administrative Agencies 
Delegation to administrative agencies is an 
inevitable byproduct of complex government. Where Congress 
undertakes to regulate in a field demanding special expertise, 
particularly in areas of science, it frequently may be 
advantageous to delegate much of the detail work to the agency. 
In sum, 
Congress may wish to exercise its authority 
in a particular field, but because the 
field is sufficiently technical, the ground 
to be covered sufficiently large, and the 
Members of Congress themselves not 
necessarily expert in the area in which 
they choose to legislate, the most that may 
be asked under the separation-of-powers 
doctrine is that Congress lay down the 
general policy and standards that animate 
the law, leaving the agency to refine those 
standards, "f i 11 in the blanks," or apply 
the standards to particular cases. 
Benzene, slip op. at 5 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added) • 
II. Origins of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
At all times, however, the administrative lawmaking 
power must be derived from Congress' article I lawmaking power. 
The delegation question concerns the extent to which this is 
constitutionally tolerable. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 u.s. 388 (1935), the Court considered delegation of 
authority to the President to regulate the flow of "hot oil." 
In the statute in that case, Congress had made a "declaration 
of policy," in which it directed the President to act, or not 
to act, in accordance with various criteria. The criteria 
conflicted somewhat. For example, Congress told the President 
"to provide for the general welfare by promoting the 
organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action 
among trade groups." In the same sect ion, however, Congress 
told the President "to eliminate unfair competitive practices." 
Similarly, at one point the President was instructed "to 
increase the consumption of industrial and agr icul tur al 
products" but simultaneously "to conserve natural resources." 
Id. at 417. In sum, the statute favored any number of good 
things. However, as Chief Justice Hughes remarked, the 
constitutionality of "such a delegation of legislative power . 
. is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed 
that the President has acted, and will act, for what he 
believes to be the public good. The point is not one of 
motives but of constitutional authority II Id. at 420. 
The Court then quoted Congress' legislative power, found in 
Article I, and said, "The Congress manifestly is not permitted 
to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested." Id. at 
421. 
Notwithstanding Panama Refining and cases like it, it 
is plain that Congress does have broad license to delegate. 
The question in each case is whether the delegation occurs 
within proper limitations. Chief Justice Hughes identified 
three factors in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
delegation. First, Congress in the statute must "declare[] a 







u.s. at 415. Second, Congress must "set up a standard for the 
[delegatee's] action." Id. Third, Congress must "require[] 
a[] finding by the [delegatee] in the exercise of" its 
authority. Id. In another case, the constitutional question 
is phrased somewhat differently: the stringency of the 
limitations constitutionally required in each case must be 
judged "according to common sense and the inherent necessities 
of the governmental co-ordination." Hampton & Co. v. United 
States, 276 u.s. 394, 406 (1928). 
III. OSHA's Construction and Application of Its Mandate 
It is hard to know exactly how Congress wanted the 
OSH Act to be applied. There are at least four possible 
interpretations. 
The first is something along the lines that you 
articulated in Benzene. We agree, I think, that it makes no 
sense to have a policy that treats costs as essentially 
irrelevant until they loom large enough to threaten "industry 
survivability." See Benze_!le, slip op. at 4-7 (Powell, J., 
concurring). Principles of diminishing returns make it clear 
that incremental gains in health and safety are accomplished at 
ever-increasing costs. 
The second is the position that the union respondents 
took at oral argument. According to the union, the threshold 
question is establishing a significant risk of health 
impairment, and the ability to reduce that risk significantly. 
This much is clear from Benzene. Then, according to the union, 
5. 
OSHA is to set the most effective standard possible. If that 
standard is not "feasible," it should be relaxed to the point 
where it provides the greatest possible protect ion for the 1. 
worker consistent with the survival of the "industry as a 
whole." 
The third is OSHA's articulated approach. OSHA 
agrees mostly with the union respondents, but adds kind of a 
gloss. In its brief and at oral argument, OSHA essentially 
claimed that it was not 
~' Bench Memo at 13-14. 
an "unreasonable regulator." 
OSHA pointed out that it is always 
cognizant of the long-run health of the industry. In setting 
standards, the Secretary of Labor takes practical realities 
into account in at least four specific ways. (A) He sets his 
own priorities based on the urgency of potential harm to 
workers. (B) As the Benzene plurality held, he regulates only 
"significant risks of material harm." (C) He looks to see 
whether proposed alternative methods would accomplish the same 
result at lesser cost. (D) He has discretion in determining 
the length of the compliance period. 
In this case, OSHA seemed to take an approach 
different from any of the three articulated above. It is kind 
of a mishmash involving some of the elements described above. 
I have read the Final Standard, reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 27350 
(1978). OSHA seemed to start with a goal of imposing a 
standard of 200 micrograms per cubic meter on all aspects of 
the industry. It is plain, however, that this is not the 
standard that would protect workers the most. Approximately 
13% of the work force will suffer from some degree of 
byssinosis even at the 200 mcgs/cu-m level. Thus, even in 
commencing deliberations at that level, OSHA already seems to 
have considered cost to some extent. Then, for the "slashing 
and weaving" aspects of the job, OSHA raised the standard to 
750 mcgs/cu-m, apparently because this standard would provide 
suitable protection and any lower standard would be too 
burdensome. Id. at 27360. At this point, however, OSHA still 
has not reached its official "feasibility" analysis. When it 
finally did reach that point, it found that the 200/750 
standard was appropriate, because "although some marginal 
employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry as a 
whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements of the 
regulation." Id. at 27378. In sum, OSHA concluded that it had 
set a standard that "assure [d] maximum benefit 
constrained only by the limits of feasibility." Id. 
IV. Nondelegation Problems in this Case 
We agree, I am sure, that Congress constitutionally 
could impose a standard that would put much of an industry out 
of business. Although an ill-advised policy, this is one on 
which the Court must rely on Congress' judgment, tempered as it 
is by public accountability. The problem here is that Congress 
has not taken a clear position. Instead, it has demanded that 
OSHA set standards to the extent "feasible." The core of the 
problem thus is easy to identify: what is "feasible?" Let me 
struggle briefly with the term. 
7. 
Two groups must bear the cost that OSHA characterizes 
in this case as "feasible." The first group, on which 
everyone's attention focuses, is the industry itself. Some 
entities will be unable to absorb the cost. Remarkably, 
however, OSHA ignored the burden on another, perhaps equally 
important group, that also must pay the cost of worker safety: 
the consumers of products. OSHA reasoned that only marginal 
firms would be put out of business because it believed demand 
for cotton products was "inelastic." [Roughly speaking, that 
means that companies largely can tack the cost of safety 
mechanisms onto the price of goods without a substantial 
decrease in sales.] At oral argument, one attorney pointed out 
that even a 500% increase in the price of goods would be no 
burden on companies if demand were inelastic. Justice Stewart 
correctly observed, however, that consumers then would pay the 
bill. 
As I noted above, the point is not that Congress 
cannot decree that consumers and corporations pay this price 
for worker safety. The question is whether Congress has done 
so. But Congress indicated only that health improvements were 
to be made if "feasible." Who is to decide what is feasible? 
Herein lies the delegation problem. Congress has not defined 
the term. It is tenable to conclude that, consistent with the 
principles of constitutional delegation, Congress must do a 
more precise job. 
In many respects, this case resembles Panama 
Refining. Here, as there, Congress did not set a policy and 
provide standards with which to implement it. In this case, 
Congress told the agency to accomplish two good things: 
protect workers, but do so in a way that is "feasible." 
Congress did not describe how to strike the balance. OSHA 
1, 
appears to take the point of view that costs passed on to 
consumers are irrelevant in assessing feasibility. Moreoever, 
the agency is comfortable as long as the health of the 
"industry as a whole" is not impaired. I recall from oral 
argument that the government lawyer was very reluctant to put 
much of a boundary on the precise number of firms that could be 
destroyed consistent with "industry survivability." Because no 
standards were given to the agency, a reviewing court cannot 
know whether the agency complied with its mandate. Finally, 
and perhaps most important, to permit Congress to abdicate its 
constitutional responsibility on an important policy choice is 
to permit it to escape the public accountability for its 
decision on an issue of broad social significance. Just 
yesterday I found a newspaper article that identified the 
problem of "cost benefit analysis" as one of the most important 
environmental issues of the age. But, the article reported, 
"direct comparisons [of costs and benefits] are difficult" 
because it is hard to put a measure on human life. Washington 
Post, Jan. 21, 1981, at A2, col. 3: see Benze1_1e, slip op. at 
29-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
This is precisely the reason that Congress should be 
required to undertake the task. Legitimate delegation to 
agencies evolved because it was useful to have someone other 
.. 9 • 
than legislators "fill in the gaps." Where the "gap" is an 
issue of such profound economic and social significance as the 
tradeoff between health and productivity, it should be 1. 
Congress, not the agency, that strikes the balance. 
V. The Wisdom and Difficulties Associated 
With a Return to Nondelegation 
Some will argue that the nondelegation doctrine is a 
discarded relic of the Lochner era of judicial intermeddling. 
I do not think so. The overzealous judicial review tendencies 
represented by Lochner denigrated Congress' role because judges 
substituted their judgment for that of legislators. The 
nondelegation doctrine does not share this flaw. On the 
contrary, the nondelegation doctrine reasserts the primacy of 
Congress as the maker of policy. To be sure, Congress does not 
always relish that responsibility. Legislators duck hard 
questions such as cost-benefit analysis by turning their 
resolution over to administrative agencies, just as legislators 
can duck "private right of act ion" quest ions by turning them 
over to the courts. 
The "cost benefit" question is precisely the kind of 
hard question that courts ought to demand that Congress answer. 
As you suggested in Benzene, the cost of regulation--in 
particular, the cost of safety--has ramifications for 
employment, inflation, and even national defense and foreign 
policy. It plainly is an issue on the minds of legislators. 
During the OSH Act debate, Senator Saxbe said, "When we come to 
-~ ..• .. 
saying that an employer must guarantee that such an employee is 
protected from any possible harm, I think it will be one of the 
most difficult areas we are going to have to ascertain." 
Benzene, slip op. at 15 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Later, 
Senator Saxbe complained, "I believe the terms that we are 
passing back and forth are going to have to be identified." 
Id. at 8. The problem in this case is that Congress never did 
adequately describe the nature of the relationship between 
health and cost that it envisioned. Because it did not, the 
three difficulties identified by Justice Rehnquist in Benzene 
have occurred. First, OSHA has no "intelligible principle" to 
guide it in its work. Second, reviewing courts are left with 
no standards to apply to test the exercise of the agency's 
discretion. Third, and most important, Congress is permitted 
to evade accountability for decisions that are of great 
significance to all. 
A nondelegation opinion in this case will not be easy 
to write. I am not unmindful that this Court, and others, in 
the recent past has permitted Congress to delegate broadly. 
The WNCN case brings to mind the FCC's statute. That agency is 
permitted to regulate the airwaves with nothing more to guide 
it than "the public interest." Yet, it may be that 
the issue in Cotton Dust is of such profound significance that 
it differs qualitatively from other cases in which delegation 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: (79-1429 
( 
~lt.prttnt <qourt of tire 'J!fuittb ~tltits 
'J!Uaslrington.1EJ. <q. 20~)~~ 
January 21, 1981 
- American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 
Inc. v. Marshall 
1, 
( 
(79-1583 - National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am inclined to think we should invite the parties 
to comment on the effect, ~f any, of the change in 
Regulations disclosed by Bork in the oral argument . 
Regards, 
•: 
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as to the change in 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§u.pumt Qfcttrl cf fltt ~tb- .:§ta'lfg 
'J]trurlpng1ct4 :!B. <q. 2!lgtJ!.~ 
January 22, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 79-1429) American Textile Mnfg. Institute v. Marshall 
79-1583) National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall 
I agree with the Chief's suggestion that the parties 
should be called upon to comment on the effect of the 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§u.prttttt <!fou.rt.of illt 1Utiub- j;tafts 
~aslrtngton. ~. <!f. 20,?'1·~ 
January 26, 1981 
RE: 79-1429 - American Textile Institute v. Marshall 
79-1583 - National Cotton Council v. Marshall 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will defer voting in this case until some light is 









.;§u.prttttt <!Jllltrl of tqt ~b .:§htltil 
'Jllfa.gfringhlt4 ~. <!f. 20,?~~ 
January 30, 1981 
-American Textile Manufacturers, Inc. v. 
Marshall 
- National Cotton Council of America v. 
Marshall 
I have now reviewed the various exchanges in this 
case,and I would prefer that you proceed to assign 
it since my views on the excessive delegation remain 
just about where they were at the time of the Conference. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
1, 
··' 
mniteb ~tatrs Jlepartmrnt of Justice 
®ffict of tbt ~olidtor ~tntral 
Masbington. Ja.~. 20530 
January 30, 1981 
Honorable Alexander Stevas 
Clerk 
upr eme Court of the United States 
Was h ington, D.C. 20543 
Re: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., 
et al. v. Ray Marshall, et al., No. 79-1429, 
and National Cotton Council of America v. Ray 
Marshall, et al., No. 79-1583 
De a r Mr. Stevas: 
We have received petitioners' response to the Court's 
re quest concerning the effect on these cases of the recent 
am endments to the Cancer Policy standard. We will refrain from 
responding in kind to petitioners' intemperate remarks, but we do 
believe that petitioners' one substantive point merits a short 
reply. 
Petitioners contend that the Cancer Policy amendments are 
r elevant to these cases because they represent abandonment by the 
Secretary of the policy that governed the setting of the cotton 
dust standard. This contention is incorrect because the stated 
purpose of the amendment was to conform the Cancer Policy to the 
s ignificant risk limitation imposed by this Court's decision in 
I ndustrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, No. 
78-911 (July 2, 1980). The error in the benzene standard 
identified by the Court in Industrial Union Department, and the 
defect in the Cancer Policy standard, was that the Secretary, 
when dealing with· a carcinogen, believed that the Act required 
hi m to set the standard at the lowest feasible level, even in the 
absence of evidence that such lowering of the level was necessary 
to eliminate or reduce a significant risk of material health 
impairment. 
What petitioners have persistently ignored .is that the 
cot ton dust record contains substantial empirical evidence 
(l ) that both the previous standard (1000 ug/m3) and the so-
cal led industry alternative (500 ug/m3) would continue to create 
a s i gnificant risk of material health impairment to employees; 
(2 ) that the new standard (200 ug/m3) would substantially reduce 1 
that risk; and (3) that even under the new standard, there would 
remain a significant risk of contracting byssinosis (13% 
a cc ording to the Merchant Study) that the Secretary could not 
eliminate because of feasibility limitations. These findings 
(wh ich were upheld by the court of appeals as supported by 
substantial evidence) are se~ out in the Secretary's statement of 
reasons accompanying the final standard, and the Secretary relied 
on t hese findings in making his decision. 43 Fed. Reg. 27358-
273 59 (1978). 
While the Secretary did set the standard at the "lowest 
fe asible level," that decision was made because the Secretary 
affirmatively demonstrated on the basis of overwhelming evidence 
that there is no safe level that could be feasibly achieved. He 
did not rely on an "assumption" of no safe level for a toxic 
substance, as was th~ case for benzene. The recent proposed 
revisions to the Cancer Policy standard, 46 Fed. Reg. 7402-7408 
(1981), simply incorporate the requirement that the Secretary 
make precisely the same findings of significant risk made in 
cot ton dust before regulating carcinogenic substances. Indeed, 
it is rather odd for petitioners to suggest that the Secretary 
would have promulgated a regulation undermining the basis for the 
cotton dust standard while that standard was undergoing judicial 
review! 
In sum, we reiterate that the Secretary's cancer policy 
modifications have absolutely no bearing on the disposition of 
the issues in this case. It is most unfortunate that the textile 
industry has determined to rely on this irrelevancy in an effort 
t o convince the Court to avoid resolution of the important legal 
is sues raised in these cases. 
cc: Neil King 
Sincerely, 
~ 7¥711 F. ~.n . 
Wade H. McCree, J~ 
Solicitor General 
- 2 -
®fficc of t fC Qllcrh 
~prtmc @oud of tire ~lnitcb Ji9tztfers 
Memorandum 
January 30, 1981 
Memo to the Conference 
Re: American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc. v. Ray Marshall, 
No. 79-1429; and National Cotton 
Council of America v. Ray 
Marshall, No. 79-1583 
Subsequent to my memorandum of 
January 29, 1981, regarding the above-
entitled cases, I have received the 






MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 1. 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 30, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1429, The Cotton Dust Cases 
I have read the memos by industry and the SG 
on the repeal of the "carcinogen policy." The SG says the 
repeal is irrelevant to this case. Industry says it is 
-= ~---------------
"highly relevant" but does not explain how. 
I think the SG is right. In repealing the 
carcinogen policy, OSHA simply was codifying the plurality's - --- ___ _;;;;..,. 
-~--
holding in Benzene. Thus, the repeal does nothing more than 
bring the Code of Federal Regulations in line with the case 
law. 
I don't understand what WJB is referring to 
in this memo, but I don't suppose it could hurt to have the 
SG file a response. 
P.w.c. 1/30/81 
I ' 
.§u:pumt <!Jcurl cf flrt ~~ .itatt_s-
'Jlfru¥!rtt41fcn.ltl. <!J. 20gtJ!~ ·1 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. January 30, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1429 & 1583 American Textile Manufacturers 
v. Marshall 
Dear Chief: 
I had supposed the order of filings in the above was 
going to be Bark first and then response from the-Solicitor 
General. In any event, it is very clear to me that Bork•s 
position in the Wilmer, Pickering letter is very different 
from that which he made at oral argument. See Transcript of 
oral argument at pages 6 and 7. 
In the circumstances I wish the Clerk would be request- ~ 
ed to telephone the Solicitor General and ask him to .file an 
additional response to the Bark letter. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
S5ncerely, 
/ ) 
' -' 1 ' 
I ·,y"C{_ l 
1, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.:§u.punu Qfl!urll!f flrt ~~ .:§fldtg 
~a,glpngtcn. :!9. QJ. z.o~'!.;l 
February 2, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1429 American Textile Mfrs. Ind. v. Marshall 
No. 79-1583 National Cotton Council of America v. 
Marshall 
Dear Chief: 
I'll undertake the opinion for the Court in the above. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
1, 





;§u.ptttttt Qfourl ttf tqt ~b .:%btits 
~as-ftingtcn. ~. <!J. 20p>!~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
February 3, 1981 
Re: 79-1429 - American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute v. Marshall 
Dear Bill: 
Are you willing to undertake a dissent 1n 
this case? 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to: Justice Stewart 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u:prtmt <Q:cnrl of tqt %titt?t .§fitts 
'J!lrasfringLm, lB. C!f. 20,?)!.~ 
February 4, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1429 American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute v. Marshall 
Dear Chief: 
I will be happy to undertake a dissent in this 
case. 








. . . 
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: March 31, 1981 
RE: 79-1429, Cotton Dust Cases 
As I told you last week, a notice in the 
federal register announced that OSHA is conducting a 
rulemaking on the feasibility of employing cost-benefit 
analysis. The SG now has filed a memorandum explaining the 
action OSHA proposes to take. Although the SG acknowledges 
that our case is not technically moot, it suggests that the ------ -----Court vacate and remand to the agency for further 
development of the record. 
P.W.C. 03/31/81 
• t 
- .... { .....-..- ...... ..-- 1 ._ ,__.... ~ ~- - . ' Mr. Justice Marshall ...., 
f~ March 31, 1981 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
c Mr. Justice Powell Mr. Justice Rehnquis-t 
· Mr. Justice Stevens 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
•.·'From: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Circulated: APR 1 1981 
1 RE: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v, DonQvan, et · 
~CClTCtt±~eu~.~~----------
al. 
Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583 
As you know, the Gov e rnment has filed a supplemental 
memorandum in the above case. The memorandum describes President 
Reagan's issuance of Executive Order No. 12291, directing all 
federal agencies to assess potential costs and benefits of major 
regulatory proposals. In response, the Secretary of Labor filed 
an "Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" on March 27, 1981. 
This is the Secretary's first step "to evaluate the feasibility 
and utility of cost-benefit analysis in the standard setting 
process, to compare the costs and benefits of the current 
standard and various alternatives, and to reassess the current 
standard in light of the findings." Memorandum, at 2. While the 
Government readily admits that this action does not moot the 
case, id., at 4, it nevertheless recommends for prudential 
reasons that we vacate the Court of Appeals decision and remand 
the case to the agency. I assume that we will not act on the 
memorandum until all parties have an opportunity to file a 
response. 
In any event, I disagree with the Government's position. My 
primary reason is that the majority conference vote in this case, 
to be reflected in the opinion for the Court now being prepared, 
is based on the proposition that cost-benefit analysis is 
prohibited by the statute. This is consistent with the 
Government's previous argument that "it would be inconsistent 
with the Act for OSHA to engage in cost-benefit analysis." 
Memorandum, at 3a. It would surely be best for all concerned to 
decide that issue and save the Secretary the necessity of 
engaging in a futile proceeding involving thousands of pages of 
study; he might better use the time to persuade the Congress to 
change the statute. 
Moreover, there clearly remains an active case or 
controversy here. The Secretary has taken no action to 
"promulgate, modify, or revoke any occupational safety or health 
standard" pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §655. We have no way of knowing 
whether this ''Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" will lead to 
a recommendation that formal rulemaking modifying or revoking the 
existing standard be pursued. Certainly the union will fight the 
Secretary tooth and nail to prevent it. The case eventually 
would be back here again, brought by the union or the industry 
depending on future actions of the Secretary. Therefore, the 
final result of the Secretary's action is highly speculative, and 
in all events probably would not occur for a substantial period 
of time. Although the Government intimates that it is 
maintaining the current cotton dust standard during this re-
evaluation for policy reasons, this explanation is misleading, 
for the Secretary would in no case be entitled to modify or 
·r 
..... -
revoke the standard without conducting a formal rulemaking 
procedure pursuant to §655. 
In sum, I think we should deny the S~cretary's application 
and proceed with decision of the case. 
Sincerely, 
W.J.B. · Jr . 
1. 
·' 
:§u:pr~mt <!J:onrt of ut~ ~nib~ :§tah.t\' 
2J)ra£fJrittgfon, ~. <!):. 2D,?J.I,.;J 
CH AM BER S 0 F 
J U STIC E J OHN PAUL STEVE N S 
April 1, 1981 
Re: 79-1429 & 79-1583 - American Textile 
v. Mar s hall 
Dear Bill: 
Although I have not yet had an opportunity to re-
examine the papers in this case, it is my recollection 
that my vote in favor of the Government was predicated 
on the proposition that cost benefit analysis was not 
It , d " b h d ' ~require y t e statute. I o not recall coming to any 
conclusion one way or the~ot~er on~~he question whether 
cost benefit analysis is ' prohibite by the statute. I 
did not think it would be necessary to reach that 
question in order to uphold the standards that are 
challenged in this case. I also have not come to rest 
on the question raised by the Secretary's application, 
but I did think I s hould clarify my understanding of 
-~the rea s on for my vote. 
Re s p e ctfully, 
j~ 
Justice Br e nnan 
Copies to the Confer e nce 










CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§u.pumt Qj:!!url of tqt ~tb .:§taiNl 
'Jlia.sfrington, ~. <.q:. 20?~.;1 
April 2, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-1429 & 79-1583 American Textile 
v. Marshall 
Although my views as to the constitutionality of the 
statute at issue here will not in all likelihood be affected 
by a change in the government's position concerning "the 
feasibility and utility" of a cost-benefit analysis for the 
cotton dust standard, I believe that the Solicitor General 
is correct that the decision by the Court at this time would 
be tantamount to an advisory opinion. Memorandum, at 4. I, 
of course, am in the dissent in this case and am in no 
position to speculate as to the intent of those in the 
majority. But from my recollection of our conference vote 
I, like my brother John, am not sure that the majority voted 










/7 .., -- lJ_ LA - ' 
Mr. Justice Powell ~~ /~
Paul Cane 
April 2, 1981 
79-1429, Cotton Dust Cases 
Petitioners, the cotton companies, have 
filed a motion to defer consideration of the government's 
suggestion of a remand. They would like to file something 
by April 9, and ask that the Court not take action until 
that time. 
I think a delay would be helpful. I 
understand that WJB's opinion is soon to circulate. Perhaps 
the Court should defer consideration of the suggestion of 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1980 
RECEIVED 
APK 2 1981 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SU.PREME COURT, 4.s. __ 
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC., et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al., 
Respondents. 
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al., --
Respondents. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
MOTION TO DEFER CONSIDERATION AND EXTEND 
THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PETITIONERS MAY 
RESPOND TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT 
Petitioners in these consolidated cases hereby 
request that this Court defer consideration of the Supplemental 
Memorandum for the Federal Respondent ("Supplemental 
Memorandum") filed on March 27, 1981, and extend until April 9, 
1981, the time within which petitioners may file a response to 
the Supplemental Memorandum. The grounds for this Motion are 
as follows. 
The Supplemental Memorandum introduces a radically 
~ew development into these cases. It discloses the Secretary 
of Labor's intention to institute a further rulemaking 
proceeding to reevaluate and reconsider the Cotton Dust 
Standard that is at issue in the cases before this Court. This 
proceeding will include a reexamination of the agency's 
position on the two most critical issues presented in these 
cases -- the nature of the cost-related limitations applicable 
to occupational health standards and the role that cost-benefit 
assessments should play in the setting of such standards. 
Most of the more than one dozen petitioners in these 
cases received copies of the Supplemental Memorandum only 
within the last two or three days. The developments described 
in the Supplemental Memorandum are highly unusual in nature, 
making it difficult for petitioners to analyze the situation 
and formulate a joint response to the Secretary of Labor's 
recommendations. The difficulty of analyzing the Secretary's 
proposal is complicated by the fact that the challenged 
Standard apparently is to remain in effect and to be enforced 
while the further rulemaking proceeding is conducted. 
Petitioners believe that their views on the issues 
raised by the Supplemental Memorandum will be of significant 
value to the Court. However, a short additional period of time 
will be required for petit ione rs to a ssess the impact of these 
new developments and to consult with each other regarding an 
appropriate response. 
Accordingly, petitioners request that the Court defer 
consideration of the developments addressed in the Supplemental 
Memorandum and extend until April 9, 1981, the time within 
- 2 -
which petitioners may file a response setting forth their views 
on those developments. 
Petitioners are authorized to make the following 
representations: The Federal Respondent does not oppose the 
present Motion. The Union Respondents were advised by the 
Clerk's Office that the Court would consider the Secretary's 
Supplemental Memorandum at its conference on Friday, April 3, 
1981, and accordingly are filing their response today. In 
these circumstances, the Union Respondents take no position on 
the present Motion. 
Robert H. Bork 
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Gregory B. Tobin 
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SUMMARY: The Secretary of Labor (resp) requests leave to file 
a supplemental memorandum after argument informing the Court of his 
\ 
decision to reconsider the health standards regulating occupational 
exposure to airborne concentrations of cotton dust and suggesting 
( '---' 
- 2 -
BACKGROUND: In June 1978, resp issued final mandatory occupa-
tional health standards regulating occupational .exposure to airborne 
concentrations of cotton dust. On pre-enforcement review, the CADC 
upheld all major provisions of the standards against petrs. Pet :r;s 
sought review from this Court, certs were granted and the two cases 
were argued on Jan. 21, 1981. 
On Feb. 17, President Reagan issued an Executive Order directing 
all federal agencies to assess costs and benefits of' major regulatory 
proposals. In light of this directive, resp has determined to under-
take a re-examination of the cotton dust standard and has issued an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which was filed with the 
Federal Register for publication on Mar. 27. 
CONTENTIONS: Resp believes that the 'additional information, 
data and comments likely to be received through the public proceed-
ing will permit him to make an informed judgment as to the feasibility · 
and utility of the cotton dust standard and may well lead to modifi-
cations. Resp suggests that pending his reconsideration, the Court 
may wish to refrain from further consideration of the issues now 
before it. While the actions of the resp do not moot the present 
controversy, resp suggests that a decision by the Court at this time 
would, to a substantial degree, be tantamount to an advisory opinion. 
Resp also suggests that in light of the recent developments, 
set forth in his supplemental memorandum, "it would be appropriate 
for the Court to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the case so that the record may be returned to the Secretary 





DISCUSSION: Although there may be substantial grounds for 
disagreeing with resp's opinions as to the effect of his reconsider-
ation, the fact that he is reconsidering the cotton dust standard 
should be formally brought to the Court's attention. Because th~ 
effect of the reconsideration involves some argument, a supplemental 
memorandum filed with leave of the Court pursuant to Rules 35.5 and 
35.6 is the appropriate method for alerting the Court to the recent 
developments. 
The motion and supplemental memorandum were tendered on Mar. 30. 
Thus, petrs have not had an opportunity to respond either to the 
motion or the memorandum. Should the Court grant the motion, it is 
recommended that the Court also allow petrs to file reply memoranda 
by a date certain. A reply date of Monday, April 13, might allow 
the Court to consi·der the cases at the Apr. 17 Conference. An 
earlier deadline is not recommended because it might not allow 
counsel sufficient time to prepare considered memoranda. 
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Recirculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 79-1429 AND 79-1583 ~ ~ 
.edlH ~ American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc,, et al., 
Petitioners, 
79-1429 v. 
Jiaymond J, Donovan, Secretary 
of Labor, United Stl:ttes De-
pattment of Labor, et al. 
National Cotton Council of 
America, Petitioner, 
79-1583 v. 
Jtaymond J , Donovan, Secretary 
of Labor, United States De-
partment of Labor, et al. 
w. 'r ~ . ~ """ 
On Writs of Certio~ ~~ ./ 
the United States C V"" V 
of Appeals for the Dis- • 
trict of Colum~it.~
~.-o''t~'' ~ 
' -r:-. ,, •' u,..J~u~ 
[May-, 1981] ~ ~ ~ 
JusTJCE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Congress enacted the Qccupational Safety ~nd Health Act ~I 
of 1970 (the. Act) "to assure so far as possible every wo}:fing 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful w~in~ 
conditions ... . " 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes • 
the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and <X1!ifei~~M.Ifl,4-olr.-C-...U~" 
nity to comment, mandatory nat.-ionwide standards go'!.~. rn~.i_.n~5g~ d .JI). . .. 
health and safety in the workplace. 29 U.S. C. §§ - 1 '~ 
(b) . In 1978, t.he Secretary, acting through the Occvp""a .. t""lO~'~'~II""I11 /J _ 1--
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/ promW~  
1 This opinion will use the terms OSHA and the Secretary int~ A.-J..J~ ~~ .. -J----
ably when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, or th(j._s~~s~nt {-r~ 
S~cretary for Occupational Safety and Health. The Secretary of Labor p 
. L .1. . 
s-jz.o 
., 
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a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an 
airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manu~ 
facture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "con-
atellation of respiratory effects" known a& "byssinosis." 43 
Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 ( 1978). This disease was one of the 
expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of 
the Occupational Safety and Health A.ct of 1970. S. Rep. No. 
fH- 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legislative History of 
the Occupatio'nal Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 143 (1971) 
(Legis. Hist.). 
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the in-
terests of the cotton industry ,2, challenged the validity of the 
HCotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29 
U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did 
below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its 
Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs 
and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the 
~ecretary 'Of Labor and two labor organizations,3 counter that 
Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, 
and that the Act should therefore be construed to preclude 
OSHA from doing so. They interpret the Act as mandating 
has delegated the authority to promulgnte occupational safpty and health 
itandards to the Assistant Secretary. See 29 CFR § 1910.4 (1980) . 
1 Petitioners in No. 79-1429 include 12 individual cotton textile manu-
facturers, and the American' Textile Manufacturers In~titute, Inc. (ATMI) , 
a. trade association representing approximately 175 companies. Brief for 
Petitioner~ American Textile Manufacturers Institute et al., at i, 2. In 
No. 79-1583, petitioner is the National Cotton Council of America, a non-
profit corporatibn chartered for the purpo~e of irrcreasing the consumption 
@Jf cotton and cotton product~. Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Coun-
eil of America, at 3-4. 
8 The two labor organizations are the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO, and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO. 
In the Court of Appeal::;, the labor organizations challenged the Cotton 
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tha~ OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to 
eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, 
~ubject to the constraints of economic and technological feasi-
bility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not re-
quire OSHA to compare costs and benefits. 617 F. 2d 636 
(1979). We granted certiorari, - U. S. - (1980), to re-
solve this important question, which was presented but not 
decided in last Term's Industrial Union Department v. Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute, - U. S. - (1980) ,4 and to decide 
other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard,ft 
I 
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as 
"brown lung" disease, is a serious and 'potentially disabling 
respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cot-
ton dust.6 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit 
4 Jus•rteE PowELL, concurring in part and in the judgment, was the only 
member of the Court to reach expressly the cost-benefit issue. .Tus1'ICE 
PowELL concluded that the statute "requires the agency to determine that 
the economic effects of it;; standard bear a reasonable relationship to the 
expected benefits." Industtial Union Department v. American Petrole·um 
In~titute, slip op., at 4 (PowELL, .T., concurring in part and in the 
judgment). 
ft In addition to the cost-benefit issue, the other questions presented and 
addressed are (1) whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole 
supports OSHA's determination that the Cotton Dust 'Standard is economi-
cally feasible; and (2) whether OSHA has the authority under the Act 
to require that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees 
who are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear 
respirators. 
6 Cotton dtt:>l is defined as 
"dust pr~ent in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which 
may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant 
matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pe:;ticides, non-cotton plant matter ami 
otlwr contaminanto which may have accumulated with the cotton during 
the growing, hurve:sting and subsequent proces:;ing or storage period~ . 
Any dust pre;,ent during the handling and proce:ssing of cotton through the 
weaving or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations or 
79-14~9 & '7~-1588-0PINie>N 
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6--16, Joint App. 15-22.7 Byssinosis is a ucontinuum 
.tisease," 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2, that has been categorized 
into four grades.8 In its least serious form, byssinosis pro-
duces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness, 
shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective 
indications of loss of pulmonary functions. Id., at 27352, 
tol. 2. In its most serious form, byssinosis is a chrouic and 
irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar 
to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely dis-
abling. Ibid. At worst, as is true of other respiratory dis-
eases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssino-
sis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions 
and contributes to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 6-
73, Joint App. 72 ("there is an association between mortality 
and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has de-
scribed the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows: 
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust], 
symptoms occur on Monday, or other days after absence 
from the work environment; later, symptoms occur on 
other days of the week; and. eventually, symptoms are 
continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure." A. 
inanufacturing proresses using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton fiber 
by-products from textile mills are considered cotton dust." 29 CFR 
§ 1910.1043 (b) (1980) (Cotton Dust Standard). 
7 References are made throughout this opinion to the Joint Appendix 
filed in this Court (Joint App.), and to the Joint Appendix lodged in 
the Court of Appeals below (Ct. of App. J. A.). 
8 Known generally as the Schilling clas~;ification grades, they include: 
'
1[Grade] %: slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity ; no 
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. 
"[Gntde] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity ; no 
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. 
" [Grade] 2 : evidence of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of 
ventilatory capacity. 
"rGradej ·a: evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of 
ventilatory capacity." Exhibit 6-27 ; Joint App. 25 ; ~ee 41 :Fed. Reg •. 
56500-56501 (1976) . 
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Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-H:l, 
Joint App. 15.3 
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which 
the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling 
grades, it is likely that prolonged e:li!posure contributes to the 
progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354:, col. 1 and 2; Exhibit 6-27, 
Joint App. 25; Emibit 11, Joint App. 152. It also appears 
9 Descriptions of the disease by individual mill workers, presented in 
hearings on the Cotton Dust Standard before an administrative law judge, 
are more vivid: 
" When they started speeding the looms up the dust got finer and more 
and more people started leaving the mill with breathing problems. My 
mother h;1d to leave the mill in the early fifties. Before she left, her 
breathing got so short she just couldn't hold out to work. l\!Jy step-
father 'left the mill on account of breaching [sic] problems. He had 
coughing spells til he couldn't. breath, like a child's whooping cough. Both 
my sisters who work in the mill have breathing problems. My husband 
bad to give up his job when he was only fifty-four years old because of 
the breathing problem." Ct. of App. J. A. 3791. 
"I suppose I had a breathing problem shlCe 1973. I just kept on getting 
sick and began losing time at the mill . Every time that I go into the 
mill I get deathly sick, choking a~d vomiting losing my breath. It would 
blow down all that lint and cotton and I have clothes right here where 
I ha,ve wore and they have been washed several times and I would like for 
you all to ~ee them. That will not come out in washing. 
I am only fifty-~ven years old and I am retired and I can't even get to 
go to church because of my breathing. I get ~hort of breath just walking 
around the house or dressing [or] ~ometimes j4st watching T, V, I cough 
all the time." lrl., at 3793. 
u • • • I had to quit because I couldn't lay down and rest without oxygen in 
the night and my doctor told me I would ha.ve to get. out of there. . . . I 
couln't. rsic] even breathe, I had to get out of the door sol could breathe 
and he told me not to go back in [the mill] under any circumstances." 
!d., at 3804. 
Byssinosis is not a newly discovered disease, having been described as early 
as in the 1820s in England, Joint App. 404-405, and observed in Belgium 
in a l:i'iudy of 2,000' cotto.u workers in 1845, Exhibit 6-16, Joint App. 15~ 
-. 
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tl1at a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without 
experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, Joint 
App. 192.10 
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and re-
tired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such workers, suffers 
from the most disabling form of byssinosis.11 43 Fed. Reg. 
27353, col. 3; Exhibit 124, Joint App. 347. The Senate Re-
port accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 ac-
tive and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease. 
S. Rep. No. 91- 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970). Legis. 
Rist. 143. One study found thf).t over 25% of a sample of 
active cotton preparation and yarn manufacturing workers 
suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure 
level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43 
Fed. Reg. 27355, col. 3; Exhibit 6--51, Joint App. 44.12 Other 
studies coufirm these general findings on the prevalence of 
byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6--56, id. at 
376--385. 
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the 
United States as a distinct occupational ha.zard associated 
with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Legis. 
to Ar:, an expert representing the industry noted: 
"[T] he assumption is often made that the disorder progresses from 1f2 to 
1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all grades reflect the progress of the individual's dis-
ability . In many instances, however, there is no progression at all. Some-
times Grade 3 seems to appear de novo, or there is a jump from 1 to 3. 
Among those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2 very often never 
occurs." Exhibit 41, Joint App. 192. 
11 The criterion of disability u:,;ed for the 35,000 worker estimate was a 
Forced Expiratory Volume (FEV1 ) measurement of pulmonary function 
of 1.2 liters or le:,;s. 43 Feu. RPg. 27353, col. 3. An FEV1 of 1.2 liters 
" 1::, a small fra ction of the pulmonary performance of a normal lung."' 
Ibid.; Ct. of App. J . A. 1231. 
1~ There are betwPen 126,000 and 200,000 active workPrs in the yarn 
preparation and manufacturing segment::, of the cotton industry. 43 Fed. 
ll,eg 27379, col. 2, 
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Hist. 143.13 In 1966, the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organiza-
tion, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust 14 be 
limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per 
cubic meter of air (1000 ug/m3) averaged over an 8-hour 
workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1. The United States 
Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968, 
when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey 
Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant 
threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that 
included the 1000 ug/m3 limit for total cotton dust. 34 
Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969),1~ Following passage of the Act in 
1970, the 1000 ug/m3 standard was adopt-ed as an "estab-
lished Federal standard" under § 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 
I 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate pro-
tection of workers for the period between enactment of the 
statute and promulgation of permanent standards.16 
In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of 
1~ Indeed the Senate Report on the Act expressly observed: 
"Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis regarding the 
magnitude of the problem. For example, despite repe!J,ted warnings over 
the years from other countries that their cotton workers suffered from 
lung disease, it ib only within the past decade that we have recognized 
byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease among workers in American 
cotton mills." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis. 
Hist. 143. 
14 "Total dust" includes both respirable and nonrespirable cotton dust. 
a The Secretary of Labor adopted the threshold limit values contained 
in a list that had been prepared by the ACGIH. 
tu Section 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), provides in pertinent 
part : 
" [T]he Secretary shall , as soon as practicable during the period begin-
ning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two year~ after 
such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health ~tand­
ard . . . any l'stabli~hed Fedl'ral st!mdard, unless he determinl's that the 
promulgation of such a ~;tandard would not result in improved ::;afety ot' 
health for specifically designated employees." 
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respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous expo-
sure limit recommendation to 200 ug/m3, measured by a 
vertical elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust par-
ticles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, 
col. 1, 27355, col. 2.11 That same year, the Director of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH)/8 pursuant to the Act, 29 U.S. C. §§ 669 (a)(3), 
671 (d)(2), submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recom-
mendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible ex-
posure limit (PEL) that "should be set at the lowest level 
feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as 
high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu. m.," or 200 ug/m3 
of lint-free respirable dust. 1u Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41 
Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA 
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 
Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from inter-
17 In many cotton preparation and manufacturing operations, including 
opening, picking, and carding, 1000 ugj m3 of total dust is roughly equi-
valent to 500 ug/m3 of re:spirable dust. Joint App. 464; 43 Fed. Reg. 
27361, col. 2; Sft> ·infra, n . 22. 
18 The Act establi:shed the National ln:;titute for Occupational Safety and 
Health as part of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
NIOSH is authorized, inter alia, to "develop and establish recommended 
occupational safety and health standards." 29 U. S. C. § 671 (c) (1) . At 
the requPst of the Secretaries of Labor or HEW, or on his own initiative, 
the Director of NIOSH may 
"conduct such research and experimPntal programs as he determines are· 
nere::;sa ry for the development of criteria for new and improved occupa-
tional »afety and health standards, and ... after comsideratiou of the 
tesults of :;uch research and experimental programs make recommenda-
tion~ concerning new or improved occupational safety and health stand-
a rd~" ld .. § 671 (d) . 
111 NIOSH presented itt. recommendation in a lengthy and detailed docu-
ment entitled "Criteria for a Recommended Standard: Occupational Ex-
po:;ure of Cotton Dust." Ex 1, Ct. of Avp. J . A. 1-169. The report 
examined the effect:s of cotton du:;t exposure and suggested implementation· 
of work practi ce:s, enginl:'ering controls, medical surveillance, and monitoc--
ing to decrease expo.,;ure to the recommended leveL 
-.. 
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ested parties on the NIOSI! recommendation and other re-
lated matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker's Union 
of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest 
Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more 
stringent PEL of 100 ug/m3. 
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to re-
place the existing Federal standard on cotton dust with a 
new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b)(5) of the Act, 
29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) . 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. · The pro-
posed standard contained a PEL of 200 ug/m3 of vertical 
elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for all segments of 
the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implemen-
tation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respira-
tors for the short-term and engineering' controls for the long-
term. !d., at 56506, col. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested 
parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period."0 
Following the comment period; OSHA conducted .three 
hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lub-
bock, Tex. that lasted over 14 days. Public participation 
was widespread, involving representatives from industry and 
the workforce, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists, 
and many others. By the time the informal rule-making 
procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments 
and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed. 
Reg. 27351 , col. 2. The volu:rpinous record, composed of a 
transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and post-
hearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages. 
- U. S. App. D. C. -, 617 F. 2d, .at 647. OSHA issued 
its final Cotton Dust Standard-the one challenged in the in-
stant case- on June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying 
statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69 
pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418; see 
29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980). 
20 The Act specifies an informal rulemaking procedure to accompany the 
promulgation of occupational safety and health :rtandards. See 29 U.S .. C. 
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The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA estab .. 
lishes mandatory PELs over an 8-hour period of 200 ug/m3 
for yarn manufacturing,21 750 ug/m3 for slashing and weav~ 
ing operations, and 500 ug/m3 for all other processes in the 
cotton industry.22 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c).· These levels 
represent a rela.xation of the proposed PEL of 200 ug/m3 for 
all segments of the cotton industry. 
OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard 
that depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls, 
such as installation of ventilation systems,23 and work prac-
tice controls, such as special floor sweeping procedures. Full 
compliance with the PELs is required within 4 years, except 
to the extent that employers can establish that the engineer-
21 The Standard provide~:- that exposure to lint-free respirable cotton 
dust may be measured by a vertical elutriator, with its 15-micron particle 
size cutoff, or "a method of equivalrnt accuracy and precitlion." 29 
CFR § 1910.1043 (c). 
22 The manufacturing of cotton textilr products is divided into several 
different stages. (1) In the operations of opening. picking, carding, draw-
ing, and roving, raw cotton is cleaned and prrparrd for spinning into 
yarn. Brief for Petitioners ATlVII et a!., at 7, n. 12. (2) In the opera-
tiontl of spinning, twisting. winding, spooling, and warping, the prepared 
cotton i::. made into yam and reudied for weaving and other proce~sing. 
ld , at 7, n 13. (3) In slashing and weaving, the yarn is manufactured 
into a woven fabric. Id. , at 7, n . 14. The Cotton Dust Standard defines 
"yarn manufacturing" to mean "all textile mill operations from opening 
to, but not including, slutihing and weaving." 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (b). 
See generally 43 Fed . Heg. 27:365, col. 1 und 2. 
The nontextile industries covered by the Standard's 500 ugjm3 PEL 
include, but arr not limited to, "warehousing, compressing of cotton lint, 
clal:l~ing and marketing, using cot ton yarn (i. e. knitting), reclaiming and 
marketing of textile manufacturing wuste, delinting of cottonl:leed, market-
ing a11d converting of linters, reclaiming and marketing of gin motes and 
batting, yarn felt manufacturing using wal:lte cotton fiberi:l and by prod· 
uct~." !d., at 27360, col. 3. 
~3 Venhlation syt<tems include general controls, such as central .air· 
conditioning, and !oral exhamt controls, which capture emissions of cotton 
dul:lt as clol:le to the point of generation as po:;sible. See 43 Fed. Reg. 
27363- 27364. 
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ing and work practice controls are infeasible. /d., § 1910.1043 
(e) ( 1) . During this compliance period, and at certain other 
times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators 
to employees. /d. , § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements in-
clude monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveil-
lance of all employees, annual medical examinations, em-
ployee education and training programs, and the posting of 
warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in 
the instant case requires employers to transfer employees 
unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, 
having a dust level at or below the Standard's PELs, with 
"no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits 
as a result of the transfer." !d., § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v) . 
On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the 
Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents 
a "significant health hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, 
col. 1, and that "the prevalence of byssinosis should be signifi-
cantly reduced" by the adoption of the Standard's PELs, id., 
at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust 
and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA 
relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relation-
ship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the coucentra-
tion of lint-free respirable cotton dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 27355-
27359; Exhibit t>-51, Joint App. 29-55. See also Ex. t>-17, 
Ct. of App. J . A. 235-245; id., at 1492-1839. Even at the 
200 ug/m3 PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least 
Grade 1/ 2 byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the 
yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Re~. 27359, col. 2 and 3. 
In enacting the Cotton Dust StandarJ, OSHA interpreted 
the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard 
to protect against material health impairment, bounded only 
by technological and economic feasibility . /d., at 27361, col. 
3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative pro-
posal for a PEL of 500 ug/m3 in yarn manufacturing, 
a proposal which would produce a 25 %· prevalence of at 
least Grade 1/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the 
• 
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Standard to be both technologically and economica.lly feasi-
ble based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Al-
though recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cot-
ton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless 
rejected the union proposal for a 100 ug/m3 PEL because 
it was not within, the "technologic~i1 capabilities of the indus-
try." 43 Fed. Reg. 27359-27360. Similarly, OSHA set 
PELs for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 ug/m3 
in part because of limitations of technological feasibility. 
ld., at 27361, col. 3. Finally, the Secretary found that "engi-
neering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even 
with massive expenditures by the industry," id., at 27360, col. 
2. and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL 
cf 750 ug/ m3 for weaving apd slashing. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major 
respects.24 The court rejected the industry's claim that 
OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give suffi-
cient reasons for failing to adopt it. 617 F. 2d, at 652-654. 
The court also held that the Standard was "reasonably nec-
essary and appropriate" within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material 
health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 617 
F. 2d, at 654-655, 654, n. 83. Rejecting the industry posi-
tion that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the 
Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead 
agreed with OSHA's interpretation that the Standard must 
protect. employees against material health impairment sub-
. jePt only to the limits of technological and economic feasi-
bility. ld., at 662-666. The court held that l'Congress 
itself struck the balance between costs and benefits in the 
mandate to ·the agency" under § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act, 29 
24 The court remanded to the agency that portion of the Standard deal-
ing with the cottonseed oil industry, after concluding that the record 
failed to establish adequately the Standard's economic feasibility. -. - -
1!. S. App. D. C. -, 617 F . 2d 636, 009, 677 (1979) .. 
''"'· 
-· 
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U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), and that OSHA is powerless to cir .. 
cumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most pro~ 
tective feasible standard. 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the 
court held that the agency's determination of technological 
and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record as a whole. ld., at 655-662. 
We affirm in part, and vacate in part.25 
21l At oral argument, and in a letter addressed to the Court after oral 
argument, petitioners contended that the Secretary's recent amendment of 
OSHA's so-called "Cancer Policy" in light of this Court's decision in 
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, - U. S. 
- (1980), was relevant to the issues in the present case. We di~agree. 
OSHA amended its Cancer Policy to "carry out the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that consideration 
must, be given to the significance of the risk in the issuance of a carcinogen 
standard nne! that OSHA must COJJsider all relevant evidence in making 
tlwse determinations." 46 fed. Reg. 4889, col. 3 (1981). Previously, 
although laeking such evidence as dose response data, the Secretary pre-
sumed that. no safe exposure level existed for carcinogenic substances. In-
(lustrial Un:ion Department v. American Petmleum Institute, supra, slip 
op., nt 10, 13-14, 25, n. 39-40. Following this Court's decision, OSHA 
deleted those Jlrovisi9ns of the Cancer Policy which required the "auto-
mHtic setting of the lowest feasible level" without regard to determinations 
of risk significance. /d., at 4890, col. 1. 
In distinct contrast with its Cancer Policy, OSHA expressly found that 
"exposure to cotton dust presents a significant heHlth hazard to em-
ployees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1, and that "cotton dust produced 
significant health effects at low levels of exposure," id., at 27358, col. 2. 
In addition, the agency noted that "grade 1;2 byssinosis and associated 
pulmonary function decreme11ts are significant health effects in themselves 
and should be prevented in so far as possible." !d., nt 27354, col. 2. In 
mHking its assessment of significant risk, OSHA relied on dose response 
curve dat'a (the Merchant Study) showing that 25% of employees suffered 
at least Grade 1f2 byssinosis at a 500 ug/m3 PEL, and that 12.7% of aU 
employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 ugjm3 PEL standard. /d., 
at 27358, col. 2 Hnd 3. Examining the Merchant Study in light, of other 
studies in the record, the agency found that "the Merchant, study provides 
a reliable asRessment of health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton 
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II 
The principal question presented in this case is whether 
the· Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secre .. 
tary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of 
the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) ( 5), to determine that the costs 
of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits. 
Relying on §§ 6 (b)(5) and 3,(8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 655 (b)(5), 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA 
must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of 
material health impairment, see Industrial Union Department 
v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 29, but 
also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk 
of material health impairment is significant in light of the 
costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners 
ATMI et al., at 38-41.26 Respondents on the other hand 
byssinosis should be significantly reduced" by the 200 ugjm3 PEL. Jd., 
at 27359, col. 3; see id., at 27359, col. 1 ("200 ugjm3 represents a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of affected worker~"). It is difficult to 
imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court 's decision 
in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute . 
26 PetitiOners ATMI et a!. express their position in several ways . They 
maintain that OSHA "is required to show that a reasonable relationship 
exists between the risk reduction benefits and the costs of its shmdards." 
Brief fo1 Petitioners ATMI et a!., at 36. Petitioners also suggest that 
OSHA must :show that "the :standard is expected to achieve a significant 
reduction in [the significant risk of material health impairment] " ba!:ied on 
"an assesbment of the cost:; of achieving it." · /d., at 38, 40. Allowing 
that "[t] hi::; does not mean that OSHA must engage in a rigidly formal 
cost-bPnefit calculation that place:; a dollar value on employee lives or 
health," ~d. , at 39, petitioners describe the required exerci:se as follows : 
' First, OSHA must make a respon:sible determination of the costs nnd r;sk 
reduction benefits of its standard. Pur:mant to the requirement of Sec-
tion 6 (f) of the Act, this determination must be factunlly supported by 
substantial evidence in the record . The subsequent determination whether 
the reduction in health nsk is ':;;gnificant ' (based upon the factual a~se:ss­
nwut of co::;ts and benefit~) is a judgment to be made by the agency in 
the first instance." 1 d., at 40. 
Hespondent disputes petitioners' description of' the exerciHe, claiming 
.... 
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eontend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate stand.., 
ards that eliminate or reduce such risks "to the extent such 
protection is technologically and economically feasible." 
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 38; Brief for 
Respondent Unions, at 26-27.27 To resolve this debate, we 
must turn to the language, structure, and legislative history 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
A 
The starting point of our analysis ls the language of the 
statute itself. Steadman v. SEC,- U.S.-, - (1981); 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section 
6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) (emphasis 
added), provides: 
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing 
that any meaningful balancing must involve ''plucing a [dollar] value on 
human life and freedom from suffering," Brief for Respondent Secretary of 
Labor, at 59, and that there iH no other way but through formal co:>t-
benefit analysis to accomplish petitioners' desired balancing, id, at 59-60. 
Cost-benefit analysis contemplates "systematic enumeration of all benefits 
and all costs, tang1ble and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or diffi-
cult to measure, that will accrue to all memuers of :;ociety if a particular 
project i:s adopted ." E . Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy 
Anulysis 104 (1978); see National Academy of Sciences, Decillion Making 
for Regulation Chemical in the Environment 38 ( 1975). See generally 
E . Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analy::;is (1976); Prest and Turvey, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, in 300 Economic Journal 680 (1965). Whether petitioner::; ' or 
te;;pondent'~ charactPrization is correct, we will sometime rt:>fer to peti-
tiont:>r'~ proposed ext:>rcise al' " cost-benefit analysi~." 
21 As described h:r the union respondentR, the test for determining 
whether a standard promulgatt:>d to regulate n ''toxic material or harmful 
physical agt:>nt" satisfif's the Act has three parts : 
"First, whether the 'place of employmt:>nt i~ unsafe-in the sense that 
significant ri~Jk:; are present and can bt:> t:>liminatt:>d or lel:ll:lt'lled by a change 
m practicel:l .' [International Union Department, ,;lip op., at 32 (plurality 
opinion)] . Second, whether of the ]J08Slble available corrt:>ctives the· Secre ... 
tary had selected 'the ,;tandard .. . that i;; mo::;t protective'. Ibid. Tlmd, 
whether that :'ltandard ib 'fea~uble .' " Bnef for Re::;pondent Unions, at 
40-41 • 
.~- .. ,-:.~ .. , 
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with toxic materit:\1S or harmful physical agents under 
this subsection, shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of 
the best available evidence,. that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity 
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard 
. dealt with by such standard for the period of his working 
life." 2.s 
Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that 
the phrase "to the extent feasible" contains the critical lan-
guage in § 6 (b) ( 5) for purposes of this case. 
The plain meaning of the word "feasible" supports re-
spondentsr m terp~tation of the 7tatute-:-- According to Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language, "feasible" means "capable of being done, executed, 
or effected." !d., at 831 (1Q76). Accord, · The Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary 116 (1933) ("Capable of being done, accom-
plished or carried out"); Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard)Y 
Dictionary of the English Language 903 (1957) ("That may 
be done, performed or effected"). Thus, § 6 (b)( 5) directs 
the Secretary to issue the standard that "most adequately 
assures ... that no employee will suffer material impairment 
of health," limited only by the extent to which this is "capa-
ble of being done." In effect then, as the Court of Appeals 
held, Congress itself defined the relationship between costs 
and benefits, by placing the "bene:ijt" of worker health above 
f& SE:ction 6 (b)( 5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) ( 5}, aliso provides: 
ccnevelopment of standards under this subsection ~hall be based npon 
res1•arch, demonstration;;, experiments, and :such other information as may 
be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of 
health and safety protection for the employee, other con~iderations shall 
be the latest available ~:<cientific data, · iu the field, thr fea8ibility of the 
standards, and experience gained under thif' and othrr hPalth and tiafety 
law:;. Whenewr practicable, the standard promulgated :;hall be expre:;~ed 
m term:; of objective criteria, and of the performance desired;" 
·' 
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all other considerations save those making attainment of thig 
"benefit" unachievable. Further balancing of costs and ben-
efits by the Secretary would be inconsistent with the com-
mand set forth in § 6 (b)(S), because it might lead to a dif-
ferent balance than that struck by Congress. Thus, not only 
is cost-benefit analysis by OSHA not required by the statute, 
but it is precluded.29 See Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 32 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). 
When Congre~ has i!lt,ended.. that_ an sgency engage in I 
cost-benefit analysiS, it has clearl ind' u intent on 
tne lace of tile statute. One early example is the Flood Con-
trol Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 710a. 
"""'= -
"[T]he Federal Government should improve or partici-
pate in the improvement of navigable waters or their 
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-con-
trol purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may ac-
crue are in excess of the est'imated costs, and if the lives 
and social security of people are otherwise adversely 
affected.'1 
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
29 In this case we are faced only with the issue whether the Act requires 
or permits OSHA to balance costs and benefits in promulgating a single 
toxic material and lut rmful physical agent standard under § 6 {b) { 5). 
Petitioners arg11e that without cost-benefit balancing, · the issuance of a 
single standard mighL result in a "serious misallocation of the finite re-
sources that an• available for the proteetion of worker safety and health," 
given the other health hazards in the workplace. Reply Brief for Peti-
tioners ATMI eta!., at 10; see Brief for Petitioners ATMI eta!., at 38-39. 
This argument is more properly addressed to other provisions of the Act 
which may authorize OSHA to explore costs and benefit~; for deciding be-
tween issuance of several standards regulating different varieties of health 
and safety hazards, e. g., § 6 {g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (g); see 
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip 
op., at 33, or for promulgating other types of standard:s not issued under 
§ 6 (b) (5). We express no view on tlwse que~tiomo. 
·, 
. ' 
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Act Amendments of 19'78, 43 U. S. C. § 1347 (b), providing· 
that offshore drilling operations shall use 
"the best av~ilable and safest technologies which the 
Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wher-
ever failure of equipment would have a signific4nt effect 
on safety, health, or the environment, except where the 
Secretary d~termines that the incrernental benefits are 
clearly insufficient to j-ust·ify the incremental costs of 
using such technologies." 
These and other statutes 30 demonstrate that Congress uses 
30 See, e. g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 6295 (c) , (d) ; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972,33 U. S. C. §1312(b){l), (2); §1314(b)(l)(B) ; Clean Water 
Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (b) (4) (B); Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, 42 U. S. C.§ 7545 (c) (2){B) . In the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress directed the J\.dministr~­
tor to consider "the total co~t of application of technology in relation to 
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application. " 3a 
U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (1) ("BPT" limitations) . With regard to 19~7 effluent 
limitations, the Adminio;trator it~ directed to con::;ider total cost, but not in 
comparison with effluent reduction benefits. Jd., § 1314 (b) (2) (B) 
("BAT" limitations) . See EPA v. National Cr·ushed .Stone Assn., No. 79-
770, ::;lip op., at 5-6, 6, n. 10, 11- 12. 
In other statutes, Congress has used the phra8e "unreason~ble risk," 
accompanied by explanation in legislative hi~tory, to o;ignify a generaliZf•d 
balancing of costs and benefit s. See, e. g., the Consumer Safety Act ol' 
1972, 15 U. S. C. § 2056 (a) ( "unrea~onable risk of injury"); B. R. Rep. 
No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Seso;., 33 (1972) (where the House ~tated: 
"It should be noted that the Commi~sion's authority to promulgate 
standard~ under this bill i::, limitl:'d to in::stances where the hazard as::;o-
ciated with a consumer product pre~ent::, an upreasonable risk of death, 
injury, or serious or frequent illne~& . . . . Protection against unreasonable 
risks is central to many Federal and State s~ fety statutes and the court~ 
have had broad experience in interpreting the term's meaning and appli-
cation. It, is generally expected th~t the determination of unreasonable 
l1azard will involve the Commission in balancing the probability that rio;k 
will result in harm and the gravity of such harm againo;t the effect on the 
product's utility, co~Sts, and availability to the co11sumer.") ; 
S. Rep. No. 92-749, !J:2d Cong., 2d Ses;,., 14-15. See also Aqua Slidl' 'N'" 
Dive · Cmp. v Consumer Product Safety Co rnrnissiuu, 569 F . 2d H31, 83!:1 
· ..
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specific language when intending that an agency engage in 
cost-benefit aualysis. See Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 23, n. 27 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary 
meaning, the word "feasible" cannot be construed to articu-
late such congressional intent. We therefore reject the argu-
ment that Congress required or authorized cost-benefit anal~ 
ysis in § 6 (b)(5). 
B 
"The term 'occupational safety and health standard~ 
means a standard which requires conditions, or the adop-
tion or use of one or more practices, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appro-
pr·i.ate to provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment." 
Taken alone, the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropri~ 
ate" might be construed to contemplate some balancing of 
the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that, 
sp construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis require-
(CA5 1978) ; Forester v. Consumer· P1·od'Uct Safety Commission, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 559 F . 2d 774, 789 (1977). 
At least one Senator thought that the Occupational Safpty and HPalth 
Act did not contemplate cost-bPnPfit analysis. In 1973, Senator Chile:; 
introduced an amendment to the Act, that, int'er alia, 
" directs the Secretary to recognize the cost-benefit ratio in promulgating a 
new standard and to publish information relative to the projected financial 
impact. This provision will promote the development of standards jui:i-
tifiable in terms of the benefits to be derived and afford those to be 
affected an opportunity to make a reasoned evaluation of the propo:sal."' 
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ment on the issuance of § 6 (b) ( 5) standards, even if § 6 (b) 
( 5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not 
decide whether § 3 (8), standing alone, would contemplate 
some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Con-
gress specifically chose in § 6 (b) ( 5) to impose separate and 
additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of oc-
cupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic 
materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those 
standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health 
to the extent feasible. Congress could reasonably have con-
cluded that health standards should be subject to different 
criteria than safety standards because of the special problems 
presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Depart-
rnent v. American Petrole·um Institute, supra, slip op., at :38-
39, n. 54 (plurality opiniou) . 
Agreement with petitioners' argument that § 3 (8) imposes 
an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit anal-
ysis on the issuance of § 6 (b)( 5) standards would eviscerate 
the "to the extent feasible" requirement. Standards would 
inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analy-
sis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b) ( 5). For exam-
ple, if cost-benefit a.nalysis indicated a protective standard 
of 1000 ug/ m3 PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a 
500 ug/m3 PEL, the agency would be forced by the cost-
benefit requirement to choose the less stringent point.31 We 
cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of 
§ 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement 
of § 6 (b) ( 5). Adoption of petitioners' interpretation would 
effeetively write § 6 (b)(5) out of the Act. We decline to 
render Congress' decision to include a feasibility requirement 
, 1 In addition , as the legislative hbtory make:> plain, see infra, at 23-24, 
any standard that was not, economically or technologically feasible would 
a fort iori not be "reasonably necessary or appropriate'' under the Act. 
See Indnstrial Union D epartment v. Hodgson, - U. S. App. D . C. -, 
499 F 2d 467, 478 {1974) (''Congre:;:; does not appear to have intended 
to protect employee~ by putting their employer<> out of bu~ine~~ '') . 
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nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rule that all 
parts of a statute, if poss;_ble, are to be given effect. E. g., 
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S, 
609, 633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 
303, 307-308 (1961). Congress eschewed any further bal-
ancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful physical 
agents standards, and we should not "impute to Congress a 
purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote 
with the other.'' Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dun-
rdng, Inc., s·upra, at 631 , quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz~ 
Korportion _. 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947).32 
c 
The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not 
crystal clear, provides general support for respondents' inter-
pretation of the Act. The congressional reports and debates 
certainly confirm that Congress meant "feasible" and nothing 
else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the 
Act. might be thought to requ'ire achievement of absolute 
eafety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that 
12 Thi~ il:l not to say that § 3 (8) might not require the balancing of 
tests and benefits for standards promulgated under provisions other than 
t6 (b) (5) of the Act. As a plurality of this Court noted in Industrial nion Department , if § 3 (8) had no substantive content, "there 
would be no statutory criteria at all to guide the Secretary in promulgating 
either national consensus standards or permanent standards other than 
those dealing with toxic materials and harmful physi~al agents." Slip op., 
at 29- 30, n . 45. Furthermore, the mere faet that a § 6 (b) (5) standard is 
" feasible '' doe:; not mean that § 3 (8) 's "reasonably necessary or appro-
priate" language might not impose additional restraints on OSHA. For 
example, all § 6 (b) ( 5) standards must be addressed to "significant risks" 
of material health impairment. ld., at 32. In addition , if the use of 
one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk a;,; the use 
of five, the use of fivt' respirators was "technologically and economically 
feasible," and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate'' limitation might come into play as an addi-
tional restriction on OSHA to choose the one-respirator standarrl. In this 
rase we need not decide all the applirations that §. 3 (8) might have, either· 
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health and safety goals be capable of economic and techno-
logical accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence 
.,{ any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA 
to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating 
a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. · The 
legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress 
was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substan-
tial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such 
eosts were part of the cost of doing business. We thus turn 
to the relevant portions of the legislative history. 
Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, introduced by 
~enator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785, 
introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific pro-
visions controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic 
materials and harmful physical agents, Legis. Hist. 1, 6-7 
(Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both 
.ontained the definitional section now codified as § 3 (8) .83 
The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the 
Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that 
included the following section: 
"The Secreta.ry, in promulgating standards under this 
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, on the basis of the best available professional 
evidence, that no e~ployee will suffer any impairment 
of health or functional capacity, or diminished life ex-
pectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to 
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period 
of his working life." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785) ~ 
Legis. Hist. 834. 
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, re-
porting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtuaJly 
sa Although both versions of the Act contained provisions identical to 
§ 3 (8), 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), there is no discussion in the legislative his-
tQry nf ·the meauing t)f the phrase "reasonably nece::>5:Hy or appropriate.'" 
·' 
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identical to the House version, except for the additional re-
quirement that the Secretary set the standard ".which most 
adequately and feas·ibly assures ... that no employee will 
suffer any impairment of health." Legis. Hist. 242 (the Sen-
ate provision was numbered § 6 (b)( 5)) (emphasis added). 
This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator 
Javits, who explained his amendment: 
"As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting 
standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of 
proposed standards. This is an improvement over the 
Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee], 
which might be interpreted to require absol·ute health 
and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the 
Administration bill, which contains no criteria for stand-
ards at all. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 
58; Legis. Hist. 197 (emphasis added). 34 
14 Petitioners' primary legislative history argument is that Senator Javit:s 
"took the position that OSHA standard~ should be 'feasible' in the sen.,e 
of being 'reasonable' and 'practical' as well as technologically achievable." 
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., aL 32. A review of the record belies 
this contention. Senator Javits himself had introduced the Administra-
tion's bill, S. 2788, which he observed contained no criteria for issuance of 
l:ltandards. Legi::;. Hist. 31, 39-42. That proposed legislation, which estab-
lished a National Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate 
standards, required the Board to submit proposed standards to an appro-
priate national standards-producing organization "to prepare a report on 
the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of snch standard.'' 
Jd., at 39. Furthermore, either thP Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and WelfarE' coulu object to a propoBed standard on 
the basis, inter alia, that it " ir, not fea~;;ible," id., at 40, at which point the 
Board could reaffirm the standard by a majority vote, ibid. President 
Nixon's message accompanying S. 2788, which Senator Javits inserted in 
the Congressional Record, described the "report oil the technical feasi· 
bility, reasonablen!:'~s and practicality of such standard" under the Act a~ a 
" report on the feasibility of the proposer! ~t:mdards." 115 Cong. Hec. 
22517. 
From this slim reed petitioners fashion their legislative hi~;;tory argu-
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'l"hus the Senator's ce,ncern was that a standard might require 
"absolute health and safety" without any consideration as to 
whether such a condition was achievable. · The full Senate 
Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this 
provision "shall represent feasible requirements," id., at· 7; 
Legis. Hist. 147, and commented that "[s]uch standards 
should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no em-
ployee will suffer impaired health . • . ," ibid. (emphasis 
added). 
The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting 
in § 6 (b )(5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the 
Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Sen-
ator Dominick, who played a prominent role in this amend-
ment process, see Legis. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits); 
527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned 
that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He 
therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b)(5) 
be struck, explaining: 
"This requirement is inherently confusing and un-
realistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to 
ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of 
injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case 
of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all 
risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria 
. could, if literally applied, close every business in this 
nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which 
might most 'adequately' and 'feasibly' assure the elim-
in~tion of the daJlger would be the prohibition of the 
occupation itself." Legis. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen. 
dent Nixon on the proposed legislation, of which there is some doubt, see 
115 Cong. Rec. 22512, this hardly supports the view that the Senator's 
addition of the fensibility requirement to the Williams bill included any 
such baggage. After all, the Senator described hiR amendment only with 
the word "fea~ible," and specifically distinguished the amended Williams 
bill from the Administration's, on the basis of the latter'~ lack of criteria. 
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Dominick on his Pllopesed ttmendment No, 1054) (em, 
phasis in original). 
In the ensuing floor d~ba.te on this issue, Senator Dominick 
reiterated hjs concern that "[i] t is unrealistic to attempt, as 
[the Committee's Section 6 (b)( 5)] apparently does, to es-
tablish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is 
an impossibility .•.. " Legis. Hist. 480.85 The Sentttor con-
cluded tha,t 11 [a]ny administrator responsible for enforcing 
the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either 
he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is 
any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could 
not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of 
Congress. ~ .. " Id., at 481-482. 
Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sen-
tence of §13 (b){ 5) deleted. However, after working with 
Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended ver-
sion of the first sentence which he though "agreeable to all" 
and which became § 6 (b)(5) as it now appears in the Act. 
!d., at 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6 
(b)( 5) to "toxic materials and harmful physical agents,'; 
changed 11health impairment" to "materiftl health impair-
ment," and deleted t~1e reference to "diminished life expect-
ancy." ~ignificantly, the feasibility requirement was left 
intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase "which most 
adequately and feasibly assures," the amendment merely sub-
stituted 11which most adequately assures, to the extent feasi-
85 Senator Dominick gave :severn! examples. }'or instance: 
' ' [L]et Ub take a fellow who is a streetcar conductor or a bus conductor· 
at the present time. How in the world, in the process of the pollution we 
have in the streets or in the process of t.he automobile accidents that we 
have all during a working day of anyone driving a bus or trolley car, ot 
whatever it may be, can we se1 standards that will make sure he will not; 
have any risk to his life for the rest of his life? It is totally impossible fot 
this to be pu1 in a bill ; and yet it is in the committee bill." Legis. Hi~t .. 
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ble,H to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated 
as a limit on the promulgation of standard under§ 6 (b)(5). 
Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made 
clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working envi-
ronment could not be achieved through "prohibition of the 
occupation itself," id., at 367, and that toxic material and 
harmful physical agent standards should not address frivo-
lous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility 
requirement, along with the need for a "material health im., 
pairment," were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns, 
He explained the effect of the amendment: 
"What we were trying to do in the bill-unfortunately, 
we did not have the proper wording or the proper draft-
ing-was to say that when we are dealing with toxic 
agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps 
as are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere 
within which a person's health or safety would not be 
affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing 
that anyone would be assured that no one would have a 
hazard .... " !d. , at 502. 
Senator Williams added that the amendment "will provide a 
continued direction to the Secretary that he shall be required 
to set the standard which most adequately and to the great-
est extent feasible assures" that no employee will suffer any 
material health impairment. !d., at 503. The Senate there-
after passed S. 2193. One week latrr. the House passPd a 
substitnte bill for its original bill, which failPd to contain 
any substantive criteria for the issnanre of health standards. 
Legis. Hist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Confer-
enrf'. howevrr . the House confere0R acceded to the Senate's 
v0rsion of § 6 (b)( :1) 3" 
$h [n acr·eding, the Reuse obtained Senate agreement to another amend-
ment , now § 6 (b) (6) (A) of the Act , that allowed employen; t o petition 
t'or a temporary vari:m~e from an occupational safety and health standard 
in ceftaln ruse~ , except that "[e]ronomic hardship is not to be a con-
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Not only qoes the legislative history confirm that Congress 
meant "feasible" rather than "cost-benefit" when it used the 
former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that 
the Af't would create substantial costs for employers, yet in-
tendE'd to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe 
and healthful working environment. 37 Congress viewed the 
costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Sena-
tor Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated: 
"We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but 
that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in 
America." Legis. Hist. 444. He asked: 
"One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too 
sideration for the qualifiration for a temporary extension nrder." H. R 
Conferepce Rep. No. 91-1765, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 35; Legis. Hist . 1188. 
The Conference Report limited the variance procedure to the followin ~ 
rases: 
"unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of ne"PSSArv 
materials or equipment or because necessary construction or alteration nf 
facilities cannot be rompleted on time. . . . Surh an order may be i~~urd 
for a maximum period of one year and may not be renewed more than 
twir·e." Ibid. 
87 Berause the rnsts of cornplianre wnuld weigh partirularly hPwi!v 01, 
t;mall bu~inesses, Congress Jll'o··ided in & 213 of the Art 11n am~l'cim~nt to 
the f?mall Busine~8 Act, 15 U. S. C. & 6:36 making sm1ll busi11esses e!igib!r 
for economic assistance throul!,'h the Sm1ll Business Admi"istration to rom-
JJly with standard~ promulgated by the Secretary. Legis. Hi~t . 1257. 
Senator Dominick explained : 
"There is a provision in the bill whirh recognizes the · impact that thi~ 
particular legislation may have on small businesses. . . . It perm'ts the 
Secretary to make loans to small busiwsse;; wherever the stancln rds that 
are set by the National Government are so ~evere as to have raused }t 
real and substantial economic in.iury. Under thrse circumstances, the 
Secretary is entitled, through the Small Business Administration , to mnke 
loans to those businesses to get them over the hump, b2cause of the need 
for new equipment, or because of new conditions within the shop, whirh 
would permit them to continue in operation. 
"I think that is a very significant and important provision for mini-
P1izing economic injury which could occur if the bill resulted in situationS' 
which would have very serious effects on businessE:'S." Legis . Hist. 525. 
•' ·,
'• ' .. 
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expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety 
equipment loses the services of its skilled employees? 
Is it too expensjve for the employee who loses his hand 
. or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow 
trying to raise her children on meager allowance under 
workmen's compensation and social security? And what 
about the man-a good hardworking man-tied to a 
wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That 
is what we ~e dealing with when we talk about indus~ 
trial safety. . . . We are talking about people's lives, 
not the indifference of some cost accountants." Legis. 
IIist. 510. 
~enator Eagleton commented that "[t]he costs that wi11 be 
incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and 
~;afety to be established under this bill are, in my view, rea-
lonable and necessary costs of doing business." Legis. Hist. 
1150-1151 (emphasis added).38 
Other Members of Congress voiced similar views.30 No-
where is there any indication that Congress intended a fur-
58 .Congress was concerned that some employers not obtain a competi-
tive advantage over others by declining to inve~t in worker health and 
llafety: 
"Although many employers in all induslries have demonstrated Hn ex-
emplary degree of concern for health and safety in the workplacP, their 
efforts are to often undercut by those who 11re not so concerned. More-
over, the fact is that many employers-particularly smallPr ones-
a;imply cannot make the necp~sary invPBtment in health and safety, and 
~urvivP competitively, unle~s all are compelled to do ~o." S .. Rep. 91-1282, 
!ilst Cong., 2d Sess., 4, Legis . Hist.. 144. 
80 See, e. g., Legis. Hist. 1030-1031 (remarks of Congre:ssman Dent) : 
"Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs Lo the· 
operation of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad, 
I would ;;ay there is a greater concern and that must bt> for the production 
men who do the producing-the men who work in the service industries 
and the men and women in thiH country who daily go out and keep the 
economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work and 
to be able t o vrospe1 in it ."' 
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-ther balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health and 
safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Congress 
thought that the financ-ial costs of health and safety problems 
in the workplace were as large or larger than the financial 
costs of eliminating these problems. In its statement of 
findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act 
itself, Congress announced that "personal injuries and ill-
nesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial 
burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in 
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and 
disability compensation payment." 29 U. S. C. § 651 (a) 
'The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs: 
"[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disabil-
ity is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost 
wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product 
is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that 
could be available for productive use are siphoned oft' to 
pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical ex-
penses," S. Rep., supra, at 2; Legis. Hist. 142. 
Senator Eagleton summarized, "Whether we, as individuals, 
are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we 
can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe 
or unhealthy worksite." Legis. Hist. 1150-1151. 
III 
Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that "[t]he determina-
tions of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 
29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secre-
tary's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is "eco-
nomically feasible" is not supported by substantial evidence 
in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they 
elaim ( 1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs nec-
essary to meet the Standard's requirements; and (2) that 
' , 
., 
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OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not 
threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry. 
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of 
the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as "such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable miud might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusiou." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U. S. 474. 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take 
into account coutradictory evidence in the record, Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 487-488, but "the possi-
bility of drawing two iuconsistent conclusions from the evi-
dence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding 
from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v. 
Federal Mariti·me Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966). 
Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial 
evidence questious in the Courts of Appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655 
{f), we apply the familiar rule that "[t]his Court will inter-
vene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the 
rsubstantial evidence] standard appears to have been misap-
preheuded or grossly misapplied" by the court below. Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil 
Corp v. FPC, 417 U. S. 2S3, 292, 310 (1974); F1'C v. Stand-
ttrd Oil Co ., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our 
inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance, 
would fiud OSHA's findiugs supported by substantial evi-
dence. Instead we turu to OSHA's findings aud the record 
upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of 
Appeals "misappreheuded or grossly misapplied" the subst~:tn­
~ial evidence test. 
A 
OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance 
with the Cotton Dust Standard after reviewing two financial 
aualyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute 
(RTI) , an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry 
representatives (Hocutt-Thomas).40 The agency carefully 
•u Set> RTf, Cotton Dutil : Technological Fea~ibility Assessment ~ud 
• 
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explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the 
conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the 
agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which 
it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost 
estimate. A brief summary of OSHA's treatment of the two 
studies follows. 
OSHA rejected RTI's cost estimate of $1.1 billion for tex-
tile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons. 41 
First, OSHA believed that RTI's estimate should be dis-
counted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3, because that esti-
mate was based on the assumption that engineering controls 
would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those 
processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust · is 
·not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that 
"[e]xclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only 
~ould reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent." Ex. 6-
76, Ct. of App. J. A. 585.42 Since the Standard did not re-
final Inflationary Impact Statement (1976), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 
457, 57:3:_748; RTI, Technological Feasibility and Economic Impact of 
Regulations for Cotton Dust: Testimony to be Presented by the Research 
Triangle Institute at Public Hearing (1977), Ex. 16, Ct. of App. J . A. 1320, 
1351- 1357. The industry estimates were presented by Hovan Hocutt and 
Arthur Thomas, employees of dust control equipment manufacturers . 
Statement of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Pneumafil 
Corp., Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2228-2247; Statement of Arthur Thomas, 
Senior Vice-President, The Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, Ct. of App. J . A. 2248-
2257. OSHA referred collectively to these two statements as the Hocutt-
Thornas estimate. 
41 RTI estimated compliance costs of $984.4 million for yarn productinn 
(opening through spinning), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 473, and $127.7 
million for yarn processing (winding through weaving/slashing), id., at 
600. ln another part of its study, RTI estimated yarn production costs 
of $885.6 million . Jd., at 589. The explanation for this discrepancy is 
not readily apparent from the record, although it may be attributable to 
cost estimates for different years. 
42 RTI made what it called a "conservative estimate" that "control5 
would be applied to all the production equipment in mills processing cotton 
and cotton-synthetic blends, even if part of their product is pure syn-
thetlc.'1 Ex. 6-7tl, Ct. of App, J . A, 585. ,, 
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ttuire controls on synthetics-only equipmeut, OSHA rejected 
RTI's assumption about application of controls to synthetics-
only machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3. Second, OSHA 
concluded that RTI "may have over-estimated compliauce 
costs since some operations are already in compliance with 
the permissible exposure limit of the new standard." ld., at 
27370, col. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some mills 
had attained PELs of 200 ug/m3 or less, while others were 
below the 100 ug/m3 total dust level.H Therefore, OSHA 
disagreed with RTI's assumption that the industry had not 
reduced cotton dust exposure below the existing standard's 
1000 ug/m3 total dust PEL. ld., at 27370, col. 3. Third, 
OSHA fouud that the RT'I study suffered from lack of recent 
accurate industry data. ld., at 27373, col. 1; see Ex. 6-76, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 858; Ex. 16, id., at 1357, 1359. 
In light of these deficiencies in the RT'I study, OSHA 
adopted the Hocutt-Thomas estimate for textile industry en-
gineering controls of $543 million,44 emphasizing that, be-
48 RTI's David LeSourd explained that RTI did not have data on the 
degree of compliance for the industry as a whole, but only for some 
specific mills. Ct. of App . .T. A. 3637-3638. Therefore RTI merely 
assumed that industry-wide PELs were at a 1000 ug/m3 total dust PEL. 
Ex. 6-76, id., at 579-580. The record contains conflicting evidence on the 
actual lew! of control in the industry. Some evidence suggests compliance 
by mills substantially better than the 1000 ugjm3 total dust level. See, 
e. g. , Ex. 47, id., at 2037 (66% of Burlington Industries work areas at 
or below 500 ugjm3, 28% below 200 ug/m3); Ex. 78, id., at 2387. One 
expert , commenting on another study, observed that "substantial propor-
tions of the indm;try are, in fact , within compliance of [200 ugjm3] ." 
Ct. of App. J . A. 3637. Other evidence in the record suggests that s~me 
segments of the industry are not in compliance with the 1000 ugjm3 
total dust PEL. See e. g , id, at 3939 (criticizing RTI assumption of 
compliance) . In any event, OSHA found that the "actual level of controls 
in the cotton industry could not be determined" on the basis of data 
available to RTI at the time of its study. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 3. 
41 OSHA'o cost estimate included $543 million for engineering controls 
(the Hocutt-Thoma::; e~Stimate), $7 million for monitoring, medical sur-
velllance, at1d other proviswnl:l (the RTI estimate), $31.5 million for waste 
' .. 
' 
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cause it was based on the most recent industry data, it was 
more realistic than RTI's estimate. 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 
V " Nevertheless OSHA concluded that the Hocutt-Thomas 
estimate was overstated for four principal reasons. First, 
Hocutt-Thomas included costs of achieving the existing PEL 
of 1000 ug/m3, while OSHA thought it likely that compli~ 
ance was more widespread and that some mills had in fact 
achieved the final standard's PEL. Ibid., see supra, at 30, 
n. 43.16 Second, Hocutt-Thomas declined to make any allow-
ance for the trend toward replacement of existing production 
machines with newer more productive equipment. 47 Relying 
proces~ing, and $75 million for ~eed proce~ing, for a total of $656.5 million. 
43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 1. 
45 The Hocutt-Thomas ,;tudy based its estimates on data obtained from 
R recent ATMI survey of cotton mills . Completed quel:ltionnaires from 
353 mills, which processed 80% of the cotton balel:l in the United States, 
were returned. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2231. 
40 The Hocutt-Thomas study included an allowance for existing com-
pliance efforts, by subtracting from its total estimate the cost of all eugi-
neering controls purchased by the industry prior to February 11, 1977. 
Ex. 60, C1. of App. J . A. 2232, 2247. Whether this is a sufficient proxy 
for current industry compliance is not apparent from the record. Hocutt 
himself admitted that he did not have figures on what portion of the 
indul:ltry was meeting the 1000 ug/ m3 total dust PEL. Ct. of App. J . A. 
3941. 
17 John Figh, a vite-president at Chase Manhattan Bank specializing in 
the textile industry , commented on the trend toward modernizing equip-
ment in the milh:. : 
" [1:3]y continuing to upgrade plants with the most modern and efficient 
equipment, the textile manufacturing industry will likely not be required 
due to demand to add much in the way of new bricks and mortar. There 
may be l:lOme indiVldual cal:les of out-of-date facilities being replaced by 
new buildingl:l ; but for the most part, I believe we will o;ee more in the 
wa:v of modernization of exil:lting plants .... "· Ex. 63 , Ct. of App. J. A. 
2260 (emphasi:s addt>d). 
One study explained why the col:lts of controls should be lower if a mill 
converts to new e4uipment as opposed to retrofitting old machines : 
1 l) The operating col:lt of llf'W PQlllJlliWIIt with conlrob on that equipmpnt 
ir: le~;: thnn thP operatmg co;;t of tlw old Pquipmcnt with control~ 
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f>O. this "[n]atural production trend[]," 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, 
col. 1, OSHA concluded that fewer machines than estimated 
by Hocutt-Thomas would require retrofitting or other con-
trols, id., at 27372, col. 3. Third, OSHA thought that Hocutt-
Thomas failed to take into account development of new 
technologies likely to occur during the four-year compliance 
period. lbid. 48 Fourth, OSHA believed that Hocutt-Thomas 
might have improperly included control costs for synthetics-
only machines, ibid., an inclusion which could result in a 
30% cost overestimate.49 
Petitioners criticize OSHA's adoption of the Hocutt-
Thomas estimate, since that estimate was based on achieve-
ment of somewhat less stringent PELs than those ultimately 
promulgated in the final Sta.ndard.~0 Thus, even if the 
Hocutt-Thomas estimate was exaggerated, they assert that 
"only by the most remarkable coincidence would the amouut 
neeet>sary for the older, slower equipment to meet. proscribed [sic] dust 
levels; and 2) by going to newer equipment with controls there is a likeli-
hood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some or· 
all of the capital cost of control." Ex. 79A, id., at 2532; see Ex. 79C, 
id., at 2550-2551; Ex. 63, id., at 2261; Ex. 78, i.d., at 2:37ti-2:377. 
48 Chase Manhattan Bank vice-pres)dent Figh noted that "[t]here does· 
not appear to be any vast new technology on the horizon," but that 
" [a]s for new machinery, evolutionary changes are continuing at what 
appears to me to be about the :;;ame rate as in the last few yean;." Ex. ti3, 
Ct. of App. J . A. 2660-2661. One study is particularly critical of the 
assumption of a "static state of technology," Ex. 7/:i, id ., at 2:380, and docu· 
ments technological advances that can be expected, id., at 2380-2386. 
Some experts were Jess optimistic of the role of technology. See, e. g., id., . 
at 3643- 3644 (lrrr .,;tudy) . 
40 Hocutt-Thomas had some information on the "ratio of synthetics to 
cotton in blends" in the mills, but it is not clear from the record if and' 
how they used thi~; information. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2230. 
50 The final Cotton Dust Standard calls for PELs of 200 ug/m3 in 
opening through roving and spinning through warping, and 750 ug/m3· 
for slashing and wc:-aving. The Hocutt-Thomas study similarly assumed· 
a 200 ug/ m3 PEL for opening through roving, but assumed less stringent 
PELs of 500 ug/ m3 for spinning through warping, and 1000 ug/m3 for· 
slashing and weaving. 
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of that overestimate be equal to the additional costs required 
to attain the far more stringent limits of the Standard OSHA 
actually adopted." Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 27; 
see Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, 
at 14-15. The agency itself recognized the problem cited 
by petitioners, but found itself limited in the precision of its 
estimates by the industry's refusal to ma.ke more of its own 
data available.51 OSHA explained that, "in the absence of 
the [industry] survey data [of textile mills], OSHA cannot 
develop more accurate estimates of compliance costs." 43 
Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1. Since § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act requires 
that the Secretary promulgate toxic material and harmful 
physical agent standards "on the basis of the best available 
evidence," 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) ( 5), and since OSHA could 
not obtain the more detailed confidential industry data it 
thought essential to further precision, we conclude that the 
agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas esti-
mate.5~ While a cost estimate based on the standard actually 
11 For example, in questioning before an administrative law judge, 
Hocutt answered: 
"Well, I'm beginning to whsh I hadn't said anything about this, which I 
did, and I have to be helpful. Practically all of this information that I 
have is confidential and I couldn't reveal any of the sources. You can only 
take my word for the figures . I can't substantiate it in any manner." 
Ct. of App. J. A. 3929. 
Petitioners note, however, that the industry subsequently provided its 
survey data to OSHA, and that the only information deleted was con-
fidential information withheld by agreement with the agency in order 
to prevent identification of specific mills. Reply Brief for Petitioners 
ATMI et al., at 23, n. 32 ; see J. A. 388-390. OSHA responds that , 
"[blecause the number of machines was deleted and corrrlated dust data 
was not supplied, the data could not be u~rd to ~Support a speeific cost 
adjustment." Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 64, n. 70. In 
any event, no contention is made that OSHA had access to Hocutt's own 
data used to calculate his cost estimate. 
62 Both petitioners and respondents attempt their own calculations from 
evidence in the record to show the unreasonableness or rrasonablene:;s of 
OSHA'~ ro\~h equ~tton ~tween the Hocu.tt-Thoma8 overstatement in 
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promulgated surely would be preferable, ss we decline to hold 
as a matter of law th~t its absence under the circumstances 
required the Court of Appeals to find that OSHA's determi-
natjon was unsupported by substantial evidence.54 
tosts and the expense of achieving a Standard somewhat more stringent 
for some operations. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner National Cotton 
Council of America, at 9-10; Brief for Respondent Unions, at 14-18. 
Such manipulation of the data suggests a wide margin of error for any 
estimate, whether it be OSHA's, the industry's, or the unions'. Viewed 
in that light, the agency's .candor in confessing its own inability to achieve 
a more precise estimate should not precipitate a judicial review that none-
theless demands what the congressionally-delegated "expert" says it can-
not provide. 
18 The Secretary originally asked RTI to prepare cost estimates for 
several PEL levels, including 500, 200, and 100 ug/m3. Ex. &--76, Ct. of 
App. J. A. 509. Clearly the Secretary intended to have cost infonnation 
on the different PELs that he might promulgate. Although RTI provided 
estimates for these levels in its final report, OSHA found them to be too 
unreliable to adopt 11s final estimates. See supra, at ---. 
Even if the Secretary had wanted to obtain a cost estimate, based on 
confidential industry data, for the actual PELs in the adopted Standard, 
it would have been unable to do so. Hocutt had concluded that it was 
technologically impractical to achieve PELs below 500 ug/m3 for the 
operations of spinning through warping, Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2239-
2241, and PELs below 1000 ug/m3 for weaving and slashing, id ., at 2241-
2243. Therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates of a 200 ug/m3 
PEL for those operations. The Secretary obviously disagreed with his 
judgment of technological feasibility. We also note that, although peti-
tioners challenged the technological feasibility of the final Cotton Dust 
Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such challenge 
here. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 8, n. 16. 
~·The Court of Appeals observed that "the agency's underlying cost 
estimates are not free from imprecision," 617 F. 2d, at 662, but that 
"[t]he very nature of economic analysis frequently imposes pra.cticallimits 
on the precision which reasonably can be required of t,he agency," id., at 
661. We suspect that this results not only from the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate data, but also from the inherent crudeness of estimation tools. 
Of necessity both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on 
assumptions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the 
·validity of their final numerical cost estimates. As the official charged' 
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Therefore, whether or not in the first instance we would 
find the Secretary's conclusions supported by substantial evi-
dence, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals in this case 
"misapprehended or groi'SlY misapplied" the substantial evi-
dence test when it found that "OSHA reasonably evaluated 
the cost estimates befo~e it, considered criticisms of each, and 
selected suitable estimates of compliance costs." 617 F. 2d, 
at 661 (footnote ornitted). 
B 
After estimating the cost of compliance with the Cotton 
Dust Standard, OSHA analyzed whether it was "economically 
feasible" for the cotton industry to bear this cost.M OSHA 
by Congress with the promulgation of occupational safety and health 
standards that protect workers "to the extent feasible," the Secretary was 
obligated to subject such assumptions to careful scrutiny, and to decide 
how they might affect the correctness of the preferred estimates. 
6" In one of their questions presented, petitioners ATMI et al., ask 
whether "the statutory requirement that compliance with an OSHA stand-
ard must be 'economically feasible' can be satisfied merely by the agency's 
eonclusion that the standard will not put the affected industry out of 
business." Pet. for Writ of Certiorari of ATMI et al., at 2. However, 
in argument in their brief, petitioners apprar to treat this issue primarily 
as a substantial evidence question. See Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., 
at 24-31. They finally summarize their position as follows: 
" ... OSitA must present a responsible prediction, supported by sub-
stantial evidence, of what its standard will cost and what impact it will 
have on such factors as production, employmrnt, competition, and prices. 
And the agency must explain in a cogent. manner-on the basis of intel-
ligible criteria-why it concludes that a standard having such an economic 
impact is 'feasiblr."' !d., , at 35 (footnote omitted). 
As our review of OSHA's economic feasibility determination demon-
r:Jtrates, OSHA presented a "responsible prediction" of what its Standard 
would cost and its impact on "production, employment, competition, and 
prices." The agency concluded that its Standard is feasible brcause "com-
pliance with [if! is well within the financial capability of the covered 
industries." 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 3. OSHA also found that thr indus-
try "will be able to meet the demands for production of cotton products." 




, . . 
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concluded that it wa.s. finding that "although some marginal 
employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry 
as a whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements 
of the regulation." 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2; see id., at 
27379, col. 3 ("compliance with the standard is well within 
the financial capability of the covered industries"). In 
reaching this conclusion on the Standard's economic impact, 
OSHA made specific findings with respect to employment, 
energy consumption, capital financing availability, a.nd prof-
itability. Id., at 27377-27378. To support its findings, the 
agency relied primarily on RTI's comprehensive investigation 
of the Standard's economic impact.~0 
RTI evaluated the likely economic impact on the cotton 
industry and the United States economy of OSHA's original 
proposed standard, an across-the-board 200 ug/m3 PEL. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 626.~7 RTI had estimated a total 
lluggests, that "[a]t bottom, the Secretary must [and did] determine that 
the industry will maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness." 
l3rief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 49. See als:> United Steel-
workers of America, v. Marshall, No . 79-1048, illip op., at 144, - U. S. 
App. D . C. -, (1980) ("the practical question is whether the iltandard 
threaleHil the competitive stability of an industry"); Industri'll Uuion 
D epartment, v. Hodgson, supra,- U. S. App. D . C., at 499 F. 2d, at 478. 
This interprE>tation by the Secretary is certainly consistent with the plain 
meaning of the word "feasible." See Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, supra, illip op., at 31, n . 30 (MARsHALL, J ., 
di::;sPnting). Therefore, thiil case doeil not present, and we do not denide, 
the que::;tion whether a Standard that threatenil the long-term profitability 
and competitiveness of an industry is "feasib!e" within the meaning of 
§ 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5) . 
~6 ln contrast to the cost estimates prepared by RTI, OSHA did not 
find any major fl aws with RTI's ~tudy of the economic impact of com-
pliance co~ts. 
57 RTI specifically analyzed the impact of the Standard on the follo')Ving 
areas in the cotton indu~try : 
"1) Additional employment requirement~. 
"2) Energy commmption. 
I ' 
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~ompliance cost of $2.7 billion fo:r a 200 ug/m3 PEL,58 anq 
used this estimate in assessing the economic impact of such 
a standard. !d., at 736-737. As described supra, at 31, n. 
44, OSHA estimated total compliance costs of $656.5 million 
for the final Cotton Dust Standard,59 a Standard less strin~ 
cent than the across-the-board 200 ug/m3 PEL of the pro-
posed standard. Therefore, the agency found that the eco-
nomic impact of its Standard would be "much less severe)) 
than that suggested by RTI for a 200 ug/m3 PEL estimate 
of $2.7 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2. Nevertheless, it 
is instructive to review RTI's conclusions with respect to the 
economic impact of a $2.7 billion cost estimate. RTI found: 
"Implementation of the proposed [200 ug/m3] stand-
ard will require adjustments within the cotton textile 
industry that will take time to work themselves out and 
that may be difficult for many firms. In time, however, 
prices may be expected to rise and markets to adjust so 
that revenues will cover costs. Although the impact on 
any one firm cannot be specified in advance, nothing in 
the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry 
as a whole will be seriously threatened by the impact of 
"3) Increases in production costs and consequent price increases by 
affected industries. 
"4) Capital requirements and capital financing problems. 
"5) Competition effects on profit and market structure. 
''6) Inflationary impact on consumers 1:1nd U. S. economy. 
''7) Employment impact due to the contraction of output demand." 
E!x. 6-76, Ct. of App. J . A. 626. 
RTI also examined the economic impact of two other across-the-board 
PELs of 500 ug/m3 and 100 ug/m3. Ibid . 
68 This cost estimate included $984.4 million for yarn production (open-
ing through spinning), $1.3879 billion for winding through weaving/slash-
iug, $292.2 million for cotton ginning, and $32 million for waste processing. 
E)x. 6-76, Ct. of App. J . A. 737. 
Gu Cotton ginning was the subject of a separate regulation not at issue 
in this case, 43· Fed. Reg. 27350, col, 1; see 29 CFR § 1910.1046 ( 1980), 
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the proposed standard for control of cotton dust expo-
sure." Ex. 60, Ct. of App. 'J. A. 1380; id., at 3620. 
In reaching this conclusion, RTI analyzed the total and an-
nual economic impact 60 on each of the different sectors of 
the cotton industry. 
For example, in yarn production (opening through spin-
ning), RTI found that the total additional capital require-
ment per dollar of industry shipment was 7.8 cents, and the 
the corresponding annual requirement was 1.9 cents. Ex. 6-
76, Ct. of App. J. A. 729. Average price increases necessary 
to maintain pre-standard rates of return on investment were 
estimated to range from 0.22 cents to 6.25 cents per dollar 
of industry sales.61 Ib·1:d. Even assuming no price increases, 
60 RTI's annual cost of compliance figure contained thrPe components: 
nn annualized capital charge, direct ·operating cost, and energy cost. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct . of App . J. A. 643. The annualized capital charge consisted 
vf depreciation, interest, administrative overhE:'ad, property tax, and in-
surance. Ibid. Depreciation and interest were computed "by use of a 
ca]>ital recovery factor based upon the concept of capital rent, the value 
of which depends on the operating life of the equipment and the market 
interest rate." Ibid. 
61 Petitioners' primary critici:;m of OSHA's reliance on the RTI study 
derives from their disagreement with RTI's a,;sumption that compliance 
cost:; would be passed on to the consumers. Brief for Petitioners ATMI 
t:t al., at 28-29. This characterization misstates RTI's position. In cal-
culating price increases necessary to maintain pre-standard rates of return, 
RTI "decided to adopt an extreme assumption of zero price demand 
ela:;ticity in computing post-control price increases" because of difficulties 
in obtaining data necessary to compute rla::~ticities for cotton yarns. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 657. However, RTI carefully te~ted this 
assumption to determine "how much bias" it would introduce into the 
analysis. Id , at 657-659. RTI concluded that, "unles:; the true demand 
elasticity for the output of the given sector i~:~ substantially greater than 
unity, our impact analysis ba:;Pd on the as:;umption of zero price elasticity 
of demand would not be invalidatE-d." !d., at 659. Therefore, unless a 
1% increase in price was met with substantially more than a 1% decrease 
in demand, RTI's e:;timates of the price increases necessary to maintain 
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only one of the six yarn producing operations would experi-
ence a negative rate of return on investment, while the five 
other rates of return would range from 1.4% to 3.95"o. !d., 
at 652.62 RTI estimated the average pre-standard rate of 
return for the yarn producing sector as 4.1%. Ibid. 
Through an output demand elasticity analysis, RTI deter-
minPd that price increases necessitated by the 200 ug/m3 
standard would result in a 1.687o contraction of cotton yarn 
consumption.63 !d., at 685; see id., at 680-687. RTI also dis-
cussed the effects of such price increases on interfiber and 
domestic/ foreign competition. RTI ob~:;erved that "non-price 
factors have probably dominated" the competition between 
cotton and man-made fibers. !d., at 623; 948-953.64 Noting 
pre-standard rates of return were valid. Since there was no evidence 
suggesting such an effect, RTI !)roceeded with its assumption. 
In any event, RTI subsequently inve:stigated :short-term price elasticities 
of demand for 25 cotton consumer products, finding that 19 of them had 
elastirities less than or equal to unity. !d., at 681. 
u~ RTI found higher price increases and lower rates of return when 
framing its analysis in pounds of cotton yarn produced. See Ex. 6-76, Ct. 
of App. J . A. 654, 729-730. 
03 Petitioner National Cotton Council of American criticizes RTI's use 
of short-term price elasticity coefficients, claiming that this underestimates 
long-term demand responses to price increases. Brief for Petitioner 
National Cotton Council of America, at 16-17. However, RTI's Dr. Lee, 
who conducted the elasticity analy~is, observed that he used two inde-
pendent procedures to compute demand contraction, and only one relied 
on short-term price elasticities. Ct. of App. J. A. 36.26-3627. Hi~> 
"main procedure [was] input output table procedure:;," which produced 
an even smaller demand contraction estimate than those calculations rely-
ing on the short-term roefficirnts. Ibid. 
64 RTI cited such nonprice factors as "research expenditures, promo-
tion and advertising, fiber and fabric development, fiber properties, and 
tare characteristins of fabric." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 623. John 
Figh, Chase Manhattan bank vice-presid!:'nt, observed that "polvester has 
grown at the expense of cotton over th!:' last 10 year:; and I think it has 
penetrated tnu;:;t of the market~ it can penetmte; . . . [Tjh!:' majority of 
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that international trade agreements restricting foreign imports 
f)f textile products "have tended to smother the effects of a 
&mall change in the relative prices of domestic versus foreign 
textile products," id., at 622. RTI concluded that such small 
ehanges have had "very little impact" on domestic industries 
and markets, id., at 961; see id., at 954-961. In order to 
measure the ability of different sized textile companies to 
finance compliance costs, RTI constructed a ratio of capital 
requirements to profit after taxes. RTI found that two of 
the six yarn production operations would have financing diffi.-
~ulties, but that such difficulties decreased as company size 
increased. !d., at 730.65 Finally, impacts on energy costs, 
employment, inflation, and market structure were evaluated, 
See id., at 728-731.68 
it, the growth of polyester at the expense of cotton, has been completed." 
Joint App. 474-475. He noted that some cotton products, such a~; towels 
and 100% cotton men's <ihirts, enjoy the support of cou~umer preferences. 
Ibid. Although RTI cited the energy cri~:>is without detailing it" po~sible 
impact on man-made fiber products, Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . .T. A. 948, 
OSHA observed that changes in petroleum prices, a key ingredient in 
flynthetic products, may have important impacts on the competitive 
balance, see 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 2. 
0 ~ Two of the six yarn production operations had ratios less than 1, two 
had ratios less than 2, and the remaining two were le;;s than 6. Ex. 6-76, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 665. Chase Manhattan Bank's .John Figh agreed with 
RTI's assessment that financing the $2.7 billion compliance cost for a 
200 ug/ m3 PEL standard would be most difficult for smaller textile com-
panies. Ex. 63, Ct. of App. J. A. 2264-2265. 
10 RTI conducted similar economic impact analyses, although in less 
dt•pth, for the twi8ting through wenviug and waste proces;;ing sector~:~ 
pf the cotton industry covered by the proposed 200 ug/m:3 PEL standard. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct . of App. J. A. 462. RTI found, for example, that price 
increases per dollar of industry sale<-~ ranged from .5 cents to 18 cents 
for twisting through weaving operations, and that some of these operations 
would experience "severe" financing difficulties . Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. 
J. A. 733-734. To recount in further detail these conclusions would be an 
irrelevant exercise. RTI cnlculated thnt a 200 ug 1m3 stand:ud for weav-
ing/slashing would cost $1.259 billion, id., at 600, and computed the 
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Relying on its comprehensive economic evaluation of the 
cotton industry's ability to absorb the $2.7 billion compliance 
cost of a 200 ug/m3 PEL standard, RTI concluded that 
''nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile 
industry as a whole will 'be seriously threatened." Ex. 60, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 1380.67 Therefore, it follows a fortiori that 
OSHA's estimated compliance cost of $656.6 million is "eco-
nomically feasible." 68 Even if OSHA's estimate were under .. 
fltated, we are fortified in observing that RTI found that a 
11tandard more than four times as costly wM nevertheless eco-
nomically feasible. 
The Court of Appeals found that the agency "explained 
the economic impact it projected for the textile industry," 
and that OSHA has "substantial support ~n the record for 
its ... findings of economic feasibility for the textile indus-
try." 617 F. 2d, at 662. On the basis of the whole record, 
tronomic impact based on that figure. But RTI had also estimated that 
tompliance costs for a 500 ug/m3 PEL would be zero. Ibid. Since the 
Ina! eotton Dust Standard sets a 750 ug/m3 PEL for weaving/sla:shing, 
further review of RTI's conclusion with respect to its $1259 billion cost 
ib particularly unnecessary. 
" Petitioners note that, although RTI estimated that compliance with 
the Cotton Dust Standard would take 8 or more years, OSHA required 
t•umpliance within four yearb. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29. 
RTI chose an 8-year period primarily because of "problems the control 
indul:ltr) may have in supplying the required equipment." Joint App. 
415; see id, a L 415-416. If this proves to be the case, then presumably 
individual mills will be able to obtain variances from the Standard's 
requirements because of technologiCal infeasibility. See 29 CFR § 1910.-
1043 (e) (1); 29 U. S. C. § 655 (6). 
18 Perhaps in light of this fact, neither petitioners ATMI et al. nor 
petitioner National Cotton Council of America frame their "economic im-
pact" ~Substantial evidence arguments based on OSHA's estimate of com-
pliance costs. Instead, they adopt as a minimum RTI 's $2.7 billion 
Pstimatp for eomplia11ce tusts with the proposed standard's 200 ug 1m3 
PEL. BriPf for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, at 15-16; 
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et nl., at 29. 
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we cannot conclude that the Court of Appeal's "misappre-
hemled or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test. 
III 
The final Cotton Dust Standa.rd places heavy reliance on 
the use of respira.tors to protect employees from exposure to 
~otton dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period 
necessary to install and implement feasible engineering con-
trols.69 One part of the respirator provision requires the 
employer to give employees unable to wear a respirator 70 
the opportunity to transfer to another position, if available, 
where the dust level meets the standard's PEL. 29 CFR 
§ 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v). When such a transfer occurs, the em-
ployer must guarantee that the employee suft'ers no loss of 
earnings or other employment rights or benefits.71 Peti-
19 The final Standard, 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (1) , provides: 
"Where the use of repirators is required under this section, the employer 
~;hall provide, at no cost to the employee, and a~~ure the u~e of respirator(') 
which comply with the requirement~ of this paragraph (f). Respirator, 
f;ha ll be used in the following circumshmces: 
"(i) During the time periods necessary to im;tall or implemrnt feasible 
engineering controls and work practice controls; 
"(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which engineering 
and work practice controls are not feasible; 
"(iii) In work situations where feasible engineering and work practice 
controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to or below the per-
missible exposure limit; and 
"(iv) In operations specified under paragrnph (g) (1 ). 
"(v ) Whenever an employee requests a respirator." 
' 0 An employee may be unable to wear a respirator because of facial 
Irritation, ~evere discomfort, or impaired brt>athing. 43 Feel. Reg. 2731l7, 
col. 1 and 2. 
n The regulation, 29 CFR § 1019.1043 (f) (2) (v) (emphasi;; added), 
provides: 
"Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear 
any form of re~pirator, including a power air purifying respirator, the 
employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another position 
which is available or later becomes available having a dust level at or· 
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tioners do not object to the transfer provision, but challenge 
OSHA's authority under the Act to require employers to 
guarantee employees' wage 11nd employment benefits follow-
ing the transfer. The Court of Appe~s held that OSHA 
has such authority. 617 F. 2d, at 675~ We conclude that, 
whether or not OSHA has this underlying authority, the 
agency has failed to make the necessary determination or 
statement of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is 
related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work 
environment. 
Respondents urge several statutory bases for the authority 
exercised here. The cite § 2 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 651 , 
which declares that the purpose of the Act is "to assure so 
far as possible every working map and woman in the Nation 
safe .and healthful working conditions"; § 2 (b) ( 5), id., a:t 
§ 651 (b)(5), which suggests achievement of the purpose "by 
developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches 
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems"; 
§ 6 (b) ( 5), id., at § 655 (b) ( 5), which requires the agency to 
"set the standard which most adequately assures ... that no 
employee will suffer material hnpairment of health or func-
tional capacity ... "; and § 3(8), id., at § 652 (8), which 
provides that a standard must require "conditions, or the 
adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate 
to provide safe or healthful employment." Brief for Re-
$pondent Secretary of Labor, at 68. Whatever methods these 
provisions authorize OSHA to apply, it is clear that such 
approaches must be justified on the basis of their relation to 
safety or health . 
Section 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), requires 
that "determinations of the Secretary" must be supported 
below the PEL. 1'he employer shall assure that an employee who is 
transferred due to an inability t·o wear a respimtor suffets no loss of earn-
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by sttbstantial evidence. Section 6 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 655 (e), 
requires the Secretary to include "a statement of the reasons 
for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Reg-
ister." In his "Summary and Explanation of the Standard," 
the Secretary stated: "Each section includes an analysis of 
the record evidence and the policy considerations underlying 
the decisions adopted pertaining to specific provisions of the 
standard. '' 43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 2. But OSHA never 
explained the wage guarantee provision as au approach de-
signed to contribute to increased health protection. Instead 
the agency stated that the "goal of this provision is to mini-
mize apy adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue 
of the inability to wear a respirator." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387. 
col. 3.72 Perhaps in recoguition of this fact, respondents in 
their briefs a:rgue that 
" [ e] xperience under the Act has shown that employees 
are reluctant to disclose symptoms of disease and tend 
to minimize work-related health problems for fear of 
being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job .... 
72 In its l:lpecific discus~Siou of the lranl:lfer /guarantee provision, occupy-
ing more than two-thirds of a column in the Federal Regil:lter, OSHA 
argned that ''[i]t i~> manife:;tly unfair that employees who are unable to 
wear re:;pirators l:lulfer ... economie detriment because their employer:; 
have not yet achirved compliance with the engineering control require-
mrnt!:i of tht> :;taudard, but are relying instead on the interim and lesl:l 
effective devire of re::;pirators ." 43 Fed. RPg. 27:387, col. 2 and 3. The 
agenry tht>n ::;tatcd its judgment that thr "protection Lthe tranl:lfer and 
guarantee regulation] afford!:! should grea1ly increa8e the success of the 
stundard':s respiratory protPction proviswns." ld ., at 27387, col. 3. Since 
lhe Secretary had ulready stated an impemussible reason for the guarantee 
provl81on, we declme to accept th1s "boilerplate" statemrnt as a suffich1t 
dett>rmination und l:ltatement of reason~ within the meaniug of the Act. 
29 lT. S. C. §§ 655 (e), (f) . See Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufac-
turer8 Association v. Brenuan, 503 F. 2d 1155 (CA3 1974); lnd,ustrial 
Vuion Department v. Hodgson, 8Uprf),, - ·u. S. App. D. C. -, 499 
F . 2d, ut 4'75-476. See all:lo Berger & Ri;;km, Economic and TPchuo!ogicuf 
Feasibility in Rcgulllting Toxic Substance!:! Under the Orrupatioual Sn fety 
anu Health Act, 7 Erology L. Q 2H.'i, 29R-299 (1978) 
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It may reasonably be expected, therefore, that many em-
ployees incapable of using respirators would continue to 
breathe unhealthy air rather than n~quest a transfer, thus 
destroying the utility of the respirator program." Brief 
for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 67; see Brief for 
Respondent Unions, at 51.73 
Whether these arguments have merit, and they very well 
may, 74 the post-hoc rationalizations of the agency or the par-
ties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate 
for age11cy action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Parle v. 
Vol77e. 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines 
v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). For Congress gave 
OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and safety, 
and to explain its reasons for its actions. Became the Act in 
no way authorizes OSHA to repair general unfairness to em-
ployees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety 
goals, we hold that OSHA acted beyond statutory authority 
when it issued the wage guarantee regulation. 
v 
When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act in 1970, it chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring 
' 8 Although it cited no i:ipecific determination or statement of reasons 
proferred by the Secretary, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by this 
argument. 617 F . 2d., at 675. 
14 There ii:i evidence in the record that might support such a determina-
tion . Dr. Merchant teHtified that a medical surveillance program alone· 
would not be ,;ufficient for identifying and relocating employees suffering 
from by;;sinosis. Joint App. 440-441. He observed : 
"There i,; reluctance very often among the employee himself to leave hio; 
job. I think clearly ,;orne guarantees as to wages and opportunities must 
be an integral part of any recommendation to relocate somebody and it 
ha;; been the experience in coal mining where miners are allowed, under 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, to be transferred, a very 
low proportion Qf th_el:ie m~n Hctu11lly eoxerci~e the:r transfer rights . ld ., at 
44t. 
.. 
79-142Q & 7.9-1583-0PINION 
48 AMEHICAN TEXTILE MfRS. INST. v. DONOVAN 
employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited 
only by the feasibility of such an environment's achievement. 
We must measure the validity of the Secretary's actions 
against the requirements of t)lttt Act. For " [ t] he .i udicial 
function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory 
policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and 
Executive oversight or amendatory legislation." Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, 
slip op., at 2 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring); see Tennessee Val-
ley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185, 194 (1978). 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is af-
firmed in all respects except to the extent of its approval of 
the Secretary's application of the wage guarantee provision 
of the Cotton Dust Standard at 29 Cli'R § 1910.1043 (f) (2) 
(v). To that extent, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is vacated and the case remanded with directions ' to remand 
to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this 
·bpiriion: 
C HAMBER S OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEVENS 
May 18, 1981 
Re: 79-1429 and 79-1583 - American Textile 
v. Marshall 
Dear Bill: 
Over the weekend I reviewed the various papers 
that have been filed in connection with the 
Government's suggestion that the Court vacate the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the 
merits, as well as your fine circulation. I have come 
to these tentative conclusions: 
1. Since the Secretary proposes to leave the 
present standard in effect during the proposed 
rulemaking proceeding, the case is certainly not 
moot and petitioners are entitled to have us 
decide the merits of the questions they have 
presented and argued. I do not believe, however, 
that there is any merit to their suggestion that 
we should hold the cases in abeyance on our docket 
while the proposed rulemaking proceeding goes 
forward. 
2. For the reasons set forth in your opinion, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
affirmed except to the extent that it upholds the 
wage guarantee provisions. 
3. There is nothing in the statute to prohibit 
the Secretary from doing a cost benefit study for 
the purposes set forth in the notice of rulemaking 
of March 27, 1981. Indeed, at page 33 of the slip 
opinion of the plurality in the Benzene case, 
after quoting§ 6(g} of the Act, we noted: 
"The Government has expressly acknowledged 
that this section requires the Secretary to 
undertake some cost-benefit analysis before 
he promulgates any standard, requiring the 
elimination of the most serious hazards 
first." 
In footnote 49 we quoted from the Secretary's 
Reply Brief at page 13: 
"First, 29 u.s.c . § 655(g) requires the 
Secretary to establish priorities in setting 
occupational health and safety standards so 
that the more serious hazards are addressed 
first. In setting such priorities the 
Secretary must, of course, consider the 
relative costs, benefits and risks." 
4. After the reconsideration and re-evaluation of 
the cotton dust standard is concluded, if the 
Secretary should adopt a less protective standard , 
the unions will have an opportunity to raise the 
question whether the cost benefit analysis has 
been misused. Now, however, I do not believe we 
should issue an opinion that would prevent further 
proceedings that may or may not lead to a change 
in the standard . 
5. In summary, I am prepared to join your opinion 
if you can modify the language in a few places to 
conclude merely that the Act does not require OSHA 
to compare costs and benefits without holding that 
the Act prohibits such comparisons. In my 
judgment, the more extreme holding is foreclosed 
by§ 6(g) and, in any event, is not necessary to 
answer the questions presented by the parties. It 
may well be true that no cost benefit analysis 
that the Secretary can make can justify a change 
in the standard, but I am not persuaded that we 
have the power to order him not to take a second 
L 
. -· 
look at a standard or not to receive any evidence 
comparing costs and benefits during a proceeding 
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Yr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
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Mr. Jus t ice Blackmun 
May 19, 1981 Mr. Just ice Powell 
Mr. Just ice R~hnquist 
Mr. Justi ce Stevens 
RE: Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583, American Textile Ma~~.rttaStice Brennan 
MY 19 1981 Institute, Inc. v. Donovan Circulated: _____ _ 
Dear John, 
Reclrculat~ 
I very much appreciate your thoughtful comments on my 
circulated opinion in the above. I think my only difference with 
you centers on whether Section 6(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§655(g), has relevance for the purposes of our decision in this 
case. I agree, without deciding, as I said in footnote 29, page 
17 of the opinion, that Section 6(g) "may authorize OSHA to 
explore costs and benefits for deciding between issuance of 
several standards regulating different varieties of health and 
safety hazards" (citing your Benzene opinion, slip op. 33), in 
setting priorities for the issuance of more than one standard, 
thereby ensuring that the most serious health hazards are 
addressed first. As Section 6(g) states: 
"In determining _the priority for establishing standards 
under [Section 6 of the Act, 29 u.s.c. §655], the 
Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the 
need for mandatory safety and health standards for 
particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, 
businesses, workplaces or work environments." 
And it is true that the Secretary acknowledged not only in 
Benzene but also in this case, Brief for Respondent Secretary of 
Labor, at 56, that Section 6(g) appears to contemplate such an 
e xercise. 
-2-
But that is not this case. Here, OSHA was not considering 
and "deciding between issuance of several standards regulating 
different varieties of health and safety hazards." The Secretary 1 
never discussed other health hazards in the cotton industry that 
the agency would address. Rather OSHA considered and promulgated 
only one health standard for the industry; therefore Section 6(g) 
is not implicated by its determinations. Your thought that 
Section 6(g) is involved here is not shared by the industry 
petitioners-- they fail to cite Section 6(g) even once in their 
briefs. I think this indicates industry recognition that we are 
not faced here with OSHA's setting of priorities for the issuance 
of several health and safety standards. The industry argument 
instead is that OSHA must undertake a cost-benefit analysis under 
Section 6(b) (5) to determine whether and how stringent a single 
standard should be promulgated, regardless of the existence of 
any other health hazards in the workplace. Under the industry 
·-
approach, if preventing 3~,000 a~nual cases of byssinosis would 
cost $500 million, and preventing 35,000 annual byssinosis cases 
would cost $650 million, OSHA might have to choose the $500 
million standard even if cotton dust exposure were the only 
health hazard in the workplace and the $650 million cost were 
economically feasible. In effect, then, the industry position 
requires the agency to undertake an analysis of the absolute 
relation between costs and benefits of a single standard, placing 
some sort of absolute value on the benefit of reducing byssinosis 
compared only with the cost of achieving such reduction, without 
reference to other hazards. 
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I think the considerations contemplated by Section 6(g) are 
quite different from the absolute considerations suggested above, 
emphasizing instead the range of health hazards in the workplace, 
which ones are most serious, and which should be addressed first. 
Such considerations might include a comparison of the relative 
costs and benefits of various 'standards addressing different 
health problems in the same industry. Let us assume, for 
example, that OSHA found two serious health hazards in textile 
mills -- cotton dust and noise. In addition, let us assume --
although untrue for the real Cotton Dust Standard that the 
agency determined that an expenditure of $650 million would be 
the maximum economically feasible expenditure by the cotton 
industry for all health and safety standards, and that 
expenditures in excess '- of $650 million would result in 
substantial reduction of material health impairment from cotton 
dust exposure. OSHA would then have to decide whether to 
promulgate a single standard regulating only one of the hazards, 
J 
or whether to issue two standards that would address both 
hazards. 
In choosing what course of action to follow, the agency 
pursuant to Section ~(g) might compare the reduction in 
byssinosis resulting from an expenditure of $650 million for 
cotton dust engineering controls versus the reduction in worker 
deafness resulting from an expenditure of $650 million 
expenditure for noise controls. In choosing between the two 
standards, or determining a proper mix of the two, the Secretary 
could compare the relative costs and benefits of the two 
standards in order to maximize total health benefits for the 
worker. And the Secretary might finally decide that spending the 
full $650 million on cotton dust control would be less worthwhile 
than spending $500 million on cotton dust control, and $150 
million on noise control. But since a total industry-wide 
expenditure of $650 million was economically feasible, the cost 
of compliance for the two standards combined would have to be 
$650 million, given Section 6(b) (5) 's requirement of promulgation 
of the most protective standard limited only by feasibility. 
Undoubtedly the industry would be no happier with this outcome 
using a Section 6(g) balancing of costs and benefits, because the 
industry's overall expenditure on health hazards would remain the 
same even as the mix of standards changes. That is why the 
distinction between absolute ~ost~benefit balancing, in a vacuum 
without reference to other health hazards, as opposed to relative 
cost-benefit balancing, comparing the costs and benefits of 
-
different health standards, is n6t just a technical distinction 
but one of real substance. The industry's failure to rely on 
Section 6(g) to buttress its argument, and the Secretary's 
willingness to accept Section 6(g) balancing while nevertheless 
arguing against absolute cost-benefit analysis, are telling 
evidence of this fact. 
My opinion deals at length with the industry argument that 
OSHA must balance, without reference to other health hazards, the 
absolute costs and benefits for considering and promulgating a 
single health standard. The basis for my rejection of their 
argument is that the statute and legislative history show that 
. ,.-. 
Congress itself struck the balance between costs and benefits 
when it said ''to the extent feasible," thereby precluding further 
balancing by OSHA for the issuance of a single standard, and that 
Section 6(b) (5) requires promulgation of the most protective 
standard limited only by feasibility. 
While it would be possible, as you suggest, to decide this 
case by holding merely that Section 6(b) (5) does not require OSHA 
to compare costs and benefits in promulgating a single standard, 
I think there is an additional reason that we should not leave 
open the question whether OSHA is precluded from doing so. It 
seems to me that OSHA, the industry, and the unions should have 
the answer now, and not leave the issue in limbo while they go 
forward with another extensive and costly rule-making (this one 
took several years and ~ produced at enormous cost a 105,000-page 
record) . The unions would be back here tomorrow arguing that 
cost-benefit analysis is precluded. If the correct forum to 
-
engraft cost-benefit analysis onto Section 6(b) (5) for 
considering and promulgating a single standard is the Congress, 
the sooner we tell the parties, the better for all concerned. 
The Secretary gives no indication in his post-argument March 
27, 1981 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, pursuant to 
Section 6(g), he wants to compare the costs and benefits of the 
Cotton Dust Standard relative to those of other possible 
standards addressing different health and safety problems in the 
cotton industry. On the contrary, the Notice implies that he 
will engage in cost-benefit analysis in reviewing the Cotton Dust 
Standard in the abstract, without reference to other hazards. 
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For instance, he notes that "it is appropriate to evaluate the 
practicality of cost-benefit balancing by investigating the 
concept in the context of an actual standard such as cotton 
dust," Memorandum, at 4a, that the "agency will produce a 
comprehensive and thorough cost-benefit analysis", id., at Sa, 
and that as a result "the standard itself may be subject to 
adjustment," ibid. I think we ought tell him whether he can do 
that. And even if the Secretary does plan to make comparisons 
with other health standards, under my proposed opinion, he is not 
precluded from undertaking, pursuant to Section 6(g), a relative 
balancing of the costs and benefits of the cotton dust standard 
with those of other health standards he plans to promulgate. 
Perhaps I should make this point more explicit in the opinion, 
for example by bringing parts of footnote 29 into the text and 
emphasizing that cost-benefit analysis is precluded only for the 
consideration and issuance of a single health standard without 
·-
reference to other health· hazard§. In addition, I can add "for 
.. 
the issuance of a single standard" after the word "Secretary" on 
page 17, line 3, after the word "analysis" on page 17, line 6, 
and in other appropriate places thoughout the opinion. Of 
course, I would welcome any other suggestions that may occur to 
you. 
In short, I do feel that it is important to indicate to the 
Secretary what he can and cannot do in considering and 
promulgating a single standard, without reference to other health 
hazards, under Section 6(b) (5). His Advance Notice may be read, 
I think, as proposing the sort of absolute cost-benefit urged by 
. ' 
petitioners, without reference to other health hazards in the 
cotton industry. My opinion concludes that he is ,precluded from 
doing so . 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
/ c / 1. f;' 
!~CL-
C HAM BE R S O F 
..JUS TI CE ..J O H N P AU L STEVENS 
• < 
May 19, 1981 
Re: 79-1429 and 79-1583 - American Textile 
v. Donovan 
Dear Bill: 
My point about § 6(g) is not that it is in any way 
involved in this case as it was argued to us, but 
rather, as the Solicitor General represented in his 
memorandum, that one of the purposes of the proposed 
rulemaking is to determine the effectiveness of cost 
benefit studies in the context of a particular industry 
in order to facilitate their implementation of § 6(g) 
in future cases. 
You may very well be correct that an advisory 
opinion indicating that OSHA is precluded from using 
any cost benefit analysis in connection with the 
promulgation of a single standard would shorten future 
~proceedings in this case. As is often true of advisory 
opinions, however, we really cannot foresee all 
possible situations in which a cost benefit analysis 
might be relevant. 
Your hypothetical concerning noise and cotton dust 
in the textile industry suggests that comparable 
variables might be involved in a single standard. 
Suppose, for example, that there are two species of 
cotton dust, one more harmful than the other. Just as 
a cost benefit study might help the Secretary to decide 
on priorities between noise and dust, might not it also 
be helpful in deciding whether to eliminate dust A 
entirely before curtailing dust B? In some situations, 
a choice between spending a great deal of money to 
reduce the exposure level and incurring a different 
kind of cost by requiring protective masks or 
shortening working hours might be made more 
intelligently with the benefit of a cost benefit 
-2-
analysis. I do not suggest that the study will 
necessarily be valuable here, but we must remember that 
your opinion will apply to other industries which may 
well present variables of the noise-dust alternative 
type problem. 
In Benzene the standard allowed exposures of 1 ppm 
averaged over an 8-hour work day with a ceiling of 5 
ppm for any 15-minute period. Conceivably a standard 
of .5 ppm over an 8-hour work day, with a ceiling of 10 
ppm for any 15-minute period, might have been an 
alternative available to the Secretary. In trading off 
between a lower exposure level for the average 8-hour 
work day and the higher exposure level for brief 
periods, should not the Secretary be permitted to 
compare costs and benefits? 
In sum, I do not believe we should try to tell the 
Secretary what he can or cannot do in future 
proceedings but should confine our ruling to the 
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Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
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NoC 79-14.29" American Textile Mfg. v. Donovan 
No~83 National Cotton Council v. Donovan 
Dear Bill: 
At our May 14 Conference, Nos. 80-1134 Lead 
Industries v. Donovan and 80-1155 South Central serr-
Telephone v. Donovan, were held for the Cotton Dust cases. 
This presents a problem for me because my former 
firm is one of a number of firms representing the lead 
industry. I, therefore, took no part in the decision to 
hold these cases. 
Although a superficial examination suggests that 
most of the questions in the present cases differ from those 
presented in the Lead cases, I think there also may be 
common questions.--xccordingly, I will remain out of the 
Cotton Dust cases - at least for the present. 
As I am not entirely sure that the two cases are 
close enough for me to disqualify, I suggest that you not 
mark me out on your circulated drafts. Before the cases are 
decided, I will make a definite decision on my status. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
LFP/lab 
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This presents a problem for me because my former 
f~is one of a number of firms representing the leaa--
~try. I, therefore, took no part in the decision to 
hold these cases. 
Although a superficial examination suggests that 
most of the questions in the present cases differ from those 
presented in the Lead cases, I think there also may be 
common questions.--xccordingly, I will remain out of the 
Cotton Dust cases - at least for the present. 
As I am not entirely sure that the two cases are 
close enough for me to disqualify, I suggest that you not 
mark me out on your circulated drafts. Before the cases are 
decided, I will make a definite decision on my status. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
LFP/lab 
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You will notice on page 13, note 25, that I have dealt with the post-
argument motions of the various parties. This assumes, of course, that 
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~ Raymond J~ Donovan, Secretary 
_ 1"1 ,. 1 AAJL · · of Labor1 United States De.:- On Writs of Certiorari tJ- - ~ · · ... ' 
the United States Co~---­
of Appeals for. the Di&- ~ 
~- -~ partrrient of Labor, eta~. 
f ~ C · N~tion~l ~o-tto~ Co~ncil of 
r~. 
.. 
· Am~pica, Petitioner, 
t9- 1583 v. 
Raymond J, Donovan, Secretary 
· of Labor, United States De-
partment of Labor, et al. 
trict of Columbia Circ~ -~ 
• [May -, 1981] 
LCJ~ · JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of th~rt.~ 
.. 
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act //- fJ/ 1A( 
of 1970 (the Act) "to assure so far as possible every working 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working ~ 
conditions .... " 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes 
the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportu- ,. _ _ f) 
nity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing ~
health and safety in the workplace. 29 U. S. C. §§ 655 (a), 
(b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/ promulgated 
1 This opinion will use the terms OSHA and the Secretary interchange-
ably when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, or the Assistant 





19-1429 & 79-1583-0PINION 
2 AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN 
a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an 
airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manu~ 
facture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "con-
stellation of respiratory effects" known as ''byssinosis." 43 
Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 ( 1978). This disease was one of the 
expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. S. Rep. No. 
91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legislative History of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 143 (1971) 
(Legis. Hist.). 
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the in-
terests of the cotton industry,2 challenged the validity of the 
"Cotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29 
U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did 
below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its 
Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs 
and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the 
Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations,8 counter that 
Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, 
and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require I 
OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating 
has delegated the authority to promulgate occupational safety and health 
standards to the Assistant Secretary. See 29 CFR § 1910.4 (1980). 
2 Petitioners in No. 79-1429 include 12 individual cotton textile manu-
facturers, and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI), 
a trade association representing approximately 175 companies. Brief for 
Petitioners American Textile Manufacturers Institute et a!., at i, 2. In 
No. 79-1583, petitioner is the National Cotton Council of America, a non-
profit corporation chartered for the purpose of increasing the consumption 
of cotton and cotton products. Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Coun-
cil of America, at 3-4. 
8 The two labor organizations are the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO, and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO. 
In the Court of Appeals, the labor organizations challenged the Cotton 
Dust Standard as not sufficiently stringent. 
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that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to 
eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, 
subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasi-
bility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not re-
quire OSHA to compare costs and benefits. 617 F. 2d 636 
(1979). We granted certiorari, - U. S. - (1980), to re-
solve this important question, which was presented but not 
decided in last Term's Industrial Union Department v. Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute,- U.S.- (1980)/ and to decide 
other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard.5 
I 
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as 
"brown lung" disease, is a serious and potentially disabling 
respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cot-
ton dust.6 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit 
4 JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and in the judgment, was the only 
member of the Court to decide the cost-benefit issue expressly. JusTICE 
PowELL concluded that the statute "requires the agency to determine that 
the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the 
expected benefits." Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum 
Institute, slip op., at 4 (PowELL, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment). ,JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting, joined by JUS1'ICE BRENNAN, 
.JusTICE WHrrE, and JusTICE BLACKMUN, indicated that the statute did 
not contemplate cost-benefit analysis. See id., slip op., at 31 n. 30, 32. 
5 In addition to the cost-benefit issue, the other questions presented and 
addreEsed are (1) whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole 
supports OSHA's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is economi-
cally feasible; and (2) whether OSHA has the authority under the Act 
to require that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees 
who are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear 
respirators. 
6 Cotton dust is defined as 
"du~t present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which 
may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant 
matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and 
other contaminants which may have accumulated with the cotton during 
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6-16, Joint App. 15-22.7 Byssinosis is a "continuum ..• 
disease," 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2, tha.t has been categorized 
into four grades.8 In its least serious form, byssinosis pro~ 
duces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness, 
shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective 
indications o~ loss of pulmonary functions. ld., at 27352, 
col. 2. In its most seri6us form, byssinosis is a chronic and 
irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar 
to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely dis-
abling. Ibid.· At -worst, as is true of other respiratory dis-
eases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssino-
sis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions 
and contributes to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 6-
73) Joint App. 72 .("there is an association between mortality 
and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has de-· 
scribed the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows: 
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust], 
symptoms o~cur on Monday, or other-days after absence 
from the work environment;· later, symptoms occur on 
Any dust present during the handling and processing of cotton through the 
weavi!lg or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations or 
manufacturing processes using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton · fiber 
by-products from textile mills are considered cotton dust." 29 CFR 
§ 1910.1043 (b) (1980) (Cotton Dust Standard). 
7 References are made throughout this opinion to the Joint Appendix 
filed in this Court (Joint App.), and to the Joint Appendix lodged -in 
the Court of Appeals below (Ct. of App. J . A.). 
8 Known genera!ly as the Schilling classification grades, they include: 
"[Grade] 72 : slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; ,no 
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. 
"[Grade] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; . n~> 
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. 
"[Grade] 2: evidence of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of 
ventilatory capacity. 
"[Grade] 3 : evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of 
ventilatory capacity." Exhibit 6-27; Joint App. 25 ; see 41 Fed. Reg. 
56500-56501 (1976). 
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other days of the week; and eventually, symptoms are 
continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure." A. 
Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-16, 
Joint App. 15.9 
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which 
the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling 
grades, it is likely that prolonged exposure contributes to the 
9 Descriptions of the disease by individual mill workers, presented in 
hearings on the Cotton Dust Standard before an administrative law judge, 
are more vivid: 
"When they started speeding the looms up the dust got finer and more 
3nd more people started leaving the mill with breathing problems. My 
mother had to leave the mill in the early fifties. Before she left, her 
breathing got so short she just couldn't hold out to work. My step-
father left the mill on account of breaching [sic] problems. He had 
coughing spells til he couldn't breath, like a child's whooping cough. Both 
my ~isters who work in the mill have breathing problems. My husband 
had to give up his job when he was only fifty-four years old because of 
the breathing problem." Ct. of App. J. A. 3791. 
"I suppose I had a breathing problem since 1973. I just kept on getting 
sick and began losing time at the mill. Every time that I go into the 
mill I get deathly sick, choking and vomiting losing my breath. It would 
blow down all that lint and cotton and I have clothes right here where 
I have wore and they have been washed several times and I would like for 
you all to see them. That will not come out in washing. 
I am only fifty-seven years old and I am retired and I can't even get to-
go to church because of my breathing. I get short of breath just walking 
around the house or dressing [or] sometimes just watching T. V. I cough 
all the time." /d ., at 3793. 
" ••. I had to quit because I couldn't lay down and rest without oxygen in 
the night and my doctor told me I would have to get out of there. . . . I 
couln't [sic] even breathe, I had to get out of the door so I could breathe 
and he told me not to go back in [the mill] under any circumstances."· 
I d., at 3804. 
Byssinosis is not a newly discovered disease, having been described as early 
as in the 1820s in England, Joint App. 404-405, and observed in Belgium 
in a study of 2,000 cotton workers in 1845, Exhibit 6-16, Joint App. 15 .. 
,, . 
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progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 1 and 2; Exhibit 6-27, 
Joint App. 25; Exhibit 11, Joint App. 152. It also appearg 
that a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without 
experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, Joint 
App. 192.10 
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and re-
tired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such wdrkers, suffers 
from the most disabling form of byssinosis.11 43 Fed. Reg. 
27353, col. 3; Exhibit 124, Joint App. 347. The Senate Re-
port accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 ac-
tive and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease. 
S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong.,· 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis. 
Hist. 143. One study found that over 25% of a sample of 
active cotton preparation and yarn manufacturing workers 
suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure 
level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43 
Fed. Reg: 27355, col. 3; Exhibit 6-51, Joint App. 44.12 Other 
studies confirm these general findings on the prevalence of 
byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6-56, id. at 
376- 385. 
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the 
United States as a distinct occupational hazard associated 
10 As an expert representing the industry noted: 
"[T]he assumption is often made that the disorder progresses from :1f2 to 
1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all grades reflect the progress of the individual's dis-
ability. In many instances, however, there is no progression at all. Some-
times Grade 3 seems to appear de novo, or there is a jump from 1 to 3. 
Ari10ng those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2 very often never 
occurs." Exhibit 41, Joint App. 192. 
11 The criterion of disability used for the 35,000 worker estimate was a 
Forced Expiratory Volume (FEV1 ) measurement of pulmonary function 
of 1.2 liters or le~s . 43 Fed. Reg. 27353, col. 3. An FEV1 of 12 liters 
"is a small fraction of the pulmonary performance of a normal lung." 
Ibid.; Ct. of App. J. A. 1231. 
12 There are between 126,000 and 200,000 active workers in the yarn 
preparation and manufacturing segments of the cotton industry. 43 Fed. 
-Reg. 27379, col. 2. 
' . 
·'· 
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with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Legis. 
Hist. 143.13 In 1966, the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organiza-
tion, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust 14 be 
limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per 
cubic meter of air (1000 p.g/m3 ) averaged over an 8-hour 
workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1. The United States 
Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968, 
when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey 
Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant 
threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that 
included the 1000 p.g/m8 limit for total cotton dust. 34 
Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969).15 Following passage of the Act in 
1970, the 1000 p.g/m3 standard was adopted as an "estab-
lished Federal standard" under § 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate pro-
tection of workers for the period between enactment of the 
statute and promulgation of permanent standards.16 
In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of 
18 Indeed the Senate Report on the Act expressly observed: 
"Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis regarding the 
magnitude of the problem. For example, despite repeated warnings over 
the years from other countries that their cotton workers suffered from 
lung disease, it is only within the past decade that we have recognized 
byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease among workers in American 
cotton mills." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis. 
Hist. 143. 
14 "Total dust" includes both respirable and nonrespirable cotton dust. 
15 The Secretary of Labor adopted the threshold limit values contained 
in a list that had been prepared by the ACGIH. 
16 Section 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), provides in pertinent 
part: 
"[T]he Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period begin-
ning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two yearr; after 
such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health stand-
ard ... any established Federal standard, unless he determines that the 
promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or· 
health for specifically designated employees." 
,. 
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respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous expo-
sure limit recommendation to 200 ~g/m3 measured by a 
vertica.I elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust par-
ticles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, 
col. 1, 27355, col. 2.17 That same year, the Director of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH)/8 pursuant to the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 669 (a)(3), 
671 (d) (2) , submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recom-
mendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible ex-
posure limit (PEL) that ushould be set a.t the lowest level 
feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as 
high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu. m.," or 200 ~g/m3 
of lint-free respirable dust.19 Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41 
Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA 
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 
Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from inter-
17 In many cotton preparation and manufacturing operations, including 
opening, picking, and carding, 1000 l"g/m3 of total dust is roughly equi-
valent to 500 J"gj m3 of respirable dust. Joint App. 464 ; 43 Fed. Reg. 
27361, col. 2; see infra, n. 22. 
18 The Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health as part of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
NIOSH is authorized, inter alia, to "develop and establish recommended 
occupational safety and health standards." 29 U.S. C. ·§671 (c)(1). At 
the request of the Secretaries of Labor or HEW, or on his own initiative, 
the Director of NIOSH may 
"conduct such research and experimental programs as he determines are 
neressary for the development of criteria for new and improved occupa-
t ional safety and health standards, and . . . after consideration of the 
results of such research and experimental programs make recommenda-
tions concerning new or improved occupational safety and health stand-
ards." ld. , § 671 (d) . 
19 NIOSH presented its recommendation in a lengthy and detailed docu-
ment entitled "Criteria for a Recommended Standard : Occupational Ex-
posure to Cotton Dust." Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 1- 169. The report 
examined the effects of cotton dust exposure and suggested implementation 
of work practices, engineering controls, medical surveillance, ·and monitor-
ing to decrease exposure to the recommended level. 
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ested parties on the NIOSH recommendation and other re-
lated matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker's Union 
of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest 
Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more 
stringent PEL of 100 p.g/m3 , 
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to re-
place the existing Federal standard on cotton dust with a 
new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act, 
29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5). 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. The pro-
posed standard contained a PEL of 200 p.g/m3 of vertical 
elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for aU segments of 
the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implemen-
tation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respira-
tors for the short-term and engineering controls for the long-
term. !d., at 56506, col. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested 
parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period. 2l) 
Following the comment period, OSHA conducted three 
hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lub-
bock, Tex. that lasted over 14 days. Public participation 
was widespread, involving representatives from industry and 
the workforce, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists, 
and many others. By the time the informal rule-making 
procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments 
and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed. 
Reg. 27351, col. 2. The voluminous record, composed of a 
transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and post-
hearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages. 
- U. S. App. D. C. --, 617 F. 2d, at 647. OSHA issued 
its final Cotton Dust Standard-the one challenged in the in-
stant case-on June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying 
statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69 
pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418; see 
29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980). 
20 The Act specifies an informal rulemaking procedure to accompany the 
promulgation of occupational safety and health standards. See 29 U. S. C. 
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The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA estab~ 
Iishes mandatory PELs over an 8-hour period of 200 ~A-g/m 8 • 
for yarn manufacturing, 21 750 /kg/m3 for slashing and weav- · 
ing operations, and 500 ~A-g/m3 for all other processes in the 
cotton industry.22 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c). These levels 
represent a relaxation of the proposed PEL of 200 /kg/m3 for 
all segments of the cotton industry. 
OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard · 
that depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls, 
such as installation of ventilation systems/8 and work prac-
tice controls, such as special floor sweeping procedures. Full 
compliance with the PELs is required within 4 years, except 
to the extent that employers can establish that the engineer~ 
21 The Standard provides that exposure to lint-free respirable cotton 
dust may be measured ·by a: vertical elutriator, with its 15-micron particle 
size cutoff, or "a method of equivalent accuracy and precision." 29 
C;FR '§ 1910.1043 (c). 
22 The manufacturing of cotton textile products is divided into severa! 
different stages. (1) In the operations of opening, picking, carding, draw-
ing, and roving, raw cotton is cleaned and prepared for spinning into 
yarn. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 7, n. 12. (2) In the opera-
tions of spinning, twisting, windmg, spooling, and warping, the prepared 
cotton is made into yarn and readied for weaving and other processing. 
ld., at 7, n. 13. (3) In slashing and weaving, the yarn is manufactured 
into a woven fabric. ld., at 7, n. 14. The Cotton Dust Standard define~ 
"yarn manufacturing" to mean "all textile mill operations from opening 
to, but not including, slashing and weaving." 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (b). 
See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 27365, col. 1 and 2. 
The nontextile industries covered by the Standard's 500 .u.g/m3 PEL 
include, but are not limited to, "warehousing, compressing of cotton lint, 
cla::;sing and marketing, using cotton yarn (i. e. knitting), reclaiming and 
marketing of textile manufacturing waste, delinting of cottonseed, market-
ing and converting of linters, reclaiming and marketing of gin motes and 
batting, yarn felt manufacturing using waste cotton fibers and by prod-
ucts." /d. , at 27360, col. 3. 
23 Ventilation systems include general controls, such as central air-
conditioning, and local exhaust controls, which capture emissions of cotton 
dust as close to the point of generation as possible. See 43 Fed. Reg. 
27363-27364. 
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ing and work practice controls are infeasible. !d., § 1910.1043 
(e) ( 1). During this compliance period, and at certain other 
times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators 
to employees. !d., § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements in~ 
elude monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveil-
lance of all employees, annual medical examinations, em-
ployee education and training programs, and the posting of 
warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in 
the instant case requires employers to transfer employees 
unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, 
having a dust level at or below the Standard's PELs, with 
-"no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits 
a.s a result of the transfer." !d., § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v). 
On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the 
Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents 
a "significant health hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, 
col. 1, and that "the prevalence of byssinosis should be signifi-
cantly reduced" by the adoption of the Standard's PELs, id., 
at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust 
and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA 
relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relation-
ship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the concentra-
tion of lint-free respirable cotton dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 27355-
27359; Exhibit 6-51, Joint App. 29-55. See also Ex. 6-17, 
Ct. of App. J . A. 235-245; id., at 1492-1839. Even at the 
200 J..tg/ m3 PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least 
Grade 1/ 2 byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the 
yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, col. 2 and 3. 
In enacting the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA interpreted 
the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard 
to protect against material health impairment, bounded only 
by technological and economic feasibility. !d., at 27361, 
col. 3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative 
proposal for a PEL of 500 J..tg/m8 in ya.rn manufacturing, 
. a proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at 
least Grade 1/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the· 
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Standard to be both technologically and economically feasi~ 
ble based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Al-
though recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cot-
ton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless 
rejected the union proposal for a 100 p.g/m8 PEL because 
it was not within the "technological capabilities of the indus-
try." 43 Fed. Reg. 27359-27360. Similarly, ·OSHA set 
PELS for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 p.g/m3 
in part because of limitations of technological feasibility. 
/d. , at 273ql, col. 3. Finally, the Secreta.ry found that "engi-
neering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even 
with massive expenditures by the industry," id., at 27360, col. 
2, and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL 
of 750 p.g/m3 for weaving and slashing. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major 
respects.24 The court rejected the industry's claim that 
OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give suffi-
cient reasons for failing to adopt it. 617 F. 2d, at 652-654. 
The court also held that the Standard was "reasonably nec-
essary and appropriate" within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material 
health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 617 
F . 2d, at 654-655, 654, n. 83. Rejecting the industry posi-
tion that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the 
Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead 
agreed with OSHA's interpretation that the Standard must 
protect. employees against material health impairment sub-
ject only to the limits of technological and economic feasi-
bility. I d., at 662- 666. The court held that "Congress 
itself struck the balance between costs and benefits in the 
mandate to the agency" under § 6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 
24 The court remanded to the agency that portion of the Standard deal-
ing with the cottonseed oil industry, after concluding that the record 
failed to establish adequately the Standard's economic feasibility. 
U. S. App. D. C. -, 617 F. 2d 636, 669, 677 (1979). 
·' 
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U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), and that OSHA is powerless to cir .. 
cumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most pro.. 
tective feasible standard. 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the 
court held that the agency's determination of technological 
and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record as a whole. Id., at 655-662. 
We affirm in part, and vacate in part.25 
25 The post-argument motions of the several parties for leave t9 file sup-
plemental memoranda are granted. We decline to adopt the sugge;tion 
of the Secretary of Labor that we should "vacate the judgmrnt of the 
court of appeals and remand the case so that the record may be returned 
to the Secretary for further consideration and development." Supple-
mental Memorandum for Federal Respondent, at 4. We also decline to 
adopt the suggestion of petitioners that we should "hold these cases in 
abeyance a11d . . . remand the record to the court of appeals with an 
instruction that the record be remanded to the agency for further pro-
ceedings." Response of Petitioners to the Supplemental Memorandum for 
Federal Respondent, at 4. 
At oral argument, and in a letter addressed to the Court after oral 
argument, petitioners contended that the Secretary's recent amendment of 
OSHA's so-called "Cancer Policy" in light of this Court's decision in 
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, - U. S. 
- (1980), was relevant to the issues in the present case. We disagree. 
OSHA amended its Cancer Policy to "carry out the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that consideration 
must be given to the significance of the risk in the issuance of a carcinogen 
standard and that OSHA must consider all relevant evidence in making 
these determinations." 46 Fed. Reg. 4889, col. 3 (1981). Previously, 
although lacking such evidence as dose response data, the Secretary pre-
sumed that no safe exposure level existed for carcinogenic substances. In-
dustrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, sliP' 
op., at 10, 13-14, 25, n. 39-40. Following this Court's decision, OSHA 
deleted those provisions of the Cancer Policy which required the "auto-
matic setting of the lowest feasible level" without regard to determinations· 
of risk significance. 46 Fed. Reg. 4890, col. 1. 
In distinct contrast with its Cancer Policy, OSHA expressly found that 
"exposure to cotton dust presents a significant health hazHrd to em-
ployees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1, and that "cotton dust produced 
significant health effects at low levels of exposure," id., at 27358, col. 2. 
In addition, the agency noted that "grade 1/2 byssinosis and associated' 
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II 
The principal question presented in this case is whether 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secre-
tary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of 
the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)( 5), to determine that the costs 
of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits. 
Relying on §§ 6 (b)(5) and 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 655 (b)(5), 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA 
must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of 
material health impairment, see Industrial Union Department 
v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 29, but 
also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk 
of material health impairment is significant in light of the 
costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners 
ATMI et al., at 38-41.26 Respondents on the other hand 
pulmonary function decrements are significant health effects in themselves 
and should be prevented in so far as possible." !d., at 27354, col. 2. In 
making its assessment of significant risk, OSHA relied on dose response 
curve data (the Merchant Study) showing that 25% of employees suffered 
at least Grade 1j2 byssinosis at a 500 ~tgjm3 PEL, and that 12.7% of all 
employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 ~tgjm3 PEL standard. !d., 
~t 27358, col. 2 and 3. Examining the Merchant Study in light of other 
studies in the record, the agency found that "the Merchant study provides 
a reliable assessment of health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton 
dust ." Id., at 27357, rol. 3. OSHA concluded that the "prevalence of 
byssinosis ~hould be significantly reduced" by the 200 ~tg/m3 PEL. !d., 
at 27359, col. 3 ; see id., at 27359, col. 1 ("200 ~tgjm3 represents a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of affected workers"). It is difficult to 
imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court's decision 
in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute. 
20 Petitioners ATMI et al. express their position in several ways. They 
maintain that OSHA "is required to show that a reasonable relationship 
exists between the risk reduction benefits and the costs of its standards." 
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 36. Petitioners also suggest that 
OSHA must show that "the standard is expected to achieve a significant 
reduction in [the significant risk of material health impairment]" based on 
"an assessment of the costs of achieving it." !d., at 38, 40. Allowing 
that "[t]his does not mean that OSHA must engage in a rigidly formal 
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contend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate stand-
ards that eliminate or reduce such risks "to the extent such 
protection is technologically and economically feasible." 
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 38; Brief for 
Respondent Unions, at 26-27.27 To resolve this debate, we 
cost-benefit calculation that places a dollar value on employee Jives or 
health," id., at 39, petitioners describe the required exercise as follows: 
"First, OSHA must make a responsible determination of the costs and risk 
reduction benefits of its standard. Pursuant to the requirement of Sec-
tion 6 (f) of the Act, this determination must be factually supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. The subsequent determination whether 
the reduction in health risk is 's:gnificant' (based upon the factual assess-
ment of costs and benefits) is a judgment to be made by the agency in 
the first instance." Id., at 40. 
Respondent disputes petitioners' description of the exercise, claiming 
that any meaningful balancing must involve "placing a [dollar] value ori 
human life and freedom from suffering," Brief for Respondent Secretary of 
Labor, at 59, and that there is no other way but through formal cost-
bem•fit analysis to accomplish petitioners' desired balancing, id, at 59-60. 
Cost-benPfit analysis contemplates "systematic enumeration of all benefits 
and all costs, tangible and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or diffi-
cult to measure, that will accrue to all members of society if a particular 
project is adopted." E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy 
Analysis 134 (1978); see National Academy of Sciences, Decision Making 
for ltegulating Chemicals in the Environment 38 ( 1975). See generally 
E . Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis (1976); Prest and Turvey, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, in 300 Economic Journal 683 (1965). Whether petitioners' or 
respondent's characterization · is correct, we will sometime refer to peti-
tioner's proposed exercise as "cost-benefit analysis." 
27 As described by the union respondents, the test for determining 
whether a standard promulgated to regulate a "toxic material or harmful 
physical agent" satisfies the Act has three parts: 
"First, whether the 'place of employment is unsafe--in the sense that 
significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change 
in practices.' [International Union Department, slip op., at 32 (plurality 
opinion)] . Second, whether of the possible available correctives the Secre-
tary had selected 'the standard ... that is most protective'. Ibid. Third, 
whether that standard is 'feasible.'" Brief for Respondent Unions, at 
40-41. 
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must turn to the language, structure, and legislative history 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
A 
The starting point of our analysis is the language of the 
statute itself. Steadman v. SEC,- U. S. -,- (1981); 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section 
() (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) (emphasis 
added). provides: 
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing 
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under 
this subsection, shall set the standard which most ade., 
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of 
the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity 
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard 
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working 
life.'' 28 
Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that 
the phrase "to the extent feasible" contains the critical lan-
guage in § 6 (b) ( 5) for purposes of this case. 
The plain meaning of the word "feasible" supports re-
spondents' interpretation of the statute. According to Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary of the English 
I;anguage, "feasible" means "capable of being done, executed,. 
or effected." ld., at 831 (1976). Accord, The Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary 116 (1933) ("Capable of being done, accom-
2 g Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), also provides: 
"Drvelopment. of standards under this subsection shall be based upon 
rr~rarch , demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may 
br appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of 
health and safety protrction for the employee, other considerations shall 
he the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the 
!-ifandard:;, and t>xperience gained under this and other health and safety 
law~ . Wht>never practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed 
iu terms of objective criteria, and of the performance desired." 
,, 
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plished or carried out"); Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard" 
Dictionary of the Englisli bapguage 903 (1957) '("That ,nay 
be done, performed or effected:'). Thu~~ § 6 (b) (5) directs 
the Secretary to issue the ·standard t~at .. ''zP~St' adequately 
assures ... that no employee will suffer, material ~mpair:tnent 
of health," limited only by the, ~xtfnt 1i? JVhicq 1 th{~ is "~apa­
b~e of being done." In effect then, as the ·court, o( Ap~eals 
. 'held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between 
' costs and benefits, by placing the "benefit" of worker health 
above all other considerations save those making attainrpent 
of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a 
balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes 
a different balance than that struck by Congress would be 
inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6 (b) ( 5). Thus, 
cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute 
because feasibility analysis is.29 See Industrial Union De-
partment v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., 
at 32 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
When Congress has intended that an agency engage in 
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on 
20 In this casf' we are faced with the issue whether the Act require<> 
OSHA to balance costs and benefits in promulgating a single.· toxic 
material and harmful physical agent standard under § 6 (b) ( 5) . \ Peti-
tioners argue that without rost-benrfit balancing, the ·llisl,ance . of a 
single standard might result in a "serious misallocation of th'e finitr re-
sources that are available for the protection of worker ::;afety'tl.'nd health ," 
given the other health hazards in the workplace. Reply BriM for Peti-
tioners ATMI et al., at 10 ; see Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 38-39; 
Brief of Chamber of Commerce of United States at> amicu~ curiae, at 12; 
Brief of American Industrial Hralth Council as amicus cu1iae, at 19. 
This argument is more properly addressed to other provisions of the Act 
which may authorizr OSHA to explore costs and benefits for deciding be-
tween issuance of several standards regulating different varieties of health 
and safety hazards, e. g, § 6 (g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (g) ; see 
Indust1ial Union Depa1'trnent v. American Petrol~um Institute, supra, slip 
op., at 33; !lee also Case Comment , 60 B. U. L. R. 115, 122, n. 52, or for 
promulgating other type:; of standards not issued under § 6 (b) ( 5). We 
'expre~s no view on these qi1estion~:>. 
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the face of the statute. One early example is the Flood Con.., 
trol Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 710a. 
1 
"[T]he Federal Government should improve or partici-
pate in the improvement of navigable waters or their 
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-con-
trol purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may ac-
crue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives 
and social security of people are otherwise adversely 
affected." 
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act Amendments of 1978, 43 . U. S. C. § 1347 (b), providing 
that offshore drilling operations. shall use 
"the best available and safest technologies which the 
Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wher-
ever failure of equipment would have a significant effect 
on safety, health, or the environment, except where the 
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are 
clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of 
using such technologies." 
These and other statutes so demonstrate that Congress uses 
so See, e. g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 6295 (c), (d); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, 33 U. S. C. §1312(b)(l), (2); §1314(b)(1)(B); Clean Water 
Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (4) (B); Clean Air Act 
Amendments of Hl70, 42 U. S. C. §7545 (c)(2)(B). In the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress directed the Administra-
tor to consider "the total cost of application of technology in relation to 
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application." 33 
U.S. C.§ 1314 (b) (1) ("BPT" limitations) . With regard to 1987 effluent 
limitations, the Administrator is directed to consider total cost , but not in 
comparison with effluent reduction benefits. /d., § 1314 (b){2) (B) 
("BAT" limitations). See EPA v. National C1·ushed Stone Assn., No. 79-
770, slip op, at 5-6, 6, n. 10, 11-12. 
In other statutes, Congress has used the phrase "unreasonable risk," 
accompanied by explanation in legislative history, to signify a generalized 
balancing of eosts and benefits. See, e. g., the Consumer Product Safety 
"t,.. .• 
79-1429 & '19-1583...-0PINION 
AMERICAN TEXTILE MF:rtS. INST, v. PONOVAN 19 
specific language when intending that an agency engage in 
cost-benefit analysis. See Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 23, n. 27 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary 
meaning, the word "feasible" cannot be construed to articu-
late such congressional intent. We therefore reject the 
Art of 1972, 15 U. S. C. § 2056 (a) ("unreasonable risk of injury"); H. R. 
Rep. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1972) (where the House 
stated: 
"It should be noted that the Commission's authority to promulgate 
standards under this bill is limited to instances where the hazard asso-
ciated with a consumer product presents an unreasonable risk of death, 
injury, or serious or frequent illness. . . . Protection against unreasonable 
risks is central to many Federal and State safety statutes and the courts 
have had broad experience in interpreting the term's meaning and appli-
cation. It is generally experted that the determination of unreasonable 
hazard will involve the Commission in balancing the probability that risk 
will result in harm and the gravity of such harm against the effect on the 
product's utility, costs, and availability to the consumer."); 
S. Hep. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 14-15. See also Aqua Slide 'N' 
Dive Corp . v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 569 F. 2d 831, 839 
(CA5 1978); Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,- U. S. 
App. D. C.-, 559 F. 2d 774, 789 (1977) . The error of ·several cases 
finding a cost-benefit analysis mandate in the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act is their reliance on the different language and clear legi~lative 
hi8tory of the Consumer Product Safety Act to reach their conrlusions. 
See 'l'exas Independent Ginners Assoc. v. Marshall, - F. 2d -, -
(CA5 1980); American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F. 2d 493, 502-
M3 (CA5 1978), aff'd on other grounds, Industrial Union Department v. 
American Pet1'oleum lrn;titute, - U. S. - (1980). 
Senator Chiles was sufficiently certain that the Act did not contemplate 
cost-benefit analysis that he introduced an amendment in 1973 that, inter 
alia, 
"direct:; the Secretary to recognize the cost-benefit. ratio in promulgating a 
new standard and to publish information relative to the projected financial 
impact. Tins provision will promote the development of standards jus-
tifiable in terms of the benefits to be derived and afford those to be 
affected an opportunity to make a reasoned evaluation of the proposal.' .. 
119 Cong. Hec. 42151 (1973), 
,. 
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11rgument that Congress required cost-benefit analysis in 
§ (j (b) (5). 
B 
Even though the plain language of § 6 (b) ( 5) supports 
this construction, we must still decide whether § 3 (8), the 
general definition of an occupational saJety and health stand-
ard, either alone or in tandem with § 6 (b)( 5)' incorporates a 
cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic 
materials or harmful physical agents. Section 3 (8) of the 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8) (emphasis added), provides: · 
"The term 'occupational safety and health standard; 
means a standard which requires conditions, or the adop-
tion or use of one or more practices, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appro-
priate to provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment." 
Taken alone, the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate" might be construed to contemplate some balancing of 
the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that, 
so construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis require-
ment on the issuance of § 6 (b)( 5) standards, even if § 6 (b) 
(5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not 
decide whether § 3 (8), standing alone, would contemplate 
some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Con-
gress specifically chose in § 6 (b) (5) to impose separate and 
additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of oc-
cupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic 
materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those· 
standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health 
to the extent feasible. Congress cobld reasonably have con-
cluded that health standards should be subject to different 
criteria than safety standards because of the special problems 
presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Depart-· 
ment v. American Petroleum Institute , supra, slip op., at 38-
39, n. 54 (plurality opinion)~ · 
,. 
' . . 
. 
' 
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Agreement with petitioners' argument that § 3 (8) imposes 
an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit anal-
ysis on the issuance of § 6 (b) ( 5) standards would eviscerate 
the 11to the extent feasible" requirement. Standards would 
inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analy-
sis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b) ( 5). For exam-
ple, if cost-benefit analysis indicated a protective standard 
of 1000 p.g/m~ PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a 
500 p.g/ m8 PEL, the ag::mcy would be forced by the cost-
benefit requirement to choose the less stringent point.31 We 
cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of 
§ 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement 
of § 6 (b)( 5). Adoption of petitioners' interpretation would 
effectively write § 6 (b)(5) out of the Act. We decline to 
render Congress' decision to include a feasibility requirrment 
nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rnle that all 
parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect. E. g., 
1 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., supra, 442 U. S., at 339; Wein~ t 
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609, 
633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 
303, 307- 308 (1961). Congress did not contemplate any 
further balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful 
physical agents standards, and we should not "impute to Con-
gress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to 
promote with the other." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & 
I>1t.nnh1(l. Tw. , .~upra. at 631. quoting Clark v. Uebersee 
Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947).32 
81 In addition, as the legislative history makes plain, see infra, at 23-24, 
any standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would 
a fortiori not be "reasonably necessary or appropriate" under the Act. 
Sre Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
499 F. 2d 467, 478 (1974) ("Congress docs not appear to have intended 
to protect employees by putting their employers out of bu;;iness"). 
3 2 This is not to say that § 3 (8) might not require the balancing of 
costs and benefits for ~tandards promulgated under provisions other than 
§ 6 (b) (5) of the Act . As a plurality of this Court noted in Industrial 
Union Department, if §:; (8) had no sub~tantive content, "there 
~; 
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c 
The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not 
crystal clear, provides general support for respondents' inter-
pretation of the Act. The congressional reports and debates 
certainly confirm that Congress meant "feasible" and nothing 
else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the 
Act might be thought to rl'lquire achievement of absolute 
safety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that 
health and safety goals be capable of economic and techno-
logical accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence 
of any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA 
to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating 
a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. The 
legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress 
was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substan-
tial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such 
costs were part of the cost of doing business. · We thus turn 
to the relevant portions of the legislative history. 
Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, introduced by 
Senator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785, 
introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific pro-
visions controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic 
would be no statutory criteria at all to guide the Secretary in promulgating 
either national consensus standards or permanent standards other than 
those dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agent::..'' Slip op., 
at 29-30, n . 45. Furthermore, the mere fact that a §()(b) (5) standard is 
"feasible" does not mean that § 3 (8) 's "reasonably necessary or appro-
priate" language might not impose additional restraints on OSHA. For 
example, all § 6 (b) ( 5) standards must be addressed to "~ignificant risks" 
of material health impairment. /d., at 32. In addition, if the use of 
one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk as the use 
of five, the use of five respirators was "technologically and economically 
feasible," and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" limitation might come into play as an addi-
tional restriction on OSHA to choo::le the one-respirator standard. In this 
case we need not decide all the applications that § 3 (8) might have, either 
alone or together with § B (b) (5). 
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materials and harmful physical agents, L€gis. Hist. 1, 6-7 
(Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both 
contained the definitional section now codified as § 3 (8).33 
The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the 
Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that 
included the following section: 
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards under this 
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, on the basis of the best available professional 
evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment 
of health or functional capacity, or diminished life ex-
pectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to 
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period 
of his working life." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785); 
Legis. Hist. 834. 
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, re-
porting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtually 
identieal to the House version, except for the additional re-
quirement that the Secretary set the standard "which most 
adequately and feasibly assures ... that no employee will 
suffer any impairment of health." Legis. Hist. 242 (the Sen-
ate provision was numbered § 6 (b) ( 5)) (emphasis added). 
This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator 
Javits, who explained his amendment: 
"As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting 
standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of 
proposed standards. This is an improvement over the 
Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee], 
which might be interpreted to require absolute health 
and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the 
Administration bill, which contains no criteria for stand-
83 Although both versions of the Act contained provisions identical to 
§ 3 (8), 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), there is no discussion in the legislative his-
tory (,f the meaning of the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate/1 
.. 
; 
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ards at all. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., 
58; Legis. Hist. 197 (emphasis added). 34 
Thus the Senator's concern was that a standard might require 
"absolute health and safety" without any consideration as to 
whether such a condition was achievable. The full Senate 
Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this 
provision "shall represent feasible requirements," id., at 7; 
Legis. Hist. 147, and commented that "[s]tich standards 
should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no em-
ployee will suffer impaired health . . . ,'; ibid. ( emphasi& 
added). 
84 Petitioners' primary legislative history argument is that Senator Javits 
"took the position that OSHA standards should be 'feasible' in the sense 
of being 'reasonable' and 'practical' as well as technologically achievable." 
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et a!., at 32. A review of the record belies 
this contention. Senator Javits himself had introduced the Administra-
tion's bill, S. 2788, which he observed contained no criteria for issuance of 
standards. Legis. Hist. 31, 39-42. That proposed legislation, which estab-
lished a National Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate 
standards, required the Board to submit proposed standards to an appro-
priate national standards-producing organization "to prepare a report on 
the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard." 
/d., at 39. Furthermore, either the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare could object to a proposed standard on 
the basis, inter alia, that it "is not feasible," id., at 40, at which point the 
Board could reaffirm the standard by a majority vote, ibid. President 
Nixon's message accompanying S. 2788, which Senator Javits inserted in 
the Congressional Record, described the "report on the technical feasi-
bility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard" under the Act as a 
"report on the feasibility of the proposed standards." 115 Cong. Rec, 
22517. 
From this slim reed petitioners fashion their legislative history argu-
ment. But even if Senator Javits fully subscribed to statements by Presi-
dent Nixon on the proposed legislation, of which there is some doubt, see 
115 Cong. Rec. 22512, this hardly supports the view that the Senator's 
addition of the feasibility requirement to the Williams bill included any 
such baggage. After all, the Senator described his amendment only with 
the word "feasible," and specifically distinguished the amended Williams 
bill from the Administration's, on the basis of the latter's lack of criteria. 
... 
. ' 
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The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting 
in § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the 
Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Sen-
ator Dominick, who pla.yed a prominent role in this amend-
ment process, see Legis. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits); 
527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned 
that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He 
therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b) (5) 
be struck, explaining: 
"This requirement is inherently confusing and un-
realistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to 
ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of 
injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case 
of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all 
risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria 
could, if literally applied, close every business in this 
nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which 
might most 'adequately' and 'feasibly' assure the elim-
ination of the danger would be the prohibition of the 
occupation itself." Legis. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen. 
Dominick on his proposed amendment No. 1054) (em-
phasis in original). 
In the ensuing floor debate on this issue, Senator Dominick 
'reiterated his concern that "[i]t is unrealistic to attempt, as 
[the Committee's Section 6 (b)(5)] apparently does, toes-
tablish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is 
an impossibility .. . . " Legis. Hist. 480.35 The Senator con-
86 Senator Dominick gave several examples. For instance: 
" [L] et us t ake a fellow who is a streetcar conductor or a bus conductor 
at the present time. How in the world, in the process of the pollution we 
have in the streets or in the process of the automobile accidents that we 
have all during a working day of anyone driving a bus or trolley car, or 
whatever it may b£>, can we set standards that will make sure he will not 
have any risk to his life for the rest of his life? It is totally impo~sible for 
this to be put in a bill ; and yet it is in the committee bill." Legis. Hist. 
423, See also id., at 481; 345. 
.• 
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eluded that "[a]ny administrator responsible for enforcing 
the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either. 
he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is 
any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could 
not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of 
Congress .... " Id., at 481-482. 
Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sen-
tence of § 6 (b)(5) deleted. However, after working with 
Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended ver-
sion of the first sentence which he though "agreeable to all" 
and which became § 6 (b) ( 5) as it now appears in the Act. 
!d., at 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6 
(b)( 5) to "toxic materials and harmful physical agents," 
changed "health impairment" to "material health impair-
ment," and deleted the reference to "diminished life expect-
ancy." Significantly, the feasibility requirement was left 
intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase "which most 
adequately and feasibly assures," the amendment merely sub-
stituted "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasi-
ble," to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated 
as a limit on the promulgation of standard under § 6 (b )(5). 
Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made 
clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working envi-
ronment could not be achieved through "prohibition of the 
occupation itself," id., at 367, and that toxic material and 
harmful physical agent standards should not address frivo-
lous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility 
requirement, along with the need for a "material health im-
pairment," were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns. 
He explained the effect of the amendment: 
"What we were trying to do in the bill-unfortunately, 
we did not have the proper wording or the proper draft-
ing-was to say that when we are dealing with toxic 
agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps 
~fl are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere· 
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within which a person's health or safety would not be 
affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing 
that anyone would be assured that no one would have a 
hazard . ... " !d., at 502. 
Senator Williams added that the amendment "will provide a 
continued d;rection to the Secretary that he shall be required 
to set the standard which most adequately and to the great-
est extent feasible assures" that no employee will suffer any 
material health impairment. ld., at 503. The Senate there-
after passed S. 2193. One week later, the House passed a 
substitnte bill for its original bill, which failed to contain 
any substantive criteria for the issuance of health standards. 
Legis. IIist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Confer-
ence, however. the House conferees acceded to the Senate's 
version of § 6 (b)( 5) .86 
Not only does the legislative history confirm that Con~rress 
meant "feasible" rather than "cost-benefit" when it used the 
former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that 
the A0t would create substantial costs for employers. yet in-
tended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe 
and healthful working environment.37 Congress viewed the 
86 In acceding, the House obtained Senate agre~ment to another amend-
ment, now § 6 (b) (6) (A) of the Act, that allowed employers to petition 
for a temporary variance from an occupational safety and health stand:ud 
in certain cases, except that " [e]conomic hardship is not to be a con-
sideration for the qualification for a temporary extens:on order." H. R. 
Conference Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 35; Legis. Hist. 1188. 
The Conference Report limited the variance procedure to the followi~g 
cases: 
"unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of ne"essary 
materials or equipment or because necessary construction or alteration of 
facilities cannot be completed on time. . . . Such an order may be issued 
for a maximum period of one year and may not be renewed more than 
twice." Ibid. 
37 Because the costs of compliance would weigh particularly heavily on 
~mall busine~ses , Congre~s provided in § 28 of the Act an amendment to 
., ) 
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costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Sena~ 
tor Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated: 
1'We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but 
that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in 
America." Legis. Hist. 444. He asked: 
"One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too 
expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety 
equipment loses the services of its skilled employees? 
Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand 
or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow 
trying to raise her children on meager allowance under 
workmen's compensation and social security? And what 
about the man-a good hardworking man-tied to a 
wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That 
is what we are dealing with when we talk about indus-
trial safety. . . . We are talking about people's lives, 
not the indifference of some cost accountants." Legis. 
Hist. 510. 
Senator Eagleton commented that "[t]he costs that will be 
incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and 
safety to be established under this bill are, in my view, rea-
the Small Business Act, 15 U. S. C. § 636, making small businesses eligible 
for economic assistance through the Small Business Administration to com-
ply with standards promulgated by the Secretary. Legis. Hist. 1257. 
Senator Dominick explained: 
"There is a provision in the bill which recognizes the impact that this 
particular legislation may have on small businesses. . . . It permits the 
Secretary to make loans to small businesses wherever the standards that 
are set by the National Government are so severe as to have caused a, 
real and substantial economic injury. Under those circumstances the 
Secretary is entitled, through the Small Business Administration, to make-
loans to those bul:linesses to get them over the hump, because of the need 
for new equipment, or because of new conditions within the shop, which 
would permit them to continue in operation. 
"I think that is a very significant and important provision for mini-
mizing economic injury which could occur if the bill resulted in situations· 
which would have very serious effects on businesses." Legis. Hist. 525 .. 
. ' 
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,ponable and necessary costs of doing business." Legis. Hist, 
1150-1151 (emphasis added). 38 
Other Members of Congress voiced similar views.39 No-
where is there any indication that Congress contemplated a ( 
different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health 
and safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Con-
gress thought that the financial costs of health and safety 
problems in the workplace were as large or larger than the 
financial costs of eliminating these problems. In its sta.tement 
of findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act 
itself, Congress announced that "personal injuries and ill-
nesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial 
burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in 
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and 
disability compensation payment." 29 U. S. C. ~ 651 (a). 
The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs: 
"[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disabil-
ity is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost 
wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product 
38 Congress was concerned that some employers not obtain a competi-
tive advantage over others by declining to invest in worker health and 
safety : 
"Although many employers in all industries have demonstrated an ex-
emplary degree of concern for health and safety in the workplace, their 
efforts are to often undercut by those who are not so concerned. More-
over, the fact is that many employers-particularly smaller ones-
simply cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety, and 
survive competitively, unless all are compelled to do so." S. Rep. 91-1282, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 4, Legis. Hist. 144. 
89 See, e. g., Legis. Hist. 1030-1031 (remarks of Congressman Dent): 
"Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs to the 
operation of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad, 
I would say there is a greater concern and that must be for the production 
men who do the producing-the men who work in the service industries 
and the men and women in this country who daily go out and keep the 
economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work and 
to be able to prosper in it." 
ao 
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is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that 
could be available for productive use are siphoned off tQ 
pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical ex-
penses," S. Rep., supra, at 2; Legis. Hist. 142. 
Senator Eagleton summarized, "Whether we, as individuals, 
are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we 
can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe 
or unhealthy worksite." Legis. Hist. 1150-1151. 
III 
Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that "[t]he determina-
tions of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 
29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secre-
tary's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is "eco-
nomically feasible" is not supported by substantial evidence 
in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they 
claim (1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs nec-
essary to meet the Standard's requirements; and (2) that 
OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not 
threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry. 
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of 
the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as "such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U. S. 474, 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take 
into account contradictory evidence in the record, Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 487-488, but "the possi-
bility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evi-
dence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding 
from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v. 
'Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966). 
Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial 
evidence questions in the Courts of Appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655 
(f), we apply the familiar rule that "[t]his Court will inter-
., 
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·vene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the 
[substantial evidence] standard appears to have been misap-
prehended or grossly misapplied" by the court below. Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 292, 310 (1974); FTC v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our 
inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance, 
would find OSHA's findings supported by substantial evi-
dence. Instead we turn to OSHA's findings and the record 
upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of 
A-ppeals "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substan-
tial evidence test. 
A 
OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance 
with the Cotton Dust Staudard after reviewing two financial 
analyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute 
(RTI), an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry 
representatives (Hocutt-Thomas) .40 The agency carefully 
explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the 
conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the 
agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which 
it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost 
estimate. A brief summary of OSHA's treatment of the two 
studies follows. 
40 See RTI, Cotton Dust : Technological Feasibility Assessment and 
Final Inflationary Impact Statement (1976), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J . A. 
457, 573-748; RTI, Technological Feasibility and Economic Impact of 
Regulations for Cotton Dust : Testimony to be Presented by the Research 
Triangle Institute at Public Hearing (1977), Ex. 16, Ct. of App. J. A. 1320, 
1351- 1357. The indust ry estimates were presented by Hovan Hocutt and 
Arthur Thomas, employees of dust control equipment manufacturers. 
Statrment of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Pneumafil 
Corp., Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2228-2247; Statement of Arthur Thomas, 
Senior Vice-President, The Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, Ct. of App. J . A. 2248-
'2257. OSHA referred collectively to these two statements as the Hocutt-
Tbomas estimate. 
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OSHA rejected RTI's cost estimate of $1.1 billion for tex~ 
tile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons.H 
First, OSHA believed that RTI's estimate should be dis-
counted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3, because that esti-
mate was based on the assumption that engineering controls 
would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those 
processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust is 
not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that 
" [ e l xclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only 
could reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent." Ex. 6-
76. Ct. of App. J. A. 585.42 Since the Standard did not re-
quire controls on synthetics-only equipment, OSHA rejected 
RTI's assumption about application of controls to synthetics-
only machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3. Second, OSHA 
concluded that RTI "may have over-estimated compliance 
costs since some operations are already in compliance with 
the permissible exposure limit of the new standard." !d., at 
27370, col. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some mills 
had attained PELS of 200 ,ug/m3 or less, while others were 
below the 100 ,ug/ m3 total dust leveJ.43 Therefore, OSHA 
41 RTI estimated compliance costs of $984.4 million for yarn producticn 
(opening through spinning), Ex. 6- 76, Ct. of App. J . A. 473, and $127.7 
million for yarn processing (winding through weaving/slashing), id., at 
600. In another part of its study, RTI estimated yarn production costs 
of $885.6 million . Id., at 589. The explanation for this discrepancy is-
not readily apparent from the record, although it may be attributable . to 
cost estimates for different years. 
42 RTI made what it called a "conservative estimate" that "controls 
would be applied to all the production equipment in mills processing cotton 
and cotton-synthetic blends, even if part of their product is pure syn-
thetic." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 585. 
48 RTI's David LeSourd explained that RTI did not have data on the 
degree of compliance for the industry as a whole, but only for some 
specific mills. Ct. of App. J . A. 3637-3638. Therefore RTI merely 
assumed that industry-wide PELs were at a 1000 !Lg/m3 total dust PEL. 
Ex. 6-76, id., at 579- 580. The record contains conflicting evidence on the 
actual level of control in the industry. Some evidence suggests compliance 
by mills substantially better than the 1000 !Lgj m3 total dust level. See, 
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disagreed with RTI's assumption that the · industry had not 
reduced cotton dust exposure below the existing standard's 
1000 J.tg/ m" total dust PEL. I d., at 27370, col. 3. Third,. 
OSHA found that the RTI study suffered from lack of recent 
accurate industry data. I d., at 27373, col. 1; see Ex. 6-76, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 858; Ex. 16, id., at 1357, 1359. 
In light of these deficiencies in the RTI study, OSHA 
adopted the Hoeutt-Thomas estima.te for textile industry en-
gineering controls of $543 million/4 emphasizing that, be-
cause it was based on the most recent industry data, it was 
more realistic than RTI's estimate. 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 
1.45 Nevertheless OSHA concluded that the Hocutt-Thomas 
estimate was overstated for four principal reasons. First, 
Hocutt-Thomas included costs of achieving the existing PEL 
of 1000 J.tg/ m3 , while OSHA thought it likely that compli-
ance was more widespread and that some mills had in fact 
achieved the final standard's PEL. Ibid., see supra, at 30, 
n. 43.46 Second, Hocutt-Thomas declined to make any allow-
e. g., Ex. 47, id., at 2037 (66% of Burlington Industries work areas at 
or below 500 ~g/mS, 28% below 200 ~g/m3 ); Ex. 78, id., at 2387. One 
.expert, commenting on another study, observed that "substantial propor-
tions of the industry are, in fact, within compliance of [200 ~g/m'l] ."· 
Ct. of App. J . A. 3637. Other evidence in the record suggests that ssme 
segments of the industry are not in compliance with the 1000 ~gjmll· 
total dust PEL. See e. g, id , at 3939 (criticizing RTI assumption of 
compliance). In any event, OSHA found that the "actual level of controls 
in the cotton industry could not be determined" on the basis of data 
available to RTI at the time of its study. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 3. 
44 OSHA's cost estimate included $543 million for engineering controls 
(the Hocutt-Thomas estimate), $7 million for monitoring, medical sur-
veillance, and other provisions (the RTI estimate), $31.5 million for waste 
processing, and $75 million for seed processing, for a total of $656.5 million~ 
43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 1. 
45 The Hoeutt-Thomas study based its estimates on data obtained from 
a recent ATMI survey of cotton mills. Completed questionnaires from 
353 mills, which processed 80% of the cotton bales in the United States, 
were returned. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2231. 
46 The Hocutt-Thomas study included an allowance for existing com-
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ance foF the trend toward replacement of existing production 
machines with newer more productive equipment.47 Relying 
on this "[n]'atural production trend[]," 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, 
col. 1, OSHA concluded that fewer machines than estimated 
by Hocutt-Thomas would require retrofitting or other con-
trols, id., at 27372, col. 3. Third, OSHA thought that Hocutt-
Thomas failed to take into account development of new 
technologies likely to occur during the four-year compliance 
period. lbid.48 Fourth, OSHA believed that Hocutt-Thorn~ 
pliance efforts, by subtracting from its total estimate the cost of all engi-
neering controls purchased by the industry prior to February 11, 1977. 
Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2232, 2247. Whether this is a sufficient proxy 
for current industry compliance is not apparent from the record. Hocutt 
himself admitted that he did not have figures on what portion of the 
industry was meeting the 1000 l'g/m3 total dust PEL. Ct; of App. J. A. 
3941. 
17 John Figh, a vice-president at Chase Manhattan Bank specializing in 
the textile industry, commented on the trend toward modernizing equip-
ment in the mills: 
" [B]y continuing to upgrade plants with the most modern and efficient 
equipment, the textile manufacturing industry will likely not be required 
due to demand to add much in the way of new bricks and mortar. There 
may be some individual cases of out-of-date facilities being replaced by 
new buildings ; but for the most part, I believe we will see more in the 
way of modernization of existing plants .... " Ex. 63, Ct. of App. J. A. 
2260 (emphasis added). 
One study explained why the costs of controls should be lower jf a mill 
converts to new equipment as opposed to retrofitting old machines: 
"1 ) The operating cost of new equipment with controls on that equipment 
io less than the operating cost of the old equipment with controls 
necessary for the older, slower equipment to meet proscribed [sic] dust 
levels; and 2) by going to newer equipment with controls there is a likeli-
hood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some or-
all of the capital cost of control." Ex. 79A, id., at 2532; see Ex. 79C, 
id., at 2550-2551 ; Ex. 63, id., at 2261; Ex. 78, id., at 2376-2377. 
48 Chase Manhattan Bank vice-president Figh noted that "[t]here does 
not appear to be any vast new technology on the horizon," but that 
1'[a]s for new machinery, evolutionary changes are continuing at what 
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might have improperly included control costs for synthetics-
only machines, ibid., an inclusion which could result in a 
30% cost overestimate.49 
Petitioners criticize OSHA's adoption of the Hocutt-
Thomas estimate, since that estimate was based on achieve-
ment of somewhat less stringent PELs than those ultimately 
promulgated in the final Standard.50 Thus, even if the 
Hocutt-Thomas estimate was exaggerated, they assert that 
"only by the most remarkable coincidence would the amount 
of that overestimate be equal to the additional costs required 
to attain the far more stringent limits of the Standard OSHA 
actually adopted." Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al.. at 27; 
see Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, 
at 14- 15. The agency itself recognized the problem cited 
by petitioners, but found itself limited in the precision of its 
estimates by the industry's refusal to make more of its own 
data available.51 OSHA explained that, "in the absence of 
appears to me to be about the same rate as in the last few years." Ex. 63, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 2660-2661. One study is particularly critical of the 
assumption of a "static state of technology," Ex. 78, id., at 2380, and docu-
ments technological advances that can be expected, id., at 2380-2386. 
Some experts were less optimistic of the role of technology. See, e. g., id., 
at 3643-3644 (RTI study). 
49 Hocutt-Thomas had some information on the "ratio of synthetics tct 
cotton in blends" in the mills, but it is not clear from the record if and 
how they used this information. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2230. 
50 The final Cotton Dust Standard calls for PELs of 200 ,ug/ms in 
opening through roving and spinning through warping, and 750 .ug/ma 
for slashing and weaving. The Hocutt-Thomas study similarly assumed 
a 200 .ugjm3 PEL for opening through roving, but assumed Jess stringent 
PELs of 500 .ug/m3 for spinning through warping, and 1000 ,ugj m3 for 
slashing and weaving. 
51 For example, in questioning before an administrative law judge, 
Hocutt answered: 
"Well, I'm beginning to wish I hadn 't said anything about this, which I 
did, and I have to be helpful. Practically all of this information that I 
have is confidential and I couldn't reveal any of the so'urces. You can Cll.nly 
.. ·" 
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the [industry] survey data [of textile mills], OSHA cannot 
develop more accurate estimates of compliance costs." 43 
Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1. Since § '6 (b) ( 5) of the Act requires 
that the Secretary promulgate toxic material and harmful 
physical agent standards "on the basis of the best available 
evidence," 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)( 5), and since OSHA could 
not obtain the more detailed confidential industry data it 
thought essential to further precision, we conclude that the 
agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas esti-
mate.52 While a cost estimate based on the standard actually 
promulgated surely would be preferable, 53 we decline to hold 
take my word for the figures . I can't substantiate it in any manner." 
Ct. of App. J. A. 3929. 
Petitioners note, however, that the industry subsequently provided its 
survey data to OSHA, and that the only information deleted was con-
fidential information withheld by agreement with the agency in order 
to prevent identification of specific mills. Reply Brief for Petitioners 
ATMI et al., at 23, n. 32; see J. A. 388-390. OSHA responds that, 
" [b.lecause the number of machines was deleted and correlated dust data 
was not supplied, the data could not be used to support a specific cost 
adjustment." Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 64, n. 70. In 
any event, no contention is made that OSHA had access to Hocutt's own 
data used to calculate his cost estimate. 
02 Both petitioners and respondents attempt their own calculations from 
evidence in the record to show the unreasonableness or reasonableness of 
OSHA's rough equation between the Hocutt-Thomas overstatement in 
costs and the expense of achieving a Standard somewhat more stringent 
for some operations. See, e. g. , Brief for Petitioner National Cotton 
Council of America, at 9-10; Brief for Respondent Unions, at 14-18. 
Such manipulation of the data suggests a wide margin of error for any 
estimate, whether it be OSHA's, the industry's, or the unions'. Viewed 
in that light, the agency's candor in confessing its own inability to achieve 
a more precise estimate should not precipitate a judicial review that none-
theless demands what the congressionally-delegated "expert" says it can-
not provide. 
53 The Secretary originally asked RTI to prepare cost estimates for 
several PEL level~, including 500, 200, and 100 .ugj m3 • Ex. 6-76, Ct. of 
App. J. A, 509. Clearly the Secretary intended to have cost informatio~ 
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as a matter of law that its absence under the circumstances 
required the Court of Appeals to find that OSHA's determi-
nation was unsupported by substantial evidence.5' 
Therefore, whether or not in the first instance we would 
find the Secretary's conclusions supported by substantial evi-
dence, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals in this case 
"misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evi-
dence test when it found that "OSHA reasonably evaluated. 
the cost estimates before it, considered criticisms of each, and 
selected suitable estimates of compliance costs." 617 F. 2d, 
at 661 (footnote omitted). 
on the different PELs that he might promulgate. Although RTI provided 
estimates for these levels in its final report, OSHA found them to be too 
unreliable to adopt as final estimates. See supm, at 31-32. 
Even if the Secretary had wanted to obtain a cost estimate, based on 
confidential industry data, for the actual PELs in the adopted Standard, 
it would have been unable to do so. Hocutt had concluded that it was 
tPchnologically impractical to achieve PELs below 500 1-1g/m3 for the. 
operations of spinning through warping, Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2239-
2241 , and PELs below 1000 1-1g/m3 for weaving and slashing, id., at 2241-
2243. Therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates of a 200 1-1gjm3 
PEL for those operations. The Secretary obviously disagreed with his 
judgment of technological feasibility. We also note that, although peti-
tioners challenged the technological feasibility of the final Cotton Dust 
Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such challenge 
here. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 8, n. 16. 
5 ~ The Court of Appeals observed that "the agency's underlying cost 
estimates are not free from imprecision," 617 F. 2d, at 662, but that 
"[t]he very nature of economic analysis frequently imposes practical limits 
on the precision which reasonably can be required of the agency," id., at 
661. We suspect that this results not only from the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate data, but also from the inherent crudeness of estimation tools. 
Of necessity both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on 
assumptions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the. 
validity of their final numerical cost estimates. As the official charged 
h? Congress with the promulgation of occupational safety and health 
standards that protect workers "to the extent feasible," the Secretary was 
()bligated to subject such assumptions to careful scrutiny, and to decide· 
how they might affect the correctness of the preferred estimates. 
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After estimating the cost of compliance with the Cotton 
Dust Standa.rd, OSHA analyzed whether it was "economically 
feasible" for the cotton industry to bear this cost.55 OSHA 
55 In one of their questions presented, petitioners ATMI et al., ask 
whether "the statutory requirement that compliance with an OSHA stand-
ard must be 'economically feasible' can be satisfied merely by the agency's 
conclusion that the standard will not put the affected industry out of 
business." Pet. for Writ of Certiorari of ATMI et al., at 2. However, 
in argument in their brief, petitioners appear to treat this issue primarily 
as a substantial evidence question. See Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., 
at 24-31. They finally summarize their position as follows: 
" ... OSHA must present a responsible prediction, supported by sub-
stantial evidence, of what its standard will cost and what impact it will 
have on such factors as production, employment, competition, and prices. 
And the agPncy must explain in a cogent manner-on the basis of intel-
ligible eriteria-why it concludes that a standard having such an economic 
impact is 'feasible.'" Id, at 35 (footnote omitted). 
As our review of OSHA's economic feasibility determination demon-
strates, OSHA presented a "responsible prediction" of what its Standard 
would cost and its impact on "production, employment, competition, and 
prices.'' The agency concluded that its Standard is feasible because '1com-
plianre with ritl is well within the finanrial capability of the covered 
industries." 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 3. OSHA also found that the indus-
try "will be able to meet the demands for production of cotton products.'' 
Id, at 27378, col. 2. We take these findings to mean, as the Secretary 
suggests, that ''r a lt bottom, the Secretary must [and did] determine that 
the industry will maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness.'' 
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at. 49. See als'J United Steel-
workers of America v. Marshall. No. 79-1048, slip op., at 144, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -, (1980) ("the practical question is whether the standard 
threatens the competitivE' stability of an industry"); Indmtrial Union 
Department v. Hodgson, supra,- U.S. App. D. C., at-, 499 F. 2d, at 
478. This interpretation by the Secretary is certainly consistent with the 
plain meaning of the word "feasible." See Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 31, n. 30 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). Therefore, this case does not present, and we do not deride, 
the question whether a Standard that threatens the long-term profitability 
and competitiveness of an industry is "feasible" within the meaning of 
§6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. §655 (b)(5). 
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.concluded that it was, finding that 11although some marginal 
employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry 
as a whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements 
of the regulation." 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2; see id., at 
27379, col. 3 ("compliance with the standard is well within 
the financial capability of the covered industries"). In 
reaching this conclusion on the Standard's economic impact, 
OSHA made specific findings with respect to employment, 
enerp:y consumption, capital financing availability, and prof-
itability. Id., at 27377-27378. To support its findings, the 
agency relied primarily on RTI's comprehensive investigation 
of the Standard's economic impact. 56 
RTI evaluated the likely economic impact on yhe cotton 
industry and the United States economy of OSHA's original 
proposed standard. an across-the-bof!rd 200 ,..g 1m3 PEL. Ex. 
6- 76. Ct. of App. J. A. 626.57 RTI had estimated a total 
compliance cost of $2.7 billion for a 200 ,..g;m~ PEL,58 and 
56 In rontrnst to the cost estimates prepared by RTI, OSHA did not 
find any major flaws with RTI's study of the economic impact of com-
pliance costs. 
57 RTI specifically ·analyzed the impact of the Standard on the following-
areas in the cotton industry: 
"1) Additional employment requirements. 
"2) Energy consumption. 
"3) Increases in production costs and consequent price increases by 
affected industries. 
"4) Capital requirements and capital finanring problems. 
"5) Compl;'tition ('ffects on profit and market structure. 
"6) Inflationary impact on consumers and U. S. economy. 
"7) Employment impact due to the contraction of output demand." 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. ,J. A. 626. 
RTI a1so examined the economic impact of two other across-the-board 
PELS of 500 ~tgjm8 and 100 ~tg/mR . Ibid. 
58 This cost estimate included $984.4 million for yarn production (open-. 
ing through spinning), $1.3879 billion for winding through weaving / slash-
ing, $292.2 million for cotton ginning, and $32 million for wast(' processing;. 
Ex. Q--7~, Ct, of App. J. A. 737. 
. , .. ~ 
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used this estimate in assessing the economic impact of such 
a standard. /d., at 736-737. As described supra, at 31, n. 
44, OSHA estimated total compliance costs of $656.5 million 
for the final Cotton Dust Standard,09 a Standard less strin-
gent than the across-the-board 200 l-'g/m8 PEL of the pro-
posed standard. Therefore, the agency found that the eco-
nomic impact of its Standa.rd would be "much less severe" 
than that suggested by RTI for a 200 l-'g/m3 PEL estimate 
of $2.7 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2. Nevertheless, it 
is instructive to review RTI's conclusions with respect to the 
economic impact of a $2.7 billion cost estimate. RTI found: 
"Implementation of the proposed [200 l-'g/ m3 ] stand-
ard will require adjustments within the cotton textile 
industry that will take time to work themselves out and 
that may be difficult for many firms. In time, however, 
prices may be expected to rise and markets to adjust so 
that revenues will cover costs. Although the impact on 
any one firm cannot be specified in advance, nothing in 
the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry 
as a whole will be seriously threatened by the impact of 
the proposed standard for control of cotton clust expo-
sure." Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 1380; id., at 3620. 
In reaching this conclusion, RTI analyzed the total and an-
nual economic impact 60 on each of the different sectors of 
the cotton industry. 
For example, in ya.rn production (opening through spin-
5 9 Cotton ginning was the subject of a separate regulntion not at issue 
in this case. 43 Fed . Reg. 27350, col. 1; see 29 CFR § 1910.1046 (1980). 
60 RTI's annual cost of compliance figure contained three components: 
an annualized capital charge, direct operating cost, and energy cost. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 643. The annualized capital charge consisted 
of depreciation, interest, administrative overhead, property tax, and in-
surance. Ibid. Depreciation and interest were computed "by use of a 
capital recovery factor based upon the conrept of capital rent , the value-· 
of which depends on the operating life of the equipment and the market 
interest rate." Ibid . 
79-1429 & 79-1583-0PINION 
AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN 4.1 
ning), RTI found that the total additional capital require-
ment per dollar of industry shipment was 7.8 cents, and that 
the corresponding annual requirement was 1.9 cents. Ex. 6-
76, Ct. of App. J. A. 729. Average price increases necessary 
to maintain pre-standard rates of return on investment were 
estimated to range from 0.22 cents to 6.25 cents per dollar 
of industry sales. 61 Ibid. Even assuming no price increases, 
only one of the six yarn producing operations would experi-
ence a negative rate of return on investment, while the five 
other rates of return would range from 1.4% to 3.9%. · !d., 
at 652.02 RTI estimated the average pre-standard rate of 
return for the yarn producing sector as 4.1 %. Ibid. 
Through an output demand elasticity analysis, RTI deter-
mined that price increases necessitated by the 200 ug/m3 
61 Petitioners' primary criticism of OSHA's reliance on the RTI study 
derives from their disagreement with RTI's assumption that compliance 
ccsts would be passed on to the consumers. Brief for Petitioners ATMI 
et al., at 28--29. This characterization misstates RTI's position. In cal-
culating price increases neressary to maintain pre-standard rates of return, 
RTI "decided to adopt an extreme assumption of zero price demand' 
elasticity in computing post-control price increases" because of difficulties 
in obtaining data necessary to compute elasticities for cotton yarns. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 657. However, RTI carefully tested this 
assumption to determine "how much bias" it would introduce into the 
analysis. Id, at 657-659. RTI concluded that, "unless the true demand 
elasticity for the output of the given sector is substantially greater than 
unity, our impact analysis based on the assumption of zero price elasticity 
of demand would not be invalidated." /d., at 659. Therefore, unless a 
1% increase in price was met with substantially more than a 1% decrease 
in demand, RTI's estimates of the price increases necessary to maintain 
pre-standard rates of return were valid. Since there was no evidence 
suggesting such an effect, RTI proceeded with its assumption. 
In any event, RTI subsequently investigated short-term price elasticities 
of demand for 25 cotton consumer products, finding that 19 of them had 
elasticities less than or equal to unity. !d., at 681. 
62 RTI found higher price increases and lower rates of return when· 
framing its analysis in pounds of cotton yarn produced. See Ex. 6-76, Ct,. 
Qf Apj). J, A .. 654, 729-730, 
. ' 
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standard would result in a 1.68% contraction of cotton yarn 
consumption.'18 ld., at 685; see id., at 680-687. RTI also dis-
cussed the effects of such price increases on interfiber and 
domestic/foreign competition. RTI ob::;erved that "non-price 
faetors have probably dominated" the competition between 
cotton and man-made fibers. !d., at 623; 948-953.114 Noting 
that international trade agreements restricting foreign imports 
of textile products "have tended to smother the effects of a 
small change in the relative prices of domestic versus foreign 
textile products," id., at 622, RTI concluded that such small 
changes have had "very little impact" on domestic industries 
and markets, id., at 961; see id., at 954-961. In order to 
measure the ability of different sized textile companies to 
finance compliance costs, RTI constructed a ratio of capital 
requirements to profit after taxes. RTI found that two of 
03 Petitioner National Cotton Council of American criticizes RTI's use 
of short-term price elasticity coefficients, claiming that this undrrestimates 
long-term demand responses to price increases. Brief for Petitioner 
National Cotton Council of America, at 16-17. However, RTI'~ Dr. Lee, 
who conducted the elasticity analy~i:s, observed that he used two inde-
pendent procedures to compute dPmand contraction, and only one relied 
on short-term price rlasticities. Ct. of App. J. A. 362G-a627. His 
"main prorrdure [was] input output table prorrdures," which produced 
an even >·mallrr drmand contraction estimate than those calculations rely-
ing on the short-term coefli.rients. Ibid. 
64 RTI cited :mch nonprire factors as "re~earch expenditures, J)romo-
tion and advertising, fiber and fabric development, fiber propertiel:l, and 
rare charactrristirs of fabric." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 623. John 
Figh, Cha8e l\.lanhattan hank vice-president, observed that "polyestrr has 
grown at the expense of cotton over the la~t 10 years and I think it has 
11enetrated moHt of the markets it ean penetrate; . . . [T]he majority of 
it, the growth of polyester at the t;xpense of cotton, has been completed.". 
Joint App. 474-475. He noted that some cotton products, such as towels 
and 100% cotton men's shirts, enjoy the support of consumer preferences. 
Ibid. Although RTI cited the energy crisis without detailing its possible 
impact on man-made fibl.'r products, Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . .T. A. 948, 
OSHA observed that changes in petroleum prices, a key ingredient in 
synthetic prodn<'ts, may have important impacts on the competitive· 
balance, see 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 2. 
·. 
. '!,'•• •• 
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the six yarn production operations would have financing diffi-
culties, but that such difficulties decreased as company size 
increased. Id., at 730.65 Finally, impacts on energy costs, 
employment, inflation, and market structure were evaluated. 
See id., at 728-731.66 
Relying on its comprehensive economic evaluation of the 
cotton industry's ability to absorb the $2.7 billion compli-
ance cost of a 200 p.g/m3 PEL standard, RTI concluded that 
"nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile 
industry as a whole will be seriously threatened." Ex. 60, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 1380.67 Therefore, it follows a fortiori that 
65 Two of the six yarn production operations had ratios less than 1, two 
had ratios less than 2, and the remaining two were less than 6. Ex. 6-76, 
Ct. of App. J. A. 665. Chase Manhattan Bank's John Figh agreed with 1 
RTI's assessment that financing the $2.7 billion compliance cost for a 
200 ,ugjm3 PEL standard would be most. difficult for smaller textile com-
panies. Ex. 63, Ct. of App. J. A. 2264-2265. 
66 RTI conducted similar economic impact analyses, although in less 
depth, for the twisting through weaving and waste processing sectors 
of the cotton industry covered by the proposed 200 ,ugjm" PEL standard. 
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 462. RTI found, for example, that price 
increases per dollar of industry sales ranged from .5 cents to 18 cents 
for twisting through weaving operations, and that some of these operations 
would experience "severe" financing difficulties. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. 
J. A. 733-734. To recount in further detail these conclusions would be an 
irrelevant exercise. RTI calculated that a 200 ,ugjm8 standard for weav-
ing/slashing would cost $1.259 billion, id., at 600, and computed the 
economic impact based on that figure. But RTI had also estimated that 
complia.nce co:;ts for a 500 ,ugjm3 PEL would be zero.. Ibid. Since the 
final Cotton Dust Standard sets a 750 ,ugjm" PEL for weaving/slashing, 
further review of RTI's conclusion with respect to its $1.259 billion cost 
is particularly unnecessary. 
67 Petitioners note that, although RTI estimated that compliance with 
the Cotton Dust, Standard would take 8 or more years, OSHA required 
compliance within four years. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29. 
RTI chose an 8-year period primarily because of "problems the control 
industry may have in supplying the required equipment." Joint App. 
415; see id., at 415-416. If this proves to be the case, then presumably 
individual mills will be able to obtain variances from the Standard's 
. ,·
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OSHA's estimated compliance cost of $656.6 million is "eco.., 
nomically feasible." 68 Even if OSHA's estimate were under., 
stated, we are fortified in observing that RTI found that E\. 
standard more than four times as costly was nevertheless eco-
nomically feasible. 
The Court of Appeals found that the agency "explained 
the economic impact it projected for the textile industryt 
and that OSHA has "substantial support in the record for 
its ... findings of economic feasibility for the textile indus-
try." 617 F. 2d, at 662. On the basis of the whole record, 
we cannot conclude that the Court of Appeal's "misappre-
hended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test. 
III 
The final Cotton Dust Standard places heavy reliance on 
the use of respirators to protect employees from exposure to 
cotton dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period 
necessary to install and implement feasible engineering con-
trols.69 One part of the respirator provision requires the 
requirements because of technological infeasibility. See 29 CFR § 1910.-
1043 (e) (1); 29 U.S. C.§ 655 (6). 
68 Perhaps in light of this fact, neither petitioners ATMI et al. nor 
petitioner National Cotton Council of America frame their "economic im-
pact" substantial evidence arguments based on OSHA's estimate of com-
pliance costs. Instead, they adopt as a minimum RTI's $2.7 billion 
'f'stimate for compliance co;;ts with the proposed standard's 200 ~tgjm3 
PEL. Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, at 15-16; 
·Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29. 
69 The final Standard, 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (1), provides: 
"Where the use of repirators is required under this section, the employer 
'shall provide, at no cost to the employee, and assure the use of respirators 
which comply with the requirements of this paragraph (f). Respirators 
shall be used in the following circumstances: 
"(i) During the time periods necessary to install or implement feasible 
•engineering controls and work practice controls; 
"(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which engineering 
; nnd work practice con trois are not feasible; 
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employer to give employees unable to wear a respirator 70 
the opportunity to transfer to another position, if available, 
where the dust level meets the standard's PEL. 29 CFR 
§ 1910.1043 (f) (2)(v). When such a transfer occurs, the em-
ployer must guarantee that the employee suffers no loss of 
earnings or other employment rights or benefits.71 Peti-
tioners do not object to the transfer provision, but challenge 
OSHA's authority under the Act to require employers to 
guarantee employees' wage and employment benefits follow-
ing the transfer. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA 
has such authority. 617 F. 2d, at 675. We conclude that, 
whether or not OSHA has this underlying authority, the 
agency has failed to ma.ke the necessary determination or 
statement of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is 
related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work 
environment. 
Respondents urge several statutory bases for the authority 
exercised here. The cite § 2 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 651, 
which declares that the purpose of the Act is "to assure so 
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation 
safe and healthful working conditions"; § 2 (b)(5), id., at 
controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to or below the per-
missible exposure limit; and 
"(iv) In operations specified under paragraph (g)(1). 
" ( v) Whenever an employee requests a respirator." 
70 An employee may be unable to wear a respirator because of facial 
irritation, severe discomfort, or impaired breathing. 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, 
col. 1 and 2. 
71 The regulation, 29 CFR § 1019.1043 (f) (2) (v) (emphasis added), 
provides: 
"Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear 
any form of respirator, including a power air purifying respirator, the 
employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another position 
which is available or later becomes available having a dust level at or 
below the PEL. The employer shall assure that an employee who is 
transferred due to an inability t"o wear a respirator suffers no loss of earn-
ings or other employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer.'"' 
.. 
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§ 651 (b) ( 5), which suggests achievement of the purpose "by 
developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches 
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems" 1 
§ 6 (b)(5), id., at § 655 (b)(5), which requires the agency t~ 
"set the standard which most adequately assures ... that n~ 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or func-
tional capacity ... "; and § 3 (8), id., at § 652 (8), which 
provides that a standard must require "conditions, or the 
adoption or use of one or more practiCes, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate 
to provide safe or healthful employment." Brief for Re-
spondent Secretary of Labor, at 68. Whatever methods these 
provisions authorize OSHA to apply, it is clear that such 
methods must be justified on the basis of their relation tu 
safety or health. 
Section 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), requires 
that "determinations of the Secretary" must be supported 
by substantial evidence. Section 6 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 655 (e), 
requires the Secretary to include "a statement of the reasons 
for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Reg-
ister." In his "Summary and Explanation of the Standard," 
the Secretary stated: "Each section includes an analysis of 
the record evidence and the policy considerations underlying 
the decisions adopted pertaining to specific provisions of the 
standard." 43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 2. But OSHA never 
explained the wage guarantee provision as an approach de-
signed to contribute to increased health protection. Instead 
the agency stated that the "goal of this provision is to mini-
mize any adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue 
of the inability to wear a respirator." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, 
col. 3. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, respondents in 
their briefs argue that 
"[e]xperience under the Act has shown that employees 
are reluctant to disclose symptoms of disease and tencf 
to minimize work-related health problems for fear ~f 
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being discharged or transferred to a lowel' paying job ... , 
It may reasonably be expected, therefore, that many em-
ployees incapable of using respirators would continue to 
breathe unhealthy air rather than request a transfer, thus 
destroying the utility of the respirator program." Brief 
for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 67; see Brief for 
Respondent Unions, at 51.72 
Whether these arguments have merit, and they very well 
may, 78 thP post-hoc rationalizations of the agency or the par-
ties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate 
for agency action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines 
v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). For Congress gave 
OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and safety, 
and to explain its reasons for its actions. Because the Act in 
no way authorizes OSHA to repair general unfairness to em-
ployees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety 
• 72 Although it citPd no !>pccific detprmination or statement of rea~ons 
proferred by the SPcretary, the Court of Appeal::; was persuaded by this 
:ugumPnt. 617 F. 2d., at 675. 
73 TherP ib evidPnce in the rrcord that might :support uch a detpmina-
tion. Dr. Merchant testified that a medical surveillance prcgram alone 
\Vould not be sufficiPnt for identifying and relocating employPes suffPring 
from byssinosis. Joint App. 440--441. He observed: 
"TherP is reluctance very often among thP employee himself to lea,·p his 
job. I think rlParly some guarantees as to wag2s and opp:>rtunities must 
be an integral purt of any recommendution to relocate somebody and it 
has bPen the experience in roal mining where miners are allowed, u"der 
thr Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, to be tram::fPrrrd, a very 
low proportion of thrse men actually exerci::;e the;r tran:sfer rights. ld., at 
441. 
Howcwr, the rourts will not be expPrted to scrutinize the record to 
uncover and formulatE' a rationale explaining an artion , whf'n the agrncy 
in the first in::;tanrf' ha:; failf'd to articulate ::;uch rationale. See Auto-
motive Parts & Accessories Assn. Y. Boyd, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 407 
F. 2d 330, 338 (1968). 
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goals, we conclude that OSHA acted beyond statutory author ... J 
ity when it issued the wage guarantee regulation/ 
v 
When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act in 1970, it chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring 
employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited 
only by the feasibility of achieving such an environment. 
We must measure the validity of the Secretary's actions 
against the requirements of that Act. For "[t]he· judicial 
function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory 
policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and 
Executive oversight or amendatory legislation." Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, 
slip op., at 2 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring); see Tennessee Val-
ley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185, 187-188, 194-195 
(1978). 
74 In its specific discussion of the transfer/guarantee proviHion, occupy-
ing more than two-thirds of a column in the Federal Register, OSHA 
argued that "[i]t is manifestly unfair that employees who are unable to 
wear respirators suffer ... economic detriment because their employers 
have not yet achieved compliance with the engineering control require-
ments of the standard, but are relying instead on the interim and less 
effective device of respirators." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, col. 2 and 3. The 
agency then stated its judgment that the "protection [the transfer and 
guarantee regulation] affords should greatly increase the success of the 
standard's respiratory protection provisions." ld., at 27387, col. 3. Since 
the Secretary had already presented an unauthorized reason for the gua-
rantee provision, we decline to accept this "boilerplate" statement as a 
sufficient determination and statement of reasons within the meaning of the 
Act. 29 U.S. C.§§ 655 (e), (f). See Synthetic Organic Chemical Manu-
fact·urers Association v. Brennan, 503 F. 2d 1155, 1157, 1160 (CAB 1974), 
cert. denied, 420 U. S. 973 (1975); Industrial Union Department v. 
Hodgson , supra,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 499 F. 2d, at 475-476; Assoc. \ 
Industries of New York State, Inc.''· U.S. Dept. of L'lbor. 4!:17 F. :2d :342, 
354 (CA2 1973); Dry Color Manufacturers' Assn. v. Dept. of Labor, 486 
F. 2d 98, 105-106 (CA3 1973). See also Berger & Riskin, Ecmwmie and 
Technological Frasibili1y in Regulating Toxic Substances Un<.ler the Oc-
tmpational Safety and Health Act, 7 Ecology L. Q. 285, 298-299 (1978). 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is af., 
firmed in all respects except to the extent of its approval of 
the Secretary's application of the wage guarantee provision 
of the Cotton Dust Standard at 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (2) 
(v). To that extent, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is vacated and the case remanded with directions to remand 
to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, 
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55o N Street, S. W. 
Waslungton, D. C. 20024 
June 19, 1981 
PERSONAL 
Dear Gib: 
Lewis III called me this morning to say 
that Mims was concerned by my failure to 
participate in the decision of the cotton dust 
cases, decided this week • 
The cotton dust cases were filed here 
last fall, and were argued January 21. At that 
time, ! .did not know about the lead industry cases 
(Lead Industries Association, et al v. Donovan and 
two other cases) • Indeed these cases did not come 
to the attention of the Justices until sometime in 
May. I then learned that Hunton & Williams was 
counsel for one of the petitioners, the Ethyl 
Corporation. 
When it became apparent that there was 
an overlap of issues, I concluded that I should 
not participate further in the cotton dust cases • 
Thus, although I sat for the argument and had 
participated in the consideration of those cases 
up to that time, I then withdrew and did not take 
part in the final decision. 
I can well understand how you and your 
partners - as well as Mims - may have wondered 
what happened. I am glad to have the opportunity 
to explain it. 
I am the only Justice who came to the 
Court directly from the private practice of law. 
In addition, my firm had an extensive list of 
clients - many of which were my personal clients. 
Thus, I have recusal problems that most Justices 
do not have. Even so, in argued cases, this 





As normally we do not give details as to 
recusals, I write this letter for the confidential 
information of you and your partners. 
With best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
w. Gibson Harris, Esquire 
McGuire, woods & Battle 
Ross Building 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
lfp/ss 
cc: Ms. Mims Powell 
